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Kamal Soleimani 
Islam and Competing Nationalisms: The Kurds and the Turks in the late Ottoman Era is a work, 
which traces how religion was intimately intertwined with nationalism during the crucial period 
of the late nineteenth century in the Modern Middle East. In this approach, I call into question 
the extent to which the principle of secularism and ethnicity serve as the only foundations of the 
modern nation state. Within the context of the late Ottoman Empire, my research foregrounds 
the differences between interpretations of Islam at the center and the myriad understandings of 
Islam adopted by those on the margins. I demonstrate how diverse Muslim communities (Arabs, 
Kurds and Turks) have linked their interpretations of 'authentic' religion to claims of 'ethnic 
superiority' during the process of nation building. I contend that this tension between the 
normative State interpretation of Islam and alternative visions was critical in shaping modern 
nationalism in the Middle East. This is significant for establishing how nationalism can in turn 
affect the range of religious interpretations. My work thus provides a new historically grounded 
theoretical foundation for recent debates on nationalism that have emerged in recent decades. 
My dissertation is based on a close examination of British archival records, Ottoman state 
records, Ottoman journals and other primary sources in Arabic, Kurdish (both Kurmanci and 
Sorani dialects), Persian and modern Turkish -- most of which I obtained during my yearlong 
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What is called nationality ‘milliyet’ is [rooted in] the depth of 
the past, the vast deserts of the present and future. [It is rooted 
in] the Kurdish prodigies’ [voices] like that of the son of Zal, 
Rustam, and of Salah ad-Din Ayyubi’s, gathered as one family 
in a tent on the mountain top…commending you all to turn 
into a single soul who embodies the unity of nation for the 
sake of its protection and happiness… [It is ] with the 
emergence of the national sentiment that [one’s] morality 
evolves. 
- Bediüzzaman Said Kurdi or Nursi1 
 
Islam appeared as a protest against idolatry. And what is 
patriotism but a subtle form of idolatry; a deification of a 
material object. The patriotic songs of various nations will 
bear me out in my calling patriotism a deification of a material 
object. Islam could not tolerate idolatry in any form. It is our 
eternal mission to protest against idolatry in all its forms. 
What was to be demolished by Islam could not be made the 
very principle of its structure as a political community. The 
fact that the Prophet prospered and died in a place not his 





Scholarship on late Ottoman society, including on the Kurds, in general, tends to present 
Muslim history with a certain uniformity. It is only after World War I and with the rise of 
Kemalism that the history of Muslim nationalist thought is treated as a fact in the related 
historiography. The historical disparity among the various “Muslim people of Asia Minor” and 
their assumed “lack of ethnic self-consciousness”3 is presented as an indisputable historical fact 
and the idea that nationalist tendencies among Muslims existed before World War I is 
vehemently rejected. In this discursive construct of the past, the emergence of Turkish 
                                                          
1
 Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, İçtima-I Dersler/ Social Lessons(2009), 189. 
2
 Muhammad Iqbal, Stray Reflections (Iqbal Academy, 1910), 35. 
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 See, Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey(London, New York,: Oxford University Press, 1961). 
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nationalism is equated with the birth of the “modern Turkish state.” The same period is also 
treated as the birth date of Muslim nationalisms in the Middle East.  
The present work deals principally with the question of the relationship between modern 
Islamic thought and nationalism. However, it is more concerned with certain trends in Islamic 
religious thought in the late-Ottoman period than the Muslim world at large. I shall concentrate 
on the possibility that modern Islamic thought and nationalism reciprocally influenced each other 
by mainly investigating the Kurdish and Turkish cases that reflect the historical relationship of 
Islamic thought and ethno-nationalism. I aim to demonstrate the malleability of religious 
interpretation that allows for the smooth ingression of nationalist discourses in religious thought 
and vice versa. 
In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, nationalist discourse was incorporated into newer 
interpretations of Islam. Various interpretations that were put forth by major Islamic religious 
leaders illustrate a new reality.
4
 The present work attends to differences between the 
interpretation of Islam in the core areas of the Ottoman Empire and the understandings of Islam 
adopted by those living in the periphery. Different communities often linked their interpretations 
of ‘authentic’ Islam to claims of ‘ethnic superiority.’ Islam became intimately intertwined with 
nationalism during this crucial period. However, the connection between the two appears in 
different forms and modes. In the late 19
th
 century, the Ottoman state attempted to dictate what 
constituted ‘correct’ Islam and became increasingly skeptical of peripheral Islam(s). Conversely, 
Muslim communities in the periphery viewed the state and centralist tendencies as degenerative 
and morally lax. The case of Sheikh Ubeydullah, which I discuss in chapter six, exemplifies this 
                                                          
4
 Cf. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Um Al-Qura(Cairo: al-Azhar, 1931). Muhammad 'Abduh, Al-Islam Wa Al-
Nasraniyye/ Islam and Christianity (Cairo: al-Manar, 1323/1905); Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri, Tuhfetul Ehbab; 
Mesnewi Şex Ubeydullah  Nehri, ed. Seyid Isalm Duagû(Urmia: Husseini 2000). 
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trend. The propagation of state-sanctioned Islam became increasingly tied to official nationalist 
practices and policies, which were contested and resisted by dominated ethnic communities. 
To explain Ottoman state vision and policies, I employ both newspaper articles from 
Istanbul journals and a wide variety of Ottoman and British archival materials alongside primary 
materials in Arabic, Persian, and Kurdish. I aim to demonstrate the systematic effort by the state 
to Turkify education and restrict the use of non-Turkish languages. In discussing the 
Turkification of the language of instruction during the reign of Abdülhamid II (1876- 1909) I 
make extensive use of Ottoman state records and journals to emphasize that the state had no 
qualms about privileging Turkish and restricting other languages.   
As noted at the outset, generally scholarship on Ottoman history has questioned the 
possibility of the existence of Muslim nationalism prior to World War I. I will later (in Chapter 
3) briefly attend to the problematic nature of those approaches to nationalism in the Empire. 
Though some scholars do see Hamidian rule as a catalyst for the rise of nationalism, I will go a 
step farther and argue that belief in the latency of Turkish nationalism reflects the influence of 
Orientalist scholarship and of the later Kemalist/Republican historiography. Comparing the 
literature produced by the pre-Republican nationalists with that of the later Kemalist/Republican 
nationalists clearly sheds light on discrepancies in the Turkish nationalist reading of the pre-1912 
Ottoman past. Additionally, a more rigorous scrutiny of the state records and Ottoman journals 
problematizes the common conception of Ottoman Turkish nationalism as latent.  
Furthermore, the Ottoman state’s discourse on Islamic identity, unity or the caliphate 
should not be taken at face value, nor should it be viewed as an inclusionary Islamic discourse. 
Firstly, there is an important inconsistency in the ways in which the Ottoman state and elite—
beginning with the Hamidian regime—emphasized both Islamic identity and unity. Secondly, 
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such concepts have been historically interpreted in a variety of ways. The employment of 
common signifiers does not  necessarily nullify their particular or exclusive signification and 
they could be misleading if treated as timeless and isolated from their socio-historical context. 
Therefore, it is essential to put the Ottoman caliphate in its historical context to see how it was 
perceived by non-Turkish Muslims. It is thus not a contradiction to assert that the upswing of 
official Ottoman nationalism and the Hamidian state’s renewed claim to the caliphate were 
concurrent. In fact, it was in the Hamidian era that Ottoman official nationalism significantly 
began to occupy cultural, bureaucratic, and educational space. 
The Ottoman state records show a drastic change in the state’s education and linguistic 
policy after Abdülhamid II’s accession to power in 1876. Ottoman archival documents attest to 
the fact that local government officials allowed for some leeway in mandating Turkish-language 
education in the pre-Hamidian era. However, not long after coming to power, Sultan 
Abdülhamid made Turkish education mandatory throughout the Empire. This reflected both 
centralization and a growing Turkish nationalism. The result was a shrinking of space for the 
cultural and literary production of non-Turkish Muslim groups such as Albanians, Arabs, and 
Kurds. The state’s language-based Turkification policies went hand in hand with its disdainful 
attitude toward peripheral or non-Turkish Islam. Such attitudes toward the peripheral region 
were reproduced and reflected in contemporary Ottoman works by the elite, who saw it as their 
mission to modernize Islam and to civilize the periphery. Their suspicions were more rooted in 
civilizational discourse rather than sectarian differences, as was pointedly illustrated by their 
discussions in Ottoman press.   
It becomes evident that the Ottoman elite’s effort to differentiate themselves from other 
Muslims was informed by their nationalism and ethnic self-perception—as the only ethnic group 
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capable of modernizing ‘the rest.’ The literature of the time evidences their self-glorification as 
the vanguards of change in the Muslim world. The Ottoman elite’s view of the ethnic Other 
became manifestly scornful as they increasingly saw themselves burdened with the mission of 
civilizing the rest. In the mind of the elite, the traditional Sunni-Shi‘i divide would increasingly 
lose its significance. They thus adopted ethnic belonging and an affinity to “civilization” to 
underscore their uniqueness. The rationale given by certain Ottoman intellectuals for opposing 
Iranian participation in a possible Islamic unity exemplifies this trend. The disqualification was 
not based on a rejection of the legitimacy of Shi‘i beliefs. Rather, it was because of Iranian 
“uncivilized-ness” and their hatred for the Turks.5  Such attitudes toward the Other were plainly 
displayed in literary works by iconic figures such as Ahmad Midhat and Şems ad-Din Sami. 
Ahmad Midhat, for instance, insisted that Turks possessed a better command of Islamic zeal than 
Arabs. In his journal, Tercüman-ı Hakikat, Midhat went so far as to claim that the Qur’an itself 
was not an Arabic text but instead was the language of God. This reflected a transformation of 
the idiom of Turkish nationalism whereby Turkish Islam was to be decoupled from Arabic, 
supposedly a “backward Semitic language.”  
  Şems ad-Din Sami, the famous playwright, lexicographer and litterateur, went even 
further, claiming that in comparison to other ethnic communities, Arab contributions to Islam 
were all too negative. In 1870s, Namik Kemal had characterized the role Arabs, in their 
contributions to contemporary Islam thought, as nothing more than their following of their 
Turkish brethren. Compared to Namik Kemal’s remarks, in the previous decade, views expressed 
by intellectuals such as Sami and Midhat represented a rapid shift in the Ottoman elite’s 
perceptions of peripheral communities. This occurrence signified the rise of cultural and official 
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 Tercüman-ı Hakikat. No: 595 ( Jun 7, 1880). 
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Ottoman nationalism and the Ottoman elite’s attitudes toward the peripheral rest and their 
eagerness to dictate who was a civilized Muslim.  
Numerous non-Turkish writers and thinkers also laid out their own criteria for being a 
true Muslim. In fact, it is only in the context of the rise of rival Muslim nationalisms that one can 
make sense of the nationalist utterances by Arab revivalists such as Muhammad ‘Abdu and ‘Abd 
al-Rahman al-Kawakibi. It is against this background that al-Kawakibi asserts that unlike that of 
the other Muslim communities, the blood of the Arabs of the Peninsula remains pure and 
unmixed and they are therefore uniquely well-suited for the leadership of the Muslim world.
6
  
Such emphasis on one’s purity of blood, a tacit claim to the existence of real Quraishis— 
supposedly the rightful owners of the caliphate— signifies the rise and pervasiveness of ethno-
nationalistic politics among Muslims.  
 It becomes clear that in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, nationalist discourse smoothly 
made its way into newer Islamic interpretations. As Ussama Makdisi rightly notes, the Ottoman 
elite seem to have been the pioneers of “derivative nationalism” (as defined by Chatterjee) in the 
Muslim Middle East.
7
 (It is a type of nationalism which, despite its modern characteristics, 
refuses a complete emulation of the West. Rather, it insists on the concurrent preservation and 
re-appropriation of native culture.)
8
 However, the derivative nationalism of the Ottomans did not 
necessarily produce Muslim unity (just as European nationalisms did not produce Christian 
unity). Native or, more precisely, national culture did not seem to have included that of the non-
Turks. Rather, Islamic interpretations became increasingly exclusionary. That is why Ottoman 
                                                          
6
 al-Kawakibi, Um Al-Qura, 196-97. 
7
 Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," The American Historical Review 107, no. 3 (Jun., 2002): 785. 
8
 See, Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse(Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993). 
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Muslim modernizers such as Hamdi Bey believed that their task was “to save Ottoman heritage 
not just  from the West but also from the Oriental peoples of the Ottoman Empire.”9 
   With the progression of time such nationalistic approaches similary influenced the non-
Turkish communities’ interpretations of Islam. Some scattered texts produced by Kurdish elites 
and intellectuals, found in late 19
th
 century Ottoman journals, reveal the existence of similar 
nationalistic tendencies.
10
 The attempt to “narrate” a nation that “is endowed with a past,”11  
became the immediate concern of many Muslim figures. Kurdish intellectuals strove to introduce 
a “civilized Muslim Kurdish nation” with a distinct history almost completely detached from that 
of other Muslims.  
For many Muslim religious figures, whose main function was to lead communal religious 
affairs, it had become fashionable to use nationalistic language and casually redraw Islamic 
boundaries along ethno-nationalistic bonds. Under the increasing influence of nationalism such 
figures’ interpretations of Islam hardly sounded inclusive. Consequently, some prominent 
Muslim figures, as discussed in Part III, would allude to their own differential ethnic 
characteristics rather than emphasizing “non-dissolvable Islamic links.” Nowhere was this 
clearer that in the poetic oeuvre of the Kurdish Naqshbandi Sheikh Ubeydullah (written during 
1878 and1880).   
The Sheikh’s portrayal of the two communities—the Turks and the Kurds — as two 
distinct and rival groups is undeniable. In his poetic work and sporadic letters the “us” versus 
“them” dichotomy is defined in both Islamic and ethno-nationalistic terms. This type of religious 
                                                          
9
 Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," 786.(Emphasis added) 
10
 See Chapter 5. 
11
 I am borrowing Chatterjee’s phrasing. See, Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and 
Postcolonial Histories, Oxford India Paperbacks (Delhi ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 75.   
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thinking, revealing a Muslim ethno-nationalistic consciousness, was prevalent. The most 
renowned Kurdish religious scholars like Bediüzzaman Said Kurdi (or Nursi) saw the religiosity 
of the center as suspicious, contaminated, and inauthentic.
12
 Contrasting it with the Islam in 
Istanbul, Bediüzzaman deemed Kurdish Islam as pure and authentic as “the clean air of the high 
mountains of Kurdistan.” Generally these religious figures’ understanding of Islam contained 
claims to cultural superiority. Thus, the ‘in-group’s’ Islam and religious devotion is the most 
celebrated, while that of the ‘out-group’ is strongly questioned. It is against this background that 
Sheikh Ubeydullah attributes the Kurds’ “superior qualities” (religious and otherwise) to their 
“noble ethnic origin.” This condition illustrates the fusion of religious with ethno-national 
consciousness, which is idealized by Bediüzzaman Nursi when he asserts that whomsoever can 
be said to embody nationalist consciousness “mirrors (ma‘kas) her/his own nation.”13 
I subscribe to Modernist views about nationalism. Nationalism, in the present work, is 
understood as various attempts by which modern communities ground the legitimacy of their 
claim to self-rule and statehood in their very own self-perception and self-description.
14
 
Ethnicity, identity, and glorified national pasts are re-interpreted and reconstituted. It is through 
such re-interpretive processes that nationalist agents also attempt to reform and re-appropriate 
religions. Nationalism here is thus underestood as the collective religious, cultural and linguistic 
attempts and processes through which communities legitimize their claims to self-determination 
and sovereignty.  
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 See Chapter 7. 
13
 Nursi, İçtimaî Dersler/ Social lessons,189. 
14
 See, Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. 
and extended ed.(London ; New York: Verso, 1991); Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism(London ; Thousand Oaks, 




In my study, the nation is not considered either primordial or an essential continuity of 
the pre-modern “ethnie.” Instead it is modern communities’ struggle to legitimate their demands 
for self-rule by way of communal self-differentiation. Such differentiations are understood as the 
foundation of modern nationalism. Ethno-symbolism, as defended and expanded by theorists 
such as Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson, espouses some important elements in modernist 
thought.
15
 Smith’s argument concerning “ethnie,” in which both religious and secular 
intelligentsia take up the project of legitimizing their claims for nationhood is in some ways 
useful for the present work. Smith argues that there exist two types of ethnie. The first is based 
on the myth of origin utilized by elites who advocate for a more centralized state. The second 
sort of ethnie might usefully be described as both “vertical” and “demotic” and is “generated in 
“popular” opposition to an oppressive state.16 The strength of Smith’s argument is the emphasis 
he places on critical roles played by both religious and secular intelligentsia in nationalist 
movements.
17
 It is the second type of ethnie that may be used in some ways to explore the 
connection between nationalism and religion, especially in the Kurdish case. Hutchinson also 
offers similar insights on how nationalists filter the past into the present. If Hutchison’s reading 
is followed, the distinctions between nationalist and revivalist Muslim becomes much fuzzier, 
especially when he declares that 
[R]evivalism faces both ways, recognising that ‘tradition’ must be reconstituted – not 
destroyed – as the basis of political action and, at the same time, that societies must 
innovate. In this way nationalists effect change by mediating between the constituent 
                                                          
15
 Cf. Anthony D. Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism : A Cultural Approach(London ; New York: Routledge, 
2009); John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism : The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish 
Nation State(London ; Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987); Nations as Zones of Conflict(London ; Thousand Oaks, 
Calif.: SAGE, 2005). 
16
 David McCrone, The Sociology of Nationalism: Tomorrow's Ancestors, International Library of Sociology 
(London ; New York: Routledge, 1998)15. 
17
 Cf. Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, Ethnonationalism in Comparative Perspective (Reno: University of 
Nevada Press, 1991). 
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identities of populations rather than by enforcing a vision from above. Moreover, 
although nationalists are able to achieve political hegemony and establish their own 
collective myths of legitimacy, they do so on an already layered past, which retains its 
potentiality for later reactivation.
18
   
The ethno-Symbolist theorists assign a vital importance to the role of the past and its continuity, 
claiming that the era of modern nationalism would not be possible without it. Therefore Smith 
argues that no nation existing today could be without their “navel” in the past.19 However, the 
ethno-symbolism approach is fundamentally problematic. Zubrzycki rightly notes “that there is 
no necessary continuity between ethnies and modern nations, although – and this is key – such 
continuity is retrospectively constructed and reinforced in nationalist discourse and narratives.”20 
The embedded supposition of the continuity of the nation makes the ethno-symbolism 
approach seriously flawed. This is the case since the modern form of conceptualizing the nation 
has no precedent in pre-modern eras. It is true that nationalism generally invokes ethnicity and 
the past. Nationalists claim that the nation is essentially perennial, defending a never-disrupted 
continuity of the nation. Nonetheless, such invocations are more a reconstruction and re-
appropriation of the past necessitated by the present nationalist discourse.
21
 In Gellner’s words, 
“nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural 
wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and most often transforms them radically.”22 Before 
the age of nationalism, ethnicity, and religion have hardly been used as the bases for the 
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 Hutchinson, Nations as Zones of Conflict, 74. 
19
 For an extensive debate over this notion between Anthony Smith and Earnest Gellner see, Atsuko Ichijo and 
Gordana Uzelac, When Is the Nation? : Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism(London ; New York: 
Routledge, 2005). 
20
 Geneviève Zubrzycki, "Religion and Nationalism; a Critical Re – Examination," in The Sociology of Relgion ed. 
Bryan S. Turner(Chichester, West Sussex, U.K. ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 609. 
21
 Abbas Vali, Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, Kurdish Studies Series (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda 
Publishers, 2003), 1-13. 
22
 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 55. 
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legitimacy of what Anderson terms as ‘imagined communities.’23  The community’s self-
perception and imagination as one endowed with the collective right to statehood is modern. In 
the modern era, at least theoretically, certain collective distinctions are perceived as merely self-
evident. This inherent and self-sufficient quality is assumed to engender inalienable political 
rights. In pre-modern eras, different communities may have regularly differentiated themselves 
from their Others. Such differences may have also constituted the basis of their claims to cultural 
or religious superiority. However, this type of collective self-referentiality could not turn into an 
ideological pursuit to make “the political and the national… congruent.”24  
It must also be noted that this study particularly benefits from a synthesized interpretation 
of works by Partha Chatterjee and Michael Billig. I have liberally employed concepts such as 
“derivativeness” and “the paradigmatic nature” of nationalism, since I became convinced that 
these concepts could offer theoretical bases for situating a possible nexus between religion and 
nationalism within socio-historical contexts.
25
  
When Billig defines national identity as “an identity [that] is to be found in the embodied 
habits of social life” and as “habits [that] include those of thinking and using language,”26 
“religion,” whatever its definition, cannot be excluded from this ascription. Religion too can be 
considered as part and parcel of “the habits of social life.” Religious identity can also function as 
one of the “forgotten reminders” of difference – it is a reminder of difference. If, in a 
community, “us” versus “them” originates from religious difference with another, such a 
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 See, Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
24
 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1. 
25
 Cf. Billig, Banal Nationalism. Also, Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative 
Discourse. 
26
 Billig, Banal Nationalism, 8. 
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difference can constitute the distinguishing characteristic of those communities. Moreover, if 
such premises have any basis in reality, then it is sound to infer that: a) any religious utterance 
for demanding certain national rights is nationalistic, and by the same token can be located 
within the modern nationalist paradigm; and likewise, b) whatever other identities an agent may 
possesses (that is, religious or otherwise), such identities do not hinder the declaration of her/his 
“own” national identity. They will rather accommodate and become harmonious with other 
identities. This can be the case at both the individual as well as the collective level. Therefore, if 
a nationalist is religious, s/he may also attempt to either justify his/her nationalism religiously or 
to diminish her/his religious identity. Such an attempt does not have to be out of bad faith, to use 
Sartre’s phrasing,27 since the religious/nationalist agent may very well be blindsided by acting 
within the paradigm. Nationalist paradigms, like any other paradigms, could very well be 
invisible to the agent living or operating within its domains. What Billig identifies as “banal 
nationalism” signifies the pervasiveness and the un-thought aspect of nationalism, such that one 
“always seems to locate nationalism on the periphery.”28 This, in turn, illustrates the non-
reflective aspects of the nationalist’s thoughts due to the impact of the prevailing paradigm.  
 Of course, nationalist beliefs are not always held without self-reflection. Nationalism 
seems to remain effective in rendering the nation-state inevitable or even natural, which makes it 
something that is “taken for granted.” For a religious/nationalist agent, this juncture can become 
reality, at least in two instances. In the first, “religion” becomes the major marker of identity, and 
a religious community demands its own sovereignty to delink itself from its Other – religious or 
otherwise. This may be derived from a lack of common religion or from ethnic and linguistic 
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differences. In recent history, the Irish and the Croats have striven for sovereign states, which 
exemplify this first case. In the second case, a religious agent may downplay her/his common 
religious bond by calling into question the correctness of the ethnic-other’s religious views to 
justify her/his self-differentiation, despite the commonality of religious bonds. Furthermore, 
individuals may decide not to forsake their own religious faith, but may blur common religious 
bonds with their coreligionists, simply by highlighting other markers of their own identity. The 
Kurdish pursuit of a state in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries falls into this second category. 
 Like that of Billing’s, Chatterjee’s works also offers ways of shedding light on the 
intersections of religion and nationalism. While the role of religion in nationalist discourse is not 
Chatterjee’s main focus, he still explains how religion comes to affect the anti-colonial-
nationalist imagination of the nation. In his criticism of Anderson’s claim that nationalism is a 
type of universalist “modular form” originating from Europe, Chatterjee argues that anti-colonial 
nationalism(s) “are posited not on an identity but on a difference with the ‘modular’ forms of the 
national society propagated by the modern West.”29 In Chatterjee’s view, it is a misconception to 
see anti-colonial nationalism as mimicry of the West. Such a misconception, he tells us, stems 
from the fact that nationalism is merely reduced to a political movement.
30
 It is the cultural self-
reliance and rejection of the colonial spiritual culture that is the ground for anti-colonial and 
nationalist self-differentiation. Anti-colonial nationalism acknowledges Western material 
superiority – of the economy, state craft, and science and technology – and yet it insists on 
preserving “the distinctness of one’s spiritual culture.”31  
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 Like Billig, Chatterjee holds that the nation can be imagined in variety of ways. He 
considers the “inner domain of national culture” to be the locus of the national imagination’s 
birth, which takes place as a result of profound transformations within that domain. For 
Chatterjee, the inner domain of national culture is where the nationalist agent’s creativity brings 
forth a project of historical significance. Such creativity unfolds when nationalists attempt “to 
fashion a ‘modern’ national culture that is nevertheless not Western.”32 Fashioning a “modern” 
national culture unveil the existence of myriad possibilities, rather than an historical inevitability. 
Whatever the scope of cultural transformation may be, is it possible to think that it results in a 
complete removal of religion(s) and religiosity?  If “religion” is expurgated from national 
culture, what does the existence of a religious minority and majority entail? What happens to a 
religion which provides a significant resource – perhaps along with other resources – for the 
“inner domain of the nationalist culture”? Is religion transformed like other components of a 
culture? Is it simply excluded with no resistance or no impact on national unity? How much 
“religion,” itself being part and parcel of the socio-cultural, influence nationalist discourse? If it 
does, to what extent does religion contribute to the multiplicity of the “modern”? How do 
religious adherences affect the politico-juridical standing of citizens under the secular nation-
state?
33
 If the womb of the old national culture is capable of delivering many children (or forms 
of imagination), is the birth of a religious one impossible? The above questions are posed in light 
of Chatterjee’s major insight. By illustrating how reinterpretations of the past shape the 




 The Turkish juridical system greatly exemplifies of the influence of religion thought on nationalism. The Turkish 
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on their religious adherences. For instance, the concept of minority legally comes to be understood as a religious 
minority. The national education programs teach Islam in the state-sanctioned schools. Yet, these schools only teach 
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nationalist discourse,  the role of “religion” becomes clear, as a factor within the ensuing power 
distributions and the structures of the nation.  
There is broad agreement over the importance of the past and its reinterpretation for the 
nationalist project among theorists of nationalism - a past in which “religion” is present and 
alive.
34
 If religion had an impact in shaping the nation’s past, its role in informing the nation’s 
present cannot be overlooked. There is a broad consensus among the theorists of nationalism on 
the fact that the cultural past significantly affects the present nationalist discourse. For instance, 
Homi Bhabha’s “narrated nation” is, in a sense, a presently celebrated past in the making. In 
Bhabha’s reading, the nation is both fictional and real. It is fictional since it did not exist as it is 
being narrated, and it is a reality since it is being narrated, functioning, and currently affecting 
our lives. The narrated nation is not what it was but what it is supposed to be. This type of 
narration resembles Chatterjee’s notion of “classization,” by which, as mentioned earlier, he 
means a form of “imagining of the nation [that is] endowed with a past.” In this way, in an effort 
to serve current objectives, nationalist agent utilizes the past in order to filter it into the present.  
A past that many modernist scholars use to assume to be merely “the universe of homo 
religiosus.”35  
The above approaches provide some important theoretical tools for making sense of the 
role religions play in nationalist struggles – anti-colonial and otherwise. It is important to 
(re)emphasize that religion is a component of national culture, and a resource to be utilized. It 
creates clearer boundaries between communities, especially in cases where the religious beliefs 
of the Other differ from those of the nationalists. Religion can be reinterpreted to become a 
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differential factor. It can be salient or neutral. It can also give an edge to the nationalist struggle 
or can be used to neutralize such struggles. This has been true in the case of Muslim relationships 
with Britain in the early decades of the 20
th
 century. The emphasis here is on the interpretability 
and presence of religions in nationalist movements. It is the openness and potential for 
reinterpretation of religions that create the means for nationalism to freely and effortlessly make 
its way into religious thought. Religious reforms, whether undertaken by state or non-state 
agents, are the results of religious reinterpretations and reflect religious adaptation to newer 
cultural and political environments. Reinterpretations – scale and degree notwithstanding – are 
also continual. Thus, if religious reinterpretations take place within the nationalist paradigm, they 
must carry their birthmark. As such, nationalism as the context of religious interpretations and 
reforms forces religious thought to ameliorate or to make it compatible with nationalist thinking. 
           The persistence of the influence of religion does not just serve as a component of national 
cultural baggage inherited from the past. It rather shapes nationalist discourse through the 
composition of the national elite, their degree of religiosity, and their adherence to the religions 
of majority or minority groups. Even if the nationalist state strives to appear neutral to the 
religious composition of the nation, religion finds various vantage points for reappearance as 
national culture goes through transformations. The state, for its creation, requires hegemony and 
consent, and for this consent to become a reality, the nationalist elite will have to consider 
communal desire in its reform agenda. And this points to the limitations of the national state in 
excluding religion. Even the colonial state has recognized such limits to its power. Therefore, it 
has to make exceptions to its “universalist” claims, which in turn provide the ground for the 
possibility of “new forms of the modern state.”36 This is how the nation – both as a community 
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and as a state – can be imagined in various and fragmentary forms. 
             Additionally, laws written, proposed, enacted, and interpreted by human beings with 
their own individuated religious beliefs may provide the opportunity for privatized and 
marginalized religion to exert its force on the greater population in the guise of secular law. This 
is not to say that, in Asad’s words, “religious discourse in the political arena is seen as a disguise 
for political power.”37 The two cannot be effectively separated, not only because the modern 
secular state was built on the framework of religious power and law, but also because 
institutional discourse cannot be separated from the individuals on whom it exerts its power.  
            In reading Chatterjee’s works, one can discern that religion or religions have been filtered 
into Indian nationalist discourse on two levels. According to Chatterjee, the Indian nationalists 
initially tried to downplay their religious differences in the face of colonial presence. As such, 
they attempted to (re)define the national (or “our” religions) by including Islam in the mix, as 
opposed to the religion of the colonial power.
38
 However, in the second phase, as colonial power 
became physically absent, local religious differences once again resurfaced.
39
 This politico-
religious configuration inspires Chatterjee, contra Anderson, to claim that the nation can go 
through an existentially “heterogeneous time.”40 Similarly, Peter van der Veer contends that 
“[e]xcept for those of the Marxist left, Indian dreams of the nation always take religion as one of 
the main aspects of national identity.”41 He also asserts that “an important part of the political 
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discourse of the Congress party depends on the Gandhian legacy, which stands…, in the Hindu 
discursive tradition. This political discourse is not secular… it imagines a common ethnic culture 
of India in terms of religious pluralism.”42  
  Neither nationalism nor religion(s) can be studied in isolation. Religious interpretation, 
as a phenomenon, is just another human interpretation that is affected by its context. Despite the 
elements of continuity in religious thought, such contextual influences transform religious 
interpretation and mark it with the specificity of its more recent contexts. In some ways, the 
Muslim Philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877 –1938) acknowledges that the continuity of 
religious element that owes its very existence to the adaptation to the newer paradigmatic 
requirements. He asserts that “the task before the modern Muslim is, therefore, immense. He has 
to rethink the whole system of Islam without completely breaking with the past.”43 However, 
such a rethinking is not homogeneous and bears the mark of interaction with specific socio-
historical contexts. Hence, religious thought in the era of nationalism must be affected by its 
context as much as it affects the context itself. This dialectic manifests as reciprocity and mutual 
entanglement. In this study, I aim to show the entanglements and reciprocities of nationalism and 
religious thought as it played out in the Ottoman context in the following order.  
In the first chapter, I attempt to demonstrate the nexus between religious thought and 
nationalism. I argue that theorists of nationalism like Gellner and sociologist Liah Greenfeld are 
unpersuasive in their respective claims that the emergence of nationalism reduces religions to 
mere cultural symbols or a private relation between “man and his creator.” I also devote a large 
portion of the chapter to establish that “Islamism” is unable to think in terms of a political system 
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beyond the nation-state. As such, Islamists appears to have internalized the political boundaries 
imposed by nation-state. Such internalization, in turn, affects Islamism’s definition of umma and 
similar ‘universalistic’ concepts. 
In  chapters two, I briefly address the historical debate over the concept of caliphate. I 
argue that crucial Islamic concepts such as caliphate should be understood in their context. The 





 century, caliphate politics should be studied in the context of the rise of nationalism and 
anti-colonialism. The Islamic faith, as commonly claimed, did not become a hindrance to the 
Muslim ethnic self-consciousness. Therefore, in chapter three I question the idea of ‘the latency 
of Turkish nationalism.’ Such claims clearly ignore the Ottoman state’s practice and its official 
nationalism. To back my theoretical discussion in chapter three, I devote a great portion of the 
subsequent chapter to the textual analysis of the Ottoman state records and contemporary 
literature in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century.  
In addition to the theories of nationalism, I make a use of Critical Discourse Analysis 
when I examine these documents.  I employ these documents to reconstruct the contextual 
backgrounds of the constitutional recognition of Turkish as the Ottoman official language. In 
parallel, I use these documents to build on the works of scholars such as Ussama Makdisi and 
Selim Deringil to argue that Ottoman Islam was both exclusionary and universalist. Ottoman 
Islam was exclusionary, as it was becoming increasingly Turkified as the state concentrated on 
the Turkification of the language and the state bureaucracy. Ottoman Islam exhibited universalist 
tendencies in the periphery when the state employed Islam to induce needed loyalty to the center 
for combating colonialism and non-Turkish nationalist developments. Therefore, the idea of 
20 
 
Islamic unity, or Pan-Islam, should be also understood in the context of the Ottoman state and 
the elite’s dual approach to Islam.   
In chapter five, I examine a number of the unexplored writings of Kurdish intellectuals in 
the Ottoman papers of 1880. The late-19
th
 century writings of Kurdish intellectuals provide us 
with a rare window into Kurdish Muslims’ ethno-nationalist consciousness, offering an 
exceptional illustration of their fears and hopes. These writings underscore the Kurdish 
intelligentsia’s efforts to make a case for the primordial existence of their own distinct nation. 
Hence, this chapter functions as a prelude to chapter six’s analysis of Sheikh Ubeydullah of 
Nehri and his revolt in 1880. These particular writings serve as a unique source for 
understanding the political circumstances present during the time of Sheikh Ubeydullah’s revolt. 
To analyze his religio-political nationalism, I mainly devote chapter six to the Sheikh 
own writings. His writings present one of the major sources for understanding the nexus between 
Islam and Kurdish nationalism. It is evident that Ubeydullah eagerly sought an independent 
Kurdish state. The Sheikh’s conception of the state, though, is rather vague. Nonetheless, like 
many modern Islamic revivalists he viewed the state as the main agent for change. Such an 
approach is one of the major characteristics differentiating the modern from the pre-modern and 
medieval forms of Islamic revivalism. In general, modern Muslim revivalist movements are 
engrossed with obtaining the state control. This obsession with the state signifies the degree in 
which Muslims have been influenced by the modern nationalist socio-political context.   
Typically, the state also had a central place in Sheikh Ubeydullah’s religio-political 
project. The Sheikh ascribed great value to the role of the state in educating the populace. He did 
not view the state only as a garantor of security and law and order. The Sheikh perceived the 
state as the instrument for the spread of his Kurdish-centered “true Islam.” Yet, his interest in 
21 
 
reviving and spreading his true Islam only occurred within the limited ethnic and geographic 
boundaries of Kurdistan. The Sheikh’s emphasis on defining Islam within the ethno-national 
boundaries of his imagined Islamic state showcases the rise of nationalism in Muslim societies 
and the way it shaped Muslim political thought. 
Chapter seven sheds light on some aspects of the debates over Caliphate among the 
Kurds and the Turks in the first quarter of the 20th century. In chapter seven, I analyze the pre-
exile writings of Said Nursi. His writing exemplifies the reciprocal influence of Islamic thought 
and nationalism. Such reciprocity becomes evident in Nursi’s thought when he admits that 
nationalism is a reality in the Muslim world. He even praises nationalism and perceives what he 
calls “positive nationalism,” as uplifting and a force for the refinement of human character and 
morality. To Nursi, so called positive nationalism raises the true spirit of collective bonds present 
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Nationalism and Religious Thought 
How to tell tale of “Din”45 and fatherland. 
No words I have on this difficult stand. 
So do not take ill if due to your ways, 





The nation [is one of the] most untheorized concepts of the 
modern world. 




No religion is true. A religion can only become true, 
i.e. correspond to that which it gives itself out to be and is 





We wanted to serve Iran by employing Islam and Mr. 






National consciousness, as a “type” of consciousness, is articulated through the use of a 
unique idiom that was absent in pre-national political language. Life within the nationalist 
paradigm imposes a modern mode of conceiving of the nation and that enables nationalist agents 
to employ nationalist idiom to explain their affiliation with the nation.
50
 In modern religious 
thinking the nation is perceived to be self-evident: since the religious agent operates within the 
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paradigm of nationalism, s/he is inclined to unite her/his religious idiom with that of nationalism. 
Therefore, the paradigm imposes its requirements on religious interpretations, and it functions as 
a context for rethinking religion and affects its scopes and limits.  
Such paradigmatic requirements should be thought of as a major ground for the fusion of 
religions and nationalism. Thusly modern Muslims’ eagerness to find examples of democratic 
forms of governing in the golden age of Islam should be seen in this context. In turn, their 
attempts to reconstruct the religious past may be more inclined to make the past compatible with 
the modern state rather than an enthusiasm for the re-introduction of ‘the original Islam.’51 
Therefore, in many instances neither nationalism nor religion(s) can be studied in isolation.  
A significant body of scholarship on nationalism tends to overlook the complex and 
reciprocal relationship
52
 between religion and nationalism – informing us that if there has been 
any direct relationship between the two, it has been ephemeral. In fact, if any connection 
between religion and nationalism is to be made, it is only when religions are no longer 
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 It has to be at “[t]he point of transition [of religion] from faith to culture.”54 Major 
theorists of nationalism have tended to assume that modern nationalism is secular by necessity. 
Gellner informs us that “In the industrialized world high cultures prevail, but they need a state 
not a church, and they need a state each. That is one way of summing up the emergence of the 
nationalist age.”55 Resistance to assertions that nationalist discourses could spill into the domains 
of religious thought (or vice-versa) stems from the belief that religion was/is unable to penetrate 
the confines of modern nationalism.  
According to Steven Grosby, however, the relation between the two “is historically and 
conceptually complicated. Religion has both been integral to, and at odds with, the formation and 
continuation of nations. An understanding of this relation requires a determination of how it 
varies from one religion to another, thereby entailing a comparative analysis.”56 In many 
nationalist movements, some sort of religious influence or presence is palpable, yet the functions 
and the role of religion or religious interpretation in shaping nationalist discourse (or vice versa) 
seldom becomes the focus of scholarly investigations of nationalist movements. This is partly 
because of the prevalence of some type of teleological approach to the emergence of nationalism 
that is usually viewed as an “order creating system” that replaced or supplanted religion from the 
public space.  In such approaches to religion, the presence of nationalism is generally equated 
with the absence of religion, and in many instances such an “absenting” of religion derives from 
a definition of religion that removes it from socio-historical contexts. If some scholars, such as 
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Talal Asad and Katherine Ewing, have questioned “transhistorical” and “translocal” definitions 
of religion,
57
 the dominant trend in nationalism studies relies on static conceptions of religion 
and defines nationalism as being entirely bereft of religiosity. In the words of Clifford Greetz, 
“the religious perspective…is everywhere the same.”58 Thus, the dominant (and separate) 
approaches to the study of religion(s) and nationalism make an examination of the reciprocal 
influences of nationalism and religion an elusive one. As Asad, in his criticism of Geertz, has 
shown us, at the core of the dominant modern conceptualization of religion lies “privatized” 
Christianity.
59
    
 This being said, an examination of the existing literature on religion and on nationalism 
suggests that the ways in which modern Christianity has come to be understood affects the 
conceptualization of the relationship between religion and nationalism. Scholarship positing 
secularism’s Western, Christian origins, for example, implies that nationalism (like secularism) 
erupted from the salvational bosom of a dying (or already dead) Christianity.
60
 Furthermore, the 
“nationalist ethos” is linked directly to Protestantism.61 At the same time, the “academic study of 
religion has drawn heavily on the Western traditions of scholarship. This tradition has been 
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 Liah Greenfeld writes: 
[S]ecularization must be traced back to that last heroic burst of religious energy in the history of 
Christianity. At the same time, this momentous trend, which was to reduce the central issue of 
man’s eternal salvation to the relatively inconsequential and marginal sphere of lifestyle, did not 
result solely or even chiefly from inner religious developments and schisms. Its independent 
sources were the same ones that nourished nascent nationalism, and nationalism itself eventually 
emerged as the most important factor in its growth (emphasis added).  
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influenced by the post-Enlightenment separation between church and state.”62 Ostensibly, the 
modern understanding of Western Christianity informs the general conception of religion, 
wherein religion is understood as a timeless phenomenon with no cultural context. Within the 




 century discipline of comparative 
religion, wherein religiosity was seen as wholly “other,” while personal religious experience 
constituted “the essence of ‘religion’ and the common core of the world’s ‘religions.’”63 Such 
approaches to the study of religion(s) increasingly “privileged what was supposedly the higher 
mystical essence of the religion in question over and above the exoteric tradition.”64 However, 
this hierarchy is beginning to teeter, with recent scholarship’s questioning of the unitary and 
universalist understanding of religion(s).    
This emergent body of critical scholarship locates the genesis of previous literature 
within the context of European identity formation,
65
 where the effort to define religion with 
universalistic traits is understood as manifesting a European self-perception “as a prototype of 
unity amidst plurality, Europe as a marker for the subject position of universal history.”66 And 
the idea of religion that emerges from this European sense of self is marked (perhaps indelibly) 
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by Christianity. As Gil Anidjar puts it, Christianity granted this name to others, “the name [that] 
it had only ever attributed to itself, the very name of ‘religion.’”67  
In addition to its Eurocentric origin, the concept of religion is exclusionary and 
epistemically disruptive, such that the application of the term in studies of non-European 
religions has had a long-lasting impact on how they came to be understood. As Chin Hong 
Chung argues, the introduction of the term has resulted in a cognitive disruption in the study of 
non-European religions, and with the straitjacket of “religion” in place, one can refer to 
“religion-before religion and religion-after religion.”68  
In the 20
th
 century, celebrated Western scholars of religion – such as Mircea Eliade and 
Huston Smith – defined “religion” as possessing an immutable essence. In many instances it was 
asserted that the universe of religious people remains static, with oral traditions being given the 
attribute of immutability. Religions were conceived as existing along a continuum, with 
“advanced” religions with sacred texts being contrasted with religions devoid of scriptures, and 
being considered to be closer to nature – that is, they were more attuned to natural religion. 
Speaking to this effect, Smith contends that “[if his] God does not evolve, neither, it 
seems, does homo religiosus, not in any important respect.”69 In more recent scholarship on 
religion, such hierarchical views are being reversed. It is now argued that the traditional 
hermeneutic, with its fixation on unchanging texts, is flawed. The major inadequacy of standard 
hermeneutics, argues Sylvia Marcos, derives from its fixed views and its inability to capture the 
                                                          
67
 Gil Anidjar, Semites : Race, Religion, Literature, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2008), 46. 
68
 Cf. Chin Hong Chung, "Religion-before Religion and Religion-after Religion: Reshuffled Rest," in Religion and 
Society: An Agenda for the 21st Century, ed. Gerrie ter Haar and Yoshio Tsuruoka(Leiden ; Boston: Brill,, 2007). 
69




constant change in “oral traditions.”70 The “methods used for systematizing religions rooted in 
the sacred’ and other texts will lead to distortions and misinterpretations,”71 since “oral traditions 
are essentially fluid, flexible and malleable.”72 
 
Eurocentric Context of the Study of Nationalism 
It is not an overstatement to say that the modern understanding of religion – vis-à-vis 
Christianity, as described above – has fundamentally affected studies of nationalism. Greenfeld’s 
assertion “that the nature of nationalism is never determined by the religious context in which it 
may grow”73 is a pertinent illustration, as she essentially characterizes religion as mere 
“exigencies of salvation and the responsibility [of man] before his Creator that each man must 
meet alone.”74 Beyond that, we are told, all “the tensions in men’s social relations, which agitate 
peculiarly social passions and anxieties – status-anxiety, the concern for dignity, recognition, and 
one’s place among others – all that, in short, [is what] religion dismisses as vanity.” 75  Such 
remarks, perhaps unintentionally, deny the possibility of multiple interpretations of the Christian 
Bible or of the idea of salvation. Further, religion becomes utterly ineffective and irrelevant to 
modern life, if the social “secular consciousness” is considered as the only determining factor in 
human relations. The assumed universality of religion and its immutable essence relegates it to a 
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place outside of modern daily life. And it does this because of the assumption that the emergence 
of homo nationalis
76
 signifies the disappearance of religious since nationalism, Greenfeld calims, 
is “the framework of the modern social consciousness,”77 or, in Taylor’s words, it is a product of 
“a purely secular time”78 – whatever that might mean. Religion is thus understood as a 
phenomenon that contains, attracts, and includes only itself within itself, and is necessarily 
devoid of any element of nationalist thought, as it would contaminate it. 
If “religion” takes the form of nationalist expression, some prominent theorists tell us that 
it is no longer “religion” – it loses its essence. Gellner, for instance, claims that in the age of 
nationalism religion fades into culture, which he claims to be “undefinable.”79 However, 
Gellner’s apparent refusal to define culture should not be interpreted as his belief in the further 
continuity of religion in a different form. He informs us that nationalists want “a state not a 
church.” Additionally, Gellner lacks consistency in his refusal.  For instance, he refers to culture 
as a “language” – albeit “provisionally”80 – as a “shared system of communication and norms.”   
Also, he considers culture as the distinguishing characteristic of the nation, when he stresses that 
“[t]wo men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture.”  So, the compelling 
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question is, if we ignore religion, what is it exactly that differentiates Irish nationalist Protestants 
from Catholics or Croats from Serbs?
81
    
Greenfeld contends that those who invoke religion within the confines of their nationalist 
discourse are ignorant to the otherworldly nature of “true religion.” It is for this reason that she 
claims that “Most religious nationalisms are ethnic nationalisms” and they “are more often than 
not predicated on the essential worldliness of this complex of sentiments[of the fusion of 
nationalism and religion], expressed most tellingly in the inattention to, even ignorance, and 
disregard of basic religious (transcendental) principles.”82  And so, yet again, religion is 
presented as being an ahistorical phenomenon that is uniform in its functionality – even though, 
to point to another seemingly obvious fact, religions have served, and continue to serve, all sorts 
of functions. 
Among such functions, religions have provided the conditions of difference. It is thus a 
considerable generalization to assert, as John Coakley does, that “Unlike nationalism, the great 
religions are universalistic and transethnic.” 83 Such a reading decontextualizes religious 
meanings and religious interpretations. Greenfeld is correct in claiming that injustice, 
humiliation, and discrimination are the immediate causes for the saliency of religious identities 
and for self-differentiation from a religious or ethnic Other. Given that an identity-based reading 
of religion constitutes a ground for the religious reading to be entangled in and influenced by its 
socio-political context such a reading necessitates re-interpretations. That is why that to assume 
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religion is limited to the exigency of the relation between individual human being and God is 
problematic and this in and of itself is only one kind of modern interpretation of religion. In a 
similar vein, as René Rémond notes, “For a people who have been conquered, oppressed, 
subjected to foreign domination, especially if their faith is different from that of their oppressor, 
religion ensures the preservation of their personality and encourages awareness of their 
identity.”84 From a slightly different angle, but still within the domain of “difference,” religious 
differences can also be a significant factor for collective conversions to or rejections of emerging 
religious beliefs. For, the very claim to absolute “truth,” which is not uncommon in religious 
discourses, provides sufficient ground for engendering difference.  
To characterize modern consciousness or “imagination” as secular in its essence is to be 
as fundamentalist as it is to be essentialist – as such a characterization is to foreground a 
perspective and a history of a certain (Christian) religion that cannot be universalized. Moreover, 
such a take on religion-secularism itself a particular interpretation of religion, represents a 
categorical denial of the existence of more than one type of modern interpretation of religion.   
In her reading of the premodern world, Greenfeld – who understands religion according 
to a particular religious prism – claims that, since religion was the only framework of social 
consciousness in medieval Europe, language never became a condition for difference.
85
 
However, it must be pointed out that the absence of a “linguistic identity” does not prove that 
religion was the only framework of social consciousness. The seemingly apolitical approach to 
language in Medieval Europe could, quite conceivably, have been related to the ways in which 
language was regarded, rather than religion. It also does not of necessity nullify the effect of 
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ethnic bonds or strong blood ties in pre-modern times. Muslims, for instance, in a short period of 
time after the Prophet Muhammad’s death, became involved in one of the longest disputes 
between Arabs and non-Arabs in Muslim history. In these intra-Muslim contestations, in-group 
claims to ethnic and language superiority of Arabs over non-Arabs (or vice versa), were reflected 
even in the supposedly sacrosanct realms of Islamic jurisprudence and hadith literature (sayings 
attributed to the Prophet).
 86
     
 Religions, either in their fusion with the general culture or in their existence as mere 
“sacred texts,” have never produced a universally uniform interpretation. Therefore, even if by 
religions only meant canonical religious texts, they would nevertheless continually affect and be 
affected by their context. That is why the decision to ignore a possible (and continual) reciprocal 
impact between religion and nationalism cannot be tenable. Like nationalism, religions are 
understood and adopted by living agents who are in constant interaction with their socio-political 
environment.  
Similar to ethnicity and nationalism, “religion can [and must] be understood as a mode of 
social organization, a way of framing, channeling, and organizing social relations.”87 It is 
perhaps for this reason that, in spite of her ardent declaration that “the nature of a nationalism is 
never determined by the religious context,” Greenfeld admits that nationalism is “often affected 
by [the religious] context to an extent, it is ultimately defined by the constraints of the immediate 
situations faced by the social groups actively involved in the formation of the national 
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consciousness.”88 And it is with this ultimately definitive aspect of nationalism that we must 
agree – for it always already includes religion. 
 
Sacralization, Religion and Nationalism 
 “The sacred” is not synonymous with “religion,”89 nor is nationalism simply 
encapsulated within “the profane.” Any thesis which requires a stark distinction between the 
sacred and the profane is unable to account for the complex relation between nationalism and 
religion. The assertion that the profane and sacred are mutually exclusive is the root of the 
problem, and one that gives rise to paradoxes. For instance, Greenfeld, a theorist who engages in 
this distinction, exemplifies such unresolvable paradoxes. She states that “[n]ationalism is an 
essentially secular form of consciousness, one that, indeed, sacralizes the secular.”90 As indicated 
above, Greenfeld concedes that as a result of religious agents’ participation in the nationalist 
enterprise, religion to some extent influences nationalism. In turn, one is propelled to ask 
whether the religious agent loses her/his religious consciousness as s/he attains nationalist 
consciousness. Greenfeld asserts that nationalism, as a secular consciousness, is able to sacralize 
the secular. These remarks are worthy of attention for two reasons: First, despite the assumed 
immobility and clarity of the boundaries between the sacred the secular, nationalism (read “the 
secular” here) is still endowed with a “religious” or sacred power – that is, it has the ability to 
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sacralize. In her words, nationalism makes “the sacred emanate from the mundane.”91 If this is 
the case, it shows “how nationalism can take on the mantle of religion even in the most 
consciously modern of nation-states.”92 Thus, it validates a contention that considers nationalism 
a modern religion or an “iconography pervading the public and private sphere” 93 
(notwithstanding such views’ inherent inadequacies and contradictions). Basically, the 
implication is that nationalism “is a religion – if not indeed the religion – of modern times.”94  
Secondly, staying with Greenfeld’s remarks that nationalism sacralizes the secular: At 
least in one type of post-Enlightenment perspective religion is perceived as nothing more than 
the beliefs and practices that revolve around the sacred. In the words of Durkheim, religion is “a 
unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things,
95
 that is to say, things set apart 
and forbidden.”96 Durkheim expands his definition by describing religion as “beliefs and 
practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to 
them.”97 Thus, to define religion as “a unified system of beliefs” that sets apart sacred things 
could just as easily be applied to nationalism. The nation could also be a “sacred” thing that is set 
apart; for, in keeping with Durkheim’s definition of “religion,” the nation contains bonds that 
unite a community. The protection of the nation, as the source of values, engenders rituals and 
prohibitions through, what Billig calls, the daily flagging. This daily flagging or ‘narration’ that 
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takes place banally recreates the nation daily. In this way its transcendental aspect is reasserted 
and becomes symbolic. And the nation’s ‘origin’ is linked to its goal: statehood and its 
continuity.  
 A national community may also be considered a moral community. It can be so because it 
imposes all types of “shalls” and “shall nots” on those who become affiliated under its banner. 
When an American calls an act “un-American,” the act is considered unpatriotic and in turn 
unethical. A patriot is expected and obliged to act otherwise. An un-American act is not 
necessarily illegal, but it is certainly immoral from the American nationalist perspective. Like 
other ethical obligations, nationalist or patriotic obligations appear to supersede the law and 
juridical boundaries. Nationalist obligations connote sacrifice and selflessness when the laws fall 
short, that is held to be based on a social contract. Of course, this would be all there is to the 
nation, even if we ignore Hegel when he asserts that “the state rests on the ethical sentiment, and 
that on the religious.’’98 
However, despite its wide acceptance, Durkheim’s definition of religion remains rather 
vague. It is unable to separate any other sets of beliefs that sacralize things from the ‘generic 
religion.’ It is also unable to define what is sacred, since there exists no universal understanding 
of the sacred. Based on Durkheim’s definition of religion, nationalism that “sacralizes the 
secular” or “any set of beliefs that focuses on the [arbitrarily designated] sacred, is a religion.”99 
Such a definition cannot distinguish homo nationalis from homo religiosus, which, supposedly, 
“always believes that there is…the sacred, which transcends this world but manifests itself in this 
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world, thereby sanctifying it and making it real.” 100 Not to mention the embedded assumption 
that “the secular” is self-evident, as whatever is non-religious.    
It must be emphasized that religious views regarding the forbidden or the permissible, are 
in constant flux. Even smaller religious denominations within the larger sets of religions are 
unable to keep their boundaries intact. The conception of the sacred is similarly time bound and 
contextual. What is sacred at one point in history could be profane in another. What might be 
sacred for one denomination could be profane for another. “The sacred is simply what is deemed 
sacred by any group” 101 For Twelver Shi‘i Muslims, the tombs of their Imams are among the 
holiest sites of Islam. To Salafi Muslims, however, the same sites are manifestly “idols,” the 
embodiment of the utmost profanity and the only unforgivable sin.
102
 Thus, the scopes and limits 
of secular objects and subjects are open to interpretation. Within these interpretations, there are 
constant shrinkages and expansions. Some religious interpretations might not leave any room for 
distinctions between the two. For instance, a Muslim could claim that “In Islam the spiritual and 
the temporal are not two distinct domains, and the nature of an act, however secular in its 
import, is determined by the attitude of mind with which the agent does it.” 103 Hence, it is one’s 
“attitude of mind” or the intent of the agent that determines what may be considered sacred or 
secular.  
At the same time, there is no reason to believe that every religion will subscribe to the 
sacred-profane binary. Sacred and profane binaries occur in marked variability, but they can also 
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be entirely absent. For instance, in the case of pantheism the entire universe is considered to be 
synonymous with “God” or the “Supreme Principle.” Hence, no distinctions between the sacred 
and profane occur. In fact, the arbitrariness or the indeterminablity of the secular and the sacred 
divide seems scandalously obvious. The sacred and the profane (or the secular) can be one and 
the same. The “soul” itself exemplifies one instance of an indiscriminable coexistence of the 
sacred and the profane in a religious text, such as the Qur’an. It has been described as follows: 
“The soul and Him who created it. And its inspirations to its evil and its good.”104  
For some Buddhists, “religion doesn’t require God.”105 Thus, if the “absence of a 
personal Creator-God is atheism, Buddhism is atheistic.”106 For a religious person, whose 
religion lacks God, the conception of the sacred is in no way commensurable with that of one 
who believes religion is essentially an otherworldly enterprise. This concern is quite prevalent in 
Confucianism. “Whenever he was questioned about other-worldly matters, Confucius drew the 
focus back to human beings.” 107 What about death and meeting the Creator, and so forth? 
Confucius would reply, “‘you do not understand even life. How can you understand death?’ In 
short: one world at a time.”108  
The instability of the sacred and the profane is reflected even in modern law. Many 
aspects of modern laws, especially with respect to marriage (for example, monogamy and 
polygamy), reflect substantial religious input. If it were not for their religious roots, some of 
these laws would not make much sense. This is why, despite his assumption about the inherent 
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non-religiosity of the modern, Eliade could not deny “that a drastically nonreligious experience 
of the whole of life is seldom found in the pure state, even in the most secularized societies.” 109  
Furthermore, and quite significantly, religious agents are also conscious of the instability 
present in the boundaries of their religions. As Talal Asad recounts, “[t]he medieval Church was 
always clear about why there was a continuous need to distinguish knowledge from falsehood 
(religion from what sought to subvert it), as well as the sacred from the profane (religion from 
what was outside it).”110 Similarly, in Islamic history there have been frequent attempts to ‘purify 
Islam’ from the constant incursions from the socio-historical context. Such efforts often were 
concurrent strive to make religious thought more applicable and attuned to the newer contexts. If 
one were to make use of such terms, if only to illustrate the instability of such binaries, the 
Qur’an itself is understood by Muslims to have ‘desacralized’ things that were ‘sacred’ at some 
point, and ‘sacralized’ those things that were not at another. It did so as it abrogated (manasukh) 
some previous provisions, and declared their annulment with the introduction of newer ones 
(nasikh).  
Muslims scholars— notwithstanding their divergences—have historically devised a 
number of theoretical tools which allow for the constancy of revival (ihya’), renewal (tajdid), 
and the reinterpretation or re-adjudication (ijtihad) of religious thought—all of which, in one 
way or another, problematizes the assumed stability of religious meaning. Ijtihad, for instance, is 
indicative of the unavailability of the precedent (in its juridical sense), or the lack of prior and 
pertinent interpretation. Ijtihad is seen to be a continuous interpretive attempt to make the 
‘original’ meaning(s) applicable to newer contexts. In other words, it offers newer readings of 
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nas (canonical texts), to make them functional and relevant to their newer cultural and socio-
historical environments. Tajdid, however, is an interpretive challenge that aims at the revival of 
the ‘original or primal’ meaning—a  meaning that is lost due to the constant interpretive 
departures and deviations from the ‘original.’111  
In a sense, these concepts are complementary, even though, tajdid is less general and less 
frequent when compared with ijtihad. Nonetheless, their existence testifies to Muslims’ 
inadvertent admission of the mutating nature of religious meaning. It also illustrates their 
cognizance of the constant changes that occur between ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ spaces. 
Thus, such instabilities not only make the constancy of the assumed boundary between the 
sacred and profane untenable, they also show that religious agents are aware of the extent and 
unpredictability of religious meanings.  
Setting aside the problematic nature of efforts at arbitrary universalization, such attempts 
could practically confuse religion and nationalism, rather than explain them. As some scholars 
have noted, there is a constant “process of sacralization,”112 by which it is claimed that “the 
secular becomes sacred or other new forms of the sacred appear.’”113 If both religion and 
nationalism are “a set of beliefs” that sacralize and profanize, what is the difference between 
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them? If nationalism is capable of sacralization (read ‘irrationalization’), then how does it 
replace religion for its supposed ‘irrational’ and ‘premodern’ essence?114  
Nationalism, then, itself becomes both ‘religious’ and ‘irrational,’ and espouses elements 
of what Eliade assumes to belong to “the primitive and oriental cultures;”115 and because the 
sacred, we are told, “is the prime obstacle” to the freedom of modern man, it requires a God.116 It 
is said that man “will not be truly free until he has killed the last god.” 117 Also, “the most 
striking trait of premodern, pre-rational visions,” contends Gellner, was, of course, “the co-
existence within them of multiple, not properly united, but hierarchically related sub-worlds, and 
the existence of special privileged facts, sacralized and exempt from ordinary treatment.”118 
Hence, nationalism as a modern phenomenon is supposed to be one manifestation of the 
disappearance of ‘the sacred.” Jeffery K. Hadden summarizes this teleological process as: 
Once the world was filled with the sacred—in thought, practice, and institutional form. 
After the Reformation and the Renaissance, the forces of modernization swept across the 
globe and secularization, a corollary historical process, loosened the dominance of the 




The secular is no longer secular if it sacralizes and possesses what it supposed to inherently 
lacking. It loses all attributes of the secular. Hence, how can nationalism replace religion if it is 
itself religious and secular all at once? Moreover, how can nationalism only exist within the 
realm of the secular even if it functions like Buddhism, as an ‘atheistic’ religion?  
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Such confusions stem from perceiving either religion or nationalism as phenomena with 
universal essences, in which the latter is presumed to supplant the first all too naturally, where   
nationalism is seen to emerge with the demise or evaporation of religion. “Mainstream 
scholarship on nations and nationalism often points out that the emergence and rise of 
nationalism as an ideology is linked to the general trend of the secularization of society. [S]ome 
scholars have concluded that religion’s demise is responsible for the extent of nationalism’s 
success.”120 Such views ignore the possibility of local interpretations of both religion and 
nationalism, and instead emphasize socio-historical contexts and the “derivative”121 nature of a 
‘local’ (that is, non-Western) nationalism. In other words, “the functional equivalence of 
nationalism and religion is dubiously premised upon a historical narrative of the secularization of 
the West.”122 Therefore, it is assumed that modernity and related phenomena everywhere have a 
standard and similar impact on all religions. Peter Berger speaks to this reality when he declares 
that “[t]he big mistake, which I shared with everyone who worked in this area in the 1950s and 
60s, was to believe that modernity necessarily leads to a decline in religion.”123 So, the very 
expression of “the resurgence or the return of religion” signifies the dismay of witnessing the 
resurrection of religion by those who prematurely declared its death. 
 
Modern Islamic Political Thought, “Islamism” and Nationalism 
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Islamic revivalism, notwithstanding its diverse historical forms, has generally possessed 
antithetical attitudes towards contemporary conceptualizations of Islam. Critiquing contemporary 
Muslims for their assumed distance from ‘the original Islam’ has constituted the core of Islamic 
revivalist claims. Such claims unintentionally validate the fact that religious interpretations are 
part of human endeavors that are always relative and contextual. Revivalist interpretations are 
not an exception to this rule. Nevertheless, modern forms of revivalism or “Islamism” claim that 
the original message, in its pure sense, is restorable. Hence, the claim to an exclusive access to 
the original meaning is embedded in Islamism.
124
 Even the term fundamentalism—
notwithstanding its essentialist and pejorative identification—ironically takes the claim of 
returning to the original understanding of “the fundamentals” seriously. Overall, such approaches 
indicate the subtlety and pervasiveness of the belief in the non-contextual nature of religion(s). 
Historically, religions have always been understood or interpreted in a variety of ways. 
The claim of different ethnic groups to being favored by God or being His chosen people, is only 
one amongst a multitude of ways of interpreting religion. Islamic religious thought is not an 
exception to this rule.  Therefore, it is justified to claim that “[t]here are as many Islams as there 
are situations that sustain it.”125 Talal Asad is right to contend that religion cannot be defined 
universally and “we [should] focus instead on how our subjects define religion.”126 However, it 
is hard to agree with Asad when he claims that “although Islamism has virtually always 
succeeded Arab nationalism in the contemporary history of the Middle East, and addressed itself 
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directly to the nation-state, it should not be regarded as a form of nationalism.”127 While Asad is 
correct in claiming that Islamism is not secular,
128
 his inadvertent suggestion that “nationalism is 
essentially secular” is problematic.129  
Asad partly bases his argument on his own definition of the term umma, whose revival is 
assumed to be the ultimate goal of Islamism.
130
 For Asad, the way in which the umma is 
conceived differentiates Islamism from a nationalist trend such as Arabism. Asad argues that 
Arabism imagines the umma as the Arab umma (al-‘Arabiyye)—a political community. He also 
states that this imagined political community is distinct from a “theologically defined space 
enabling Muslims to practice the disciplines of din in the world,”131 in the Medieval era.  Asad’s 
reading, however, overlooks the historical impact of Arab nationalism and the nationalist 
tendencies present in the Arabo-Islamic revivalist reinterpretation of umma.  It is true that 
Islamism has connections to “the tradition.” The tradition, however, to borrow Katherine 
Ewing’s phrasing, has passed through “the gaze of modernity.”132 In a way, it is justifiable to 
describe revivalist groups as those demanding “reinterpretation of the present through a 
reevaluation and recreation of the past that it fits within the modern context.”133 Hence, the 
modern context in which these connections are made to “the tradition,” should not go 
unattended.     
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More importantly, ethnic self-differentiation has been largely embedded in Muslim Arab 
revivalism. Historically, Arab revivalist trends have perceived non-Arab Muslims as one of these 
causes for “decadence” or “degeneration” (inhitat) of Islam.134 The non-Arab role in Islam is 
mostly explained in negative terms. The ethnic overtone of such explanations is evident as they 
attempt to tie the “impurity” of non-Arab Islamic comprehension to their ethnic character and to 
their history. For example, Muhammad ‘Abduh, the renowned Arab-Islamic revivalist had no 
qualms in stating that “since the Turks were late converts, they remained unable to grasp the 
spirit of Islam.”135 He wrote that the Ottoman Turks’ rule “polluted the purity (khulus) of Arabic 
languages, which in turn led to discord and sectarianism amongst Muslims.”136  
In ‘Abduh’s mind, there is an organic tie between the Arabic language and Islam. The 
“degeneration” of the first, for ‘Abduh, caused “the decline” of the second. In his 1902 work, al-
Islam wa al-Nasraniyye, ‘Abduh also claimed that “Islam [originally] was a religion of the 
Arabs.” However, an Abbasid Caliph’s decision “to create a foreign (ajnabi) army comprised of 
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Turks, Dailamites and other [non-Arab] people… alienated – or made foreign –Islam… 
transforming it into a non-Arab (‘ajami) [religion].”137 ‘Abduh was not the only person to hold 
such views. Similar remarks are often made by other iconic revivalist figures, including Rashid 
Rida and Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi.
138
  Even Hassan al-Banna (1906 – 1949), the founder of 
Muslim Brotherhood, states that “we are not denying that the various nations have their own 
distinct qualities and particular moral characters…. We believe that in these respects Arabism 
possesses the fullest and most abundant share...”139 
 Asad also admits that umma can mean “a people.”140 However, the term has more to it 
than what Asad calls “the sense of ‘a people’—‘a community’ in the Qur’an.”141 In the Qur’an, 
while the Muslim community is regarded as an umma, so is Ibrahim – a single human being also 
considered an umma.
 142




 and of Christians
145
 
(as opposed to their respective communities at large), are also designated by the term umma. The 
Qur’an sometimes uses the term to describe a religious tradition,146 and sometimes for a 
community consisting of the deniers as well as the endorsers of a newly introduced divine 
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 An initial stage of the life of humanity, supposedly a collective homogeneity, is also 
described as a unified umma (umma wahida).
148
  
 The intent in enumerating the above examples is to indicate that umma could be 
conceived in various ways.  More importantly, the definition of umma by the revivalists does not 
seem to be very different from the one put forth by Arab nationalists. It must be noted here that 
the redefinition of umma was heavily informed by the Muslim anti-colonial struggle in the late 
19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries – a struggle that shaped modern Muslim self-perception and enabled 
the revivalists to perceive the entire Muslim world as a unified politico-religious community vis-
à-vis the colonial West, with its ties to Christendom. In addition, Muslim Arabs’ exclusive, and 
inherently ethno-religious, claim to the caliphate increased the chance of imagining umma in 
ethnic and political terms.
149
 
In fact, Muslim revivalist writings, such as that of al-Kawakibi, exemplify the 
inseparability of Arab nationalist and Islamist claims to the caliphate in the late 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 centuries. Al-Kawakibi claimed that all Muslims will fall behind an Arab caliph as in the 
beginning of Islam. For him, this was true because he believed that “of all ethnic groups, Arabs 
are the most qualified (ansab) to be viewed as [the authentic] source of the religion (marja‘an fi 
al-dini), and as providing the role model (qudwa) for all Muslims.”150 The ethnic perception of 
umma becomes abundantly clear in al-Kawakibi’s writings when he classifies Muslims as ethnic 
umam (plural).
151
 So, he declares that “no Muslim umma (umam al-Islamiya), is as eager in 






 For more on this see, chapter three. 
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preserving its own independence and freedom as the Arabs of the Peninsula….”152 al-Kawakibi 
claims that Arabic is not only the first language (khusus) of one third of the world’s Muslim 
population, it is also their common (‘umum) and richest language.153 In defense of Arabs’ 
exclusive right to the caliphate, al-Kawakibi enumerates various “superior” Arab national traits, 
and contends that they were “the first umma to follow the principle of consultation.”154 
Furthermore, Arabs, he stresses, are “the best guided umma in observing al-ishtrakiya155 
(egalitarianism)…”156 and “the most eager umma in honoring their pacts....”157 
 The discourse of the caliphate in the rest of the Sunni world was mostly informed by the 
colonial presence, and therefore generated degrees of solidarity with the Ottomans. However, the 
caliphate remained an exclusionary concept for Arabs.
158
 Thus, in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
centuries, the invocation of concepts such as umma and khilafa among Arabs had a much greater 
bearing on ethnicity than it did in the rest of Sunni world. Such an approach to the revival of the 
institution, under the leadership of an Arab caliphate, could shed some light on the mixed 
reactions against European colonialism on the part of people such as ‘Abduh, Qasim Amin, and 
even Rashid Rida and the Wahhabis. Fearing that it could undermine their own claim – even 
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when they sided with the Ottomans against European colonialism – both nationalist and 
revivalist Arabs remained reluctant to ascribe any legitimacy to the Ottoman caliphate.
159
   
It is true that in medieval times Muslims did not imagine their community at large as a 
political community,
160
 perhaps because it took only a few decades following the death of the 
Prophet for Muslims to fall under two rival political rules – one centered in Medina and the other 
in Damascus. This was the beginning of a never-ending Muslim disunity – a disunity which in 
the ensuing centuries gained newer dimensions, and in greater scales. More importantly, Muslim 
discord came to be interpreted differently by those who were part of the experience. Even 
ahadith (plural; singular: hadith, the Prophet’s sayings) were fabricated, and disagreements 





 were disparate in nature, ranging from denial of the overall 
necessity of the state to the legitimation of concurrent rival political domains within the 
community at large. The majority of Sunnis had readily accepted the hadith that categorically 
negates the legitimacy of any state coming after the first four caliphs (the so called Khulfah al-
Rashidun, or the “Rightly Guided Caliphs”).163  Thereafter, according to the same hadith, the 
Muslim community will be ruled over by usurping or unjust (‘adud)164 kings.165  
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It cannot be emphasized enough that the ideas of reviving the umma and the true khilafa 
coincides with the rise of nationalism and anti-colonialism in the Muslim world, which in turn 
reveals the shared historical context of Arab nationalism and Islamic revivalism. In the last two 
centuries, Islamic revivalism has been one way in which modern Muslims have formulated their 
concerns. Of course, the diversity in Islamic revivalism itself has been informed by different 
types of ethno-nationalism, geography, and other contextual factors. From early on, Islamic 
revivalism has concerned itself with a strong and authentic Islamic governance, especially in the 
face of colonial threat. However, this has not generally prevented a blithe insertion of 
nationalism into Islamic revivalist discourse.  
 In the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, Arabs more than other Muslims “ethnicized” the 
discourse of the caliphate.  It is worth noting, however, that throughout the Muslim world the 
idea of the caliphate was becoming increasingly imbued with nationalism. The abolishment of 
the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 uncovered this common tendency among Muslims.  While 
different Muslim groups have tried to keep a nostalgic-sounding caliphate discourse alive, they 
have also simultaneously prioritized their own national boundaries for any possibility of an 
Islamic caliphate.
166
 Such a nationalistic prioritization resulted in the very first conference for the 
revival of the caliphate in 1926. In the conference, “each participating delegation wanted to make 
its own ruler caliph... Abdülhamid, the last true Ottoman caliph to freely exercise its 
prerogatives, politicized it beyond the permissible.”167 Thus, the establishment of the caliphate is 
not essentially universalistic. It should be kept in mind that even if it is perceived as the 
                                                          
166
 For the question that how nationalism might fit in Caliphate movement among the Muslims in South Asia see  
Adeeb Khalid, "Pan-Islamism in Practice: The Rhetoric of Muslim Unity and Its Uses," in Late Ottoman Society: 
The Intellectual Legacy, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga(London ; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005). 
167
 Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam : Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late 
Ottoman State, Studies in Middle Eastern History (Boston, MA: Brill, 2001), 257. 
50 
 
embodiment of a true Islamic state, Islamist groups imagine the creation of a possible caliphate 
within their current and local national space. It is important to bear in mind that whether such 
groups are labeled as fundamentalist or Islamist, they have also internalized the boundaries of the 
nation-state. 
Islamists’ operation within the confines of the nation-state and their strategic goal to 
control the state structure forces them to deal with nationalism at various levels. Of course, 
Islamism is not nationalism, if nationalism is perceived as essentially secular.  However, if 
nationalism can be derivative, as argued by Partha Chatterjee, and if it is susceptible to taking 
various forms in order to incorporate local cultural mores, its connection with nationalism is 
more complex.  
Islamist attempts to work through the nation-state are in and of themselves grounds for 
the fusion of religion and politics, which is informed by “national interest.” Also, the modern 
state has neither entirely removed religion from the public space nor has it expurgated it from 
politics. Nor is the nation-state indifferent or neutral toward religions. The modern nation-state 
constantly manages, rethinks, redefines, and selectively incorporates or discards aspects of 
religion. The state’s treatment of religion(s), however, takes place within the confines of a legal 
regime (that of secularism), and therefore the state’s reinterpretation of religion is legally 
binding. The scale of religious presence and the degree of its utterances notwithstanding, both 
Islamist and non-Islamist states adopt similar strategies in their management of religions. The 
state generally, be it Islamist or nationalist, monopolizes religious interpretation. This is carried 
out by either ignoring or outright penalizing non-state actors’ interpretations of religion.  The 
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 Saudi Arabia, and Turkey
170
 in the last three decades provides 
us with ample evidence of this.  
 Islamism reinterprets Islam and operates through the confines of the paradigm of 
nationalism. The impact of such paradigmatic requirements on religious thinking must not be 
taken lightly. If Islamism remains, as has been the case so far, incapable of rethinking the nation-
state – as the “ideal type” of modern governing system – it is none other than another hostage of 
what Billig astutely calls “banal nationalism.” Banal nationalism can be conceived as being an 
inadvertent endorsement and glorification of the nation-state. In other words, the nation-state is 
“taken for granted.” Whatever the Islamists’ motives may be in their engagement of modern 
politics is a secondary question. What is at issue here is the inseparability of the Islamists’ 
vision(s) of the political from that of other types of homo nationalis. As with other modes of 
modern thought, in Islamism the boundaries of the state similarly coincide with that of the 
nation. An Islamist is content with her/his legal and national “de-affiliation” or “delinking” from 
the rest of the “umma” of Islam. 
The normalcy of such contentions is modern and nationalistic. If such a description is 
correct, then Islamists are neither living in a different universe nor imagining or advocating a 
way of life that could be situated outside the confines of the modern nation-state. For Islamists, 
as citizens, the acceptance of the national boundaries does not seem to constitute a dilemma. 
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That is why Persian Shi‘i Muslims in Iran proudly made it a constitutional requirement for their 
president to be, among other things, an Iranian born citizen and a Shi‘i with Iranian ancestry 
(Irani al-asl).
171
  Such a reality signifies that an Islamist ought to be considered a “homo 
nationalis” just like his/ her Christian or Jewish counterparts. After all, in Balibar’s words, “the 
‘external frontier of the state’ has to become ‘the internal frontier’” of the citizen,172  as 
necessitated by the sheer fact of life within the nationalist paradigm.  
As indicated earlier, Islamists are content with the nation-states’ boundaries. Generally, 
except for some rhetoric about the role of colonialism in imposing current geographic 
boundaries, there is no significant Islamist literature indicating that the internalization of the 
national boundaries may constitute a problem to Muslim religious devotion. The blithe 
endorsement of the existing ethno-national boundaries and repeated nationalist utterances 
showcases this reality.
173
 What needs to be emphasized here is that a Muslim, be s/he 
traditionalist or Islamist, will not necessarily see her/himself as irreligious when s/he internalizes 
the boundaries of the nation-state. Such individuals do not imagine themselves as being part of a 
community of the faithful torn apart by the unwanted ethno-national frontiers.
174
 
 The past few decades have offered Islamists the control of state power. This opportunity 
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has provided, in a few cases, the potential to demonstrate an alternative to the nation-state. 
However, Islamism not only has not presented any alternative forms of governing; it has been 
manifestly incapable of showing any fundamental difference in modern modes of governance. 
For instance, while Islamists in power have attempted to make the laws of the nation more 
religious, they have exhibited an utter failure even to overcome the limitations put in place by the 
dominant ethnic groups within their national context. For example, the Iranian regime or the pro-
Islamist Turkish government not only function respectively as a Persian or Turkish state, but 
they also remain inherently intolerant to political, cultural and linguistic representation of the 
ethnic Other. 
When in power, Islamists, in many ways reproduces conservative nationalist politics and 
policies. Nonetheless, despite their universalist religious and anti-Western slogans, the political 
stances of Islamists are nationalistic. Like any other nation-state, the foreign policy of Islamist 
states is determined by what is usually defined as the “national interest.” For instance, both the 
Iranian regime and Arab Islamist groups have maintained contradictory stances over many 
catastrophic issues, which have been informed by their regional politics rather than greater 
Islamic bonds. For example, the massacre of members of The Muslim Brotherhood and 
defenseless civilians in Hama
175
 did not reduce friendly relations between Iran and Syria; rather, 
it strengthened them. The genocidal wars in the Balkans and outright Russian support for 
Slobodan Milošević regime in 1990s did not induce any Iranian criticism of Russian foreign 
policy. Neither did China’s violent repression of its Muslim population become significant 
                                                          
175
 The Hama massacre occurred in February 1982, when the Syrian Army under the orders of the country's 
president, Hafez al-Assad, conducted a scorched earth operation against the town. 
54 
 
enough to receive any coverage by state media in Iran.
176
 When it comes to the Muslims outside 
their own national boundaries, these states either remain indifferent or address such issues in 
relation to the banal requirements of their own national interests. 
The basic point is that the overall Muslim understanding of their religion is as affected by 
their attempts to control the modern state as it is by nationalism. The attempt here is not to 
accuse Islamists of lacking sincerity. What is at issue is to point out that they too have 
internalized the nation-state as the “ideal type.” It is only in this context that one could possibly 
make sense of Hassan al-Banna’s statement when he utters that “if they mean by ‘patriotism’ to 
reinforce the bonds which unite individuals within a given country, and to show them a way of 
utilizing this reinforcement for their best interests, then we are also in agreement with them on 
this. For Islam regards this as a necessary religious duty….”177  
 To regard patriotism as an Islamic duty in and of itself signifies a great degree of the 
fusion between Arab nationalism and Islamism in the reconstruction of the modern Islamic 
thought.  Perhaps even more significant is the unintended adaptation of modern ways of 
describing the nation by the likes of al-Banna, for it indicates that “Islamists” too embrace 
national identity. The degree of influence that nationalism had on Islamists such as al-Banna can 
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be understood when his views are compared with that of Iqbal’s.178 Iqbal contends that “the 
feeling of patriotism which the national idea evokes, is a kind of deification of a material object, 
diametrically opposed to the essence of Islam which appears as a protest against all the subtle 
and coarse forms of idolatry.”179 
In summation, national identity is a particular way of referencing or imagining one’s 
nation. “To have a national identity,” in the words of Billig, “is to possess ways of talking about 
nationhood.”180 To have ways of talking about nationhood is a modern phenomenon. As 
indicated in the outset, the modern religious agent is also inclined to perceive the nation as a self-
evident phenomenon; since the religious agent operates within the paradigm of modern 
nationalism, s/he tends to unite her/his religious consciousness with that of nationalism. As such, 
the paradigm of nationalism shapes her/his modes of religious interpretations, and it works as a 
context for rethinking religion and in some ways delimits her/his thoughts. 
It is important to note that the modern conception of the state in the Muslim world 
coincides with the emergence of the religious reform movements and other enormous socio-
political changes. The prevalence of religious reform and the emergence of modern forms of 




 centuries is more than a mere coincidence. In the 
third decade of the 19
th
 century, the Ottoman state embarked on an epoch-making project, which 
indicates an epistemic shift in the statesmen’s approach to Islam, state, and society. The Sultan 
took apart the old army, which had strong ties with the old religious establishment. He created a 
new army that, unlike the previous one, was a part of the state, not a parallel force to it. He 
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attempted to centralize the religious establishment in order to manage it and turn it into a state 
apparatus. It was then that for the first time the highest religious post in Sunni religion, Sheikh al-
Islam, entered the cabinet as an appointee by the Sultan. Moreover, the state adopted a new 
policy toward the periphery as it attempted to eliminate local powers and ethnic differences. It is 
also in this era that the state felt the need to educate it is subjects in “the sublime language of the 
state,” 181 in places as far as its North African domains. These transformations in the state’s 
policy and its administrative culture coincide with various religious reforms in different domains 
of the Empire.  
The point is that the state began to rethink Islam and the religious establishment, just as it began 
to rethink itself and its relation with the periphery. Therefore, given these enormous shifts in the 
Ottoman state and its approach to Islam in the 19
th
 century, both official Ottoman nationalism 
and Kurdish nationalism (addressed in the following chapters) must be examined in a different 
light. Moreover, rather than considering concepts such as caliphate, umma, and Sunni-ness as 
givens, they should be treated as empty signifiers. They must be studied in their socio-cultural 
contexts, rather than as abstract concepts that generate the same religious loyalty and sentiment 
regardless of time, place and culture. 
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The Politics of the Khilafa, Old and New 
 
  In this chapter I shall briefly attend to some aspects of the historical debates surrounding 
the concept of the khilafa, or the caliphate. I shall touch upon some approaches to the caliphate 
in pre-Ottoman and Ottoman times, in order to illustrate the heterogeneous nature of its 
conceptualization among Sunni Muslim thinkers. The political discourse surrounding the 
khilafa deserves some attention, as I make repeated references to the caliphate both as a concept 
and institution throughout this work. Also, there is a prevalent generalization about Muslims’ 
approaches to the khilafa in Ottoman studies in general and Kurdish studies in particular. Under 
this narrow conception, the khilafa is typically understood as a religious concept or as institution 
that has been little affected by socio-political change. It is not rare to come across works in 
which the author claims that for their reliance “on the Qur’an, the Sunnis believe that every 
Muslim should pay allegiance to the head of the Muslim community, the Caliph or Imam.”182 
Such a degree of generalization is problematic. In this chapter, by way of attending to various 
historical examples, I will demonstrate that despite some element of continuity, the interpretation 
of the concept of caliphate has been constantly affected by different socio-historical contexts. 
 Moreover, due to the aforementioned assumption that the caliphate generated universal 
Muslim obedience, many scholars have overlooked the connection between the debates over 
caliphate and rising Muslim communities’ nationalist sentiments in the late 19th and early 20th 
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century. Still, it should be noted that this study is not a chronological account of the history of 
caliphate. It provides but a few snapshots of long and ever-changing historical debates on several 
key questions: How did the caliphate emerge? How did the rise of non-Arab claimants to the 
institution affect the reinterpretation of the qualifications of the caliph? How did similar 
processes of reinterpretation help the nationalist imaginations of Muslim communities to figure 
into the debate over the caliphate in the late 19th and early 20th centuries? 
 
The Emergence of the Caliphate (632) and Ensuing Debates 
The events after the Prophet Mohammad’s death demonstrate that he had not instructed 
his followers about how the community should be led. Therefore, the emergence of the caliphate, 
as a form of leadership, can be considered as an accident in Muslim history. As a defense against 
their theological rivals, Sunni Muslim historiography and some parts of their theological 
literature, declared that this institution was a kind of natural outgrowth of the dogma.
183
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However, the same literature is too contradictory to validate dominant Sunni Muslims’ own claim 
in this regard. Montgomery Watt is right in asserting that khilafa as a system of governing is not 
rooted in the Quran.
184
 The term khilafa in the Qur’an rather than a reference to a governing 
system seems to indicate generational successions in human history that call for a deeper human 
contemplation and thinking. Such calls to take heed of those changes have even inspired some 
Muslim scholars to make use of the term partly as a proof of their belief in the compatibility of 
the Qur’anic narrative of creation with the theory of evolution.185 
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Both Shi’is and Sunnis have presented a variety of contradictory traditions attributed to 
Muhammad, describing the ruler(s) of the community after him. Major historical sources, 
including that of Ibn Hisham’s, the first major Muslim historiographer, show that the community 
was in complete confusion in the aftermath of his death, in 632. The initial reactions of 
prominent figures like ‘Umar, the second caliph, was a categorical denial of the possibility of the 
Prophet’s death.186 In addition, there were a number of claimants to the leadership of the 
community: al-Muhajiroon (those who migrated from Mecca to Median with or followed the 
Prophet of Islam in 622 CE) and the al-Ansar (Helpers from Medina) and others who remained 
discontented, even after the first caliph’s selection. Ali, the fourth Successor, and some of his 
associates, for instance, were among the discontented. Also, there were the people of apostasy 
(ahl ar-riddah), whose refusal to give zakat (religious tax) and to accept Abu Bakr’s authority 
ended only after they were crushed by force.
187
 
In some ways, the above-mentioned event had a lasting impacts on Sunni political 
thought.
188
 It was from that time onward that death was legislated as the proper punishment for 
apostasy. These events also became the embryonic stage for the later Sunni and Shi’i differences, 
the most important of which was whether or not the caliph had to be a Quraishi.
189
 ‘Umar noted 
Abu Bakr's Quraishi-ness along with his other qualities for leadership, which solidified 
Quraishis’ supremacy in the eyes of Muslims for centuries to come. The Quraishi lineage became 
a significant issue for the challenger of non-Arab claimants of the caliphate, and in the age of 
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nationalism Arab nationalists utilized it to serve their cause. 
             Whether or not Abu Bakr and ‘Umar personally believed in the supremacy of the 
Quraish, they were farsighted enough to predict that the Quraish would have not accepted the 
rule of a ruler who was not from Quraish.
190
 “Abu Bakr, in a speech made at the Thaqifa, the 
place for the first grand meeting after the Prophet’s death, clearly gave expression to this view 
and said: ‘The people of Arabia will not acquiesce in this as long as the Quraish lived.’”191 Upon 
his death, ‘Umar refused to appoint his successor and famously said, “if Salim, the freed slave 
(Mawla) of Hudhayfa, was alive, I would have appointed him as my successor.”192 This evinces 
both Prophet Muhammad's lack of involvement in the creation of the newly established 
institution after his death as well as the significance of Quraishi tribal lineage in its 
establishment. Even contemporary ‘Islamist’ scholars such Abul ’Ala Maududy or Sayyid Qutb 
acknowledge that the first four caliphs, who later gained the title of Rashidun, rightly guided, had 
major juridical, political and administrative differences.
193
 Nothing shows their obvious 
differences better than the fact that Ali, the fourth caliph, had no problem in appointing Walis and 
commanders who had participated in the assassination of the third caliph, i.e. Othman. This issue 
was one of the causes for his war with ‘Aysha, Muhammad’s wife.194 Still, the dominant Sunni 
have generally remembered the era of Rashidun as the golden age. The title Rashidun itself 
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signifies their unique moral and political position in the later Sunni religious imagination, which 
distinguishes them from the rest of Muslim rulers and leaders in the entire Islamic history. Yet, 
Othman, the third caliph, was assassinated by a group of rioters. Among the rioters, was one of 
the sons of Abu Bakr, the third caliph. Strict Muslim groups such as the Kharijites not only 
questioned the fourth caliph’s qualification for leadership, but were also among the first groups 
to question Quraishi lineage as a legitimate prerequisite to lead the community of faithful.
195
 
Thereafter, the issue of the caliphate becomes much messier. 
 Looking for a unified view about the issues of caliphate and universal Muslim obedience 
to givwn caliph seems to be a futile attempt. Neither Muslims nor Muslim scholars seem to have 
had consensus on these issues. Their views sometimes might reflect a personal relation with the 
ruler or the general and independent juridico-political thoughts which with that they identify. For 
example, Abu Hanifa (699-767), who is known as one of the greatest Sunni jurists and the head 
of the Hanifite School, throughout his life kept his distance from the Palace. Once he was 
summoned to declare his view about the Abbasid caliphate, he tells the Caliph that he was 
brought to the Palace to legitimize the de facto power of the establishment. Abu Hanifa 
contended that it was the Caliph’s duty to seek the ‘ulama’s views prior and not after his 
accession to power. He asserted that the Caliph knew well that no caliphate would be legitimate 
without the consensus of the Muslim community and their scholars beforehand.
196
 However, his 
most celebrated pupil, Abu Yusuf, was appointed as Qazi al-Quzat (chief justice) by the same 
dynasty. Unlike his master, Abu Yusuf declared that the rulers came to power according to God’s 
will and their subjects were the herds whose shepherd was only responsible before God alone.
197
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          With the emergence of the Mu’tazilites, the issue of the caliphate gained a different 
dimension and they preferred anyone to a Quraishi ruler since, they believed, it would be much 
easier to oust an unjust non-Quraishi ruler than the other way around.
198
 Al-Mawardi’s (991-
1058) well-known book on governance, al-Ahkam al-sultaniyya, reflects the opposite side of the 
debate. It was an era in which Quraishi-Arabs’ exclusive right to rule was challenged. The palace 
also had become one of the battlegrounds of this fight. 
  Describing the lineage-based politics of the time, Ahmad Amin cites ample examples of 
these thoughts and beliefs in the superiority of one blood lineage over another which had 
infiltrated almost every branch of knowledge from Hadith to Fiqh and from poetry to Adab.
199
 It 
was against this context that al-Mawardi put forward his famous statement, in the 
aforementioned book, which could be considered as a well-known treatise in defense of the 
exclusive right of Arabs to govern by claiming that the Quraishis were the only group qualified 
for caliphate. Al-Mawardi formulated a certain approach that would become one of the persistent 
positions among the Sunni for the centuries to come. Al-Mawardi attempts to utilize the first four 
decades of Rashidun rule as a juridico-theological foundation and as the only legitimate 
precedent for the Muslim community to choose their leaders. To al-Mawardi, a caliph is a 
successor of the Prophet, and Shar‘i precepts necessitate his selection. He states: 
 [The caliph’s] functions are political as well as religious: to maintain orthodoxy, execute 
legal decisions, protect the frontiers of Islam... He must possess certain qualifications, 
physical, intellectual, and spiritual, as well as the extraneous qualification of belonging to 
the same tribe of Muhammad, that of Quraish, and he must be designated for his office by 
someone else either by choice of the leaders of the community, those who bind and 
loose’, or by choice of the previous caliph. Once chosen, the people owe him 
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It should be emphasized that this idea never went unchallenged. A number of prominent 
contemporaneous scholars like Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar (d.1025) and Abii Bakr al-Asamm (d. 975) 
and others are known for rejecting the idea of “the obligatory character of the state” itself, let 
alone its nature or form. They contended that “if the affairs of the community were based on 
fairness and justice, there remained hardly any need for the state.”201 They declared it was up to 
the community if they wanted to choose a leader for themselves. Some went even a step further 
and asserted that the task of choosing a leader, imam, requires the consensus of the entire 
community and therefore any selection of leadership at times of turbulence is void (which could 
entail questioning of the selection of the very first Rashidun Caliph). This was the case since, 
they argued, at such times the attainment of universal consensus becomes impossible.
202
 These 
discussions were taking place between the Arabs and mawali (freed-people).
203
 Non- Arab ethnic 
tendencies were generally known as Shu‘ubiyya (non-Arab Muslim reactions to the privileged 
status of Arabs)204 that took hold among different groups with strong anti-Arab sentiments to 
anti-Islamic ones. The exclusive governing right of the Muslim Arabs was strongly questioned 
and the non-Arabs were quick to claim that unlike the Arabs, they had “a rich history of 
statesmanship.”205 
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 The crucial point to be made here is as follows: the debate over the aliphate like many 
other debates reflects Muslims' disparate views about governance in their contemporary socio-
political concerns, which were widely divergent in different stages of Muslim history. It would 
be simplistic to believe that all Muslims were unified over an immutable political concept and 
that their views with regard to governance and caliphate remained entirely intact, 
notwithstanding the passage of time and the change of place. It is clear that if al-Mawardi’s 
views reflected some aspects of the long and ever-changing debates over these issues, so were 
those of Ibn Taymiyya's (1263–1328), al-Ghazali’s (1058-1111) and other celebrated Muslim 
thinkers. Observing that more than one ruler already ruled the Muslims in his time, Ibn Taymiyya 
did not have much of a problem with a multiplicity of ruling centers among Muslims. He was 
content with any form of government, be it a kingdom or caliphate, as long as shari'a was 
implemented,
206
 while for some of his predecessors such as al-Ghazali, establishing order in 
society held central importance. Whether the ruler was a caliph or a king, just or unjust, these 
were all secondary issues to the establishment of the order itself. According to al-Ghazali, to 
prevent disoder one even has to obey an unjust ruler.
207
 
Theological roots of the late Ottoman Caliphate 
 
 Having glanced at some of the sketches of early debates over the caliphate it is necessary 
to take a brief look at the Ottoman in 16
th
 century as the first non-Arab claimants of the 
caliphate. This is particularly significant considering that Abdülhamid II based his reinvigorated 
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caliphate claim on the same theological reasoning that was put forward by the famous Ottoman 
statesman Luṭfī Paşa in the 16th century.208 
 A cursory look at the  16
th
 century Ottoman history, when they began to calim caliphate,  
indicates that the previous debates could not be settled easily. As shown below, Luṭfī Paşa’s 
(1488 – 1564 ) booklet on caliphate209 clearly illustrate that justifying the ruler’s legitimacy was 
becoming even more problematic.  
 In the 16
th
 century, after conquering the Arab heartlands and expanding his empire 
enormously, Selim I (d. 1520) took the title of the Caliph of Islam, becoming the first Ottoman 
sultan to do so. At the same time, he gained the title of “Khâdim al-Haramain al- Sharifain,”210 
the servant of the two holy places (Mecca and Medina).
211
 However, it turned out that these titles 
and claims were not sufficient to persuade his subjects entirely to concede to his proclaimed 
religious status as a caliph. Religious challenges did not die down and the Sultan’s opponents 
reinvigorated the age-old debate over the caliphate with a new force in the face of a non-Arab 
claimant of Khilafa.
212
 It seems that the debate made its way well into the reign of Sultan 
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Suleyman and led his grand vizier Lütfi Paşa, (d.1562) to write a booklet213 in defense of the 
legitimacy of the Sultan and of a non-Arab caliphate.  
 This booklet in part reproduces a context in which existed multiple claimants of the 
caliphate. Al-Mutawakkil, the last Abbasid Caliph, still remained in power until his death in 
1543. The Mughals, who had advanced in India, did not accept the Ottomans’ so-called 
“universal caliphate” claim because scholars like Jalal al-Din al-Dawani (1427-1501) had 
already legitimized the simultaneous rule of more than one caliph.
214
 So did Ibn Taymiyah; as 
indicated earlier, a few centuries before Dawani, Ibn Taymiyya had expressed similar views with 
a stronger emphasis on the implementation of the Shari‘a. It seems that they were so eager to 
convince the other rulers and to submit to their rule wherever they could not militarily hold their 
territories. Needless to say, such demands must have been as made in the name of religion. 
However, what is important here is the existence of multiple interpretations of the concept of 
caliphate that are partly represented in Lütfi Paşa’s booklet. 
 The booklet reproduces a variety of theoretical challenges that were directed at the 
Sultan's legitimacy. The  jargon in Lütfi Paşa's booklet illustrates the seriousness of the posed 
challenges and questions by contemporary scholars with respect to Suleyman the Lawgiver’s 
rule, who  was  introduced  as the guardian of the Shar’ and reformer of the customary laws, 
“'urfi diwans.”215 The booklet is indicative of the rise of the Shi’i Safavids, along with millenarist 
and other theological challenges
216
 as the author strives to establish that kingship is 
encompassing both Imamate and caliphate. Lütfi Paşa makes a painstaking effort to prove that 
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the Sultan not only is a caliph but also “the imam of the age” or the imam of all the imams. For 
that, he resorts to a whole host of textual (naqli) and rational (‘aqli) arguments that he assumes 
could justify the Sultan’s religious legitimacy vis-à-vis the dissenters. 
             Quraishi-ness, once a problem for Mu‘tazilites, now had become an enduring challenge 
to the non-Arab caliphs that was repeatedly raised against any claimants to the caliphate. It 
seems this was a powerful tool against later generations of rulers in the hands of people. As it is 
shown in Lütfi Paşa’s booklet, some of the earlier traditional Sunni mutakallimun ( theologians) 
such as Taftazani (1312-1389)
217
 and ‘Umar al-Nafis (1213-1288), raised important questions 
with regard to equating kings or sultans with caliphs and Imams. Therefore, Lütfi Paşa tries to 
refute their views by referring to that of other Sunni scholars and implies that the views of these 
two scholars on the caliphate are not acceptable to the Sunni ‘ulama and community at large.  
 Sa‘daddin al-Taftazani argued that the end of Rashidun also ended the caliphal institution 
(of “the Prophetic Mission”). He considered the ending of the Abbasid reign to be tantamount to 
the end of Imamate. Al-Taftazani defended his position that “the Imam[ate] of Quraish; and as 
for the status of the Sultans, this arises from conquest and seizure, not from fitness and 
rightfulness (istihqaq).”218 Therefore, it was not permissible to use such a title for non-Quraishi 
rulers.
219
 However, to al-Taftazani, neither the title of caliphate nor Imamate of a lower-level 
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religious title can be used for non-Arab rulers. As such, in the post-Abbasid era, any ruler with 
no Quraish lineage was a usurper of the leadership position and his rule lacked legitimacy. Thus, 
according to al-Taftazani, the only legitimate Post-Rashidun leadership, with some degree of 
legitimacy would be imamate, not caliphate, which exclusively belongs to Quraish. Non-Arabs 
were not seen to be qualified for the position of either caliphate or imamate. Therefore, in al-
Taftazani’s view, the caliphate, which lasted only thirty years after the Prophet’s death, was a 
higher level of Islamic leadership that was not revivable. Some 20
th
-century modernist Sunni 




 To refute such ostensibly restrictive views, which if they had been accepted would have 
meant an automatic disqualification of Ottoman caliphate or imamate, Lütfi Paşa resorts to some 
textual sources and recounts a number of prophetic sayings in which imamate, caliphate and 
sultanate are all equated in terms of their religious standing.
221
 
  At times, Lütfi Paşa resorts to a more rational approach by referring to the necessity of 
socio-political order, which in its absence he argues people will not be able to live up to their 
obligations, religious and otherwise.
222
 As such, the establishment of order by a ruler is 
tantamount to creating an environment for the community to live up to their religious obligations 
and therefore this very act is sufficient to legitimate his rule. By the mere establishment of the 
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order, a ruler can legitimate his rule. Similarly, for al-Ghazali and Lütfi Paşa, sultans and kings’ 
legitimacy originates from the very order they create. To Lütfi Paşa, the Sultan’s mere ability to 
establish order should be accepted as a sufficient condition for the subjects to become loyal and 
obedient to his authority. Lütfi Paşa claims, “[a] man becomes a Sultan by two things: the first, 
by the swearing of allegiance to him, and the second, that he effectively executes his 
decision.”223 
 The concept of bai‘a, swearing of allegiance, in post-Rashidun and particularly in the 
Ottoman era, has much to do with a given sultan's ‘effectiveness in executing his decisions’ 
rather than the consensus of the community of the faithful. Therefore, these two conditions in 
reality are just one. For the Prophet Muhammad, bai’a was a pledge by his followers based on 
the fact that they could not disobey him in ma'ruf—what is good or right.224 To Lütfi Paşa, 
apparently, the mere absence of violence against the Sultan should be interpreted as people’s 
consensus and their allegiance to the Sultan’s rule. Thus, he states: 
 [He is the] sultan of the Arabs, the Turks, the Kurds and the Persians, and under his hand 
are many lands, as we have stated; and there is rightly applicable to him the definition of 
the Imam inasmuch as he is the lieutenant of the Apostle in maintaining the Faith in the 
requisite manner over all the peoples subject to him.
225 
It is evident that there must have been debates whether an unjust ruler is a legitimate one; 
whether a Muslim has to follow such a ruler or whether he is obliged to launch a war against 
him, whether an unjust ruler can rule the Muslim community or whether he shall be obeyed at 
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 Lütfi Paşa rejects the idea of just conduct as a necessary condition for accepting the Sultan 
as a caliph, notwithstanding his emphatic defense of Ottoman justice and claiming that “the 
'Osmani[s]
227
 are blameless with respect to maintenance of the Faith and Equity and the chad 
[Ar. Jihad].”228 As such, he tries to delegitimize any uprising or jihad against a sultan for his 
unjust conduct.   
 Lütfi Paşa, in his booklet, justifies this claim with another non-textual argument when he 
states that “...the lands of Islam which are in the hands of the infidels are undoubtedly lands of 
Islam, not lands of [the Domain of]
229
 War.”230 Lütfi Paşa presupposes the lack of justice in any 
domain that is ruled by non-Muslim rulers, notwithstanding the subjects’ religion. Therefore, he 
argues that despite the lack of justice, a land populated by Muslims cannot be treated as the 
domain of war, dar al-harb. And by way of analogy, Lütfi Paşa tries to relax the condition of just 
conduct in order for a Muslim ruler to be recognized a caliph. Hence, the Sultan must be 
followed and the Muslims are not allowed to unleash violence against him simply for his lack of 
just conduct. What is revealing here is the supposition that if a sultan is not recognized as caliph, 
violence against him is automatically seen permissible. However, if an unjust sultan is accepted 
as caliph, violence against him cannot be justified. 
 Lütfi Paşa’s booklet is significant as it highlights the fact that the debate over the 
caliphate had remained unsettled. In each era, with new social, political and historical events 
unfolding, the debate gained newer dimensions. It also indicates relentless efforts by groups and 
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communities to resist the rulers’ pressure to guarantee a greater degree of submission on the part 
of the subjects.
231
 As the rulers resorted to new arguments to overcome the crisis of their 
legitimacy, so did people venture into other ways to question their claims. If some groups in the 
Umayyad and Abbasid era, as shown earlier, found Quraishi lineage as an obstacle for ending 
unjust rule, the lack of such a lineage turned into a big liability for the later generations of rulers. 
In subsequent eras, the lack of Arab, to be more precise, Quraishi, lineage became a liability for 
the rulers. The lack of Arab lineage was regarded as a violation of a sacred tradition and as a sign 
of degeneration and moving astray from that tradition that was founded by and embodied in the 
exemplary rule of Rashidun. The model of Rashidun was remembered and sanctified as a 
yardstick to measure the degree of degeneration of the contemporary rules in Sunni community. 
              The caliphate from its inception produced neither a universally accepted definition nor a 
universal obedience among Sunni Muslims. To explain ruler-ruled relations with the sole focus 
on people’s religiosity as if it is a singular phenomenon that is almost everywhere manifested 
and construed identically, one has to grossly oversimplify the situation. The concept of khilafa 
thus should not be treated as if it has remained unaffected by the passage of time and the change 
in the social political context. It is erroneous to assume that the khilafa generated a universal 
following amongst Sunni Muslims; that Sunni-ness alone sufficed as a criterion for making all 
Sunnis obedient to a Caliph such as Abdülhamid II (1876-1909). 
It must be noted that in the post 16th century, among various titles used by the Ottoman 
rulers, ‘caliph’ was rarely used until the 18th centuries. Even if the Sultans did use this title, they 
“did so without attaching much weight to it...They sometimes used it as a term of praise for other 
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Muslim rulers...”232 It was during the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca of 1774, which was the 
outcome of the Ottoman defeat at the hand of the Russian, that the Ottoman decided to revive the 
caliphate. Such a revitalization of the caliphate was merely an outcome of the Ottomans’ new 
intentional standing.  The above-mentioned treaty  
marked the full emergence of Russia as a world power and the rapid decline of Ottoman 
military power….The Ottoman trade monopoly in the Black Sea was broken and the czar 
received the right to make representation to the Porte on behalf of its Orthodox Christian 
subjects while Russia's Muslims were permitted to acknowledge the caliph as their 
religious head. The newly acquired rights gave both rulers the means to incite nationalist 
sentiments in their respective communities. Russia justified its drive into Ottoman lands 
as a move designed to liberate Orthodox Christians and used religion to incite resistance, 
thereby transforming faith into a foundation for the Balkan Slavs' nationalism.
 233
 
It cannot be emphasized enough that even a quick reading of modern Muslim history indicates a 
different situation than the assumed universal obedience to the caliphate. As far as the khilafa’s 
theoretical grounding, the 1876 Ottoman constitution marked the end of the “traditional” Sunni 
approach to the institution, granting that there was a unified Sunni approach. The second era of 
Ottoman Constitutionalism in 1909 commenced its practical end. For instance, the Ottoman 
constitution no longer recognized the caliph as imam or mujtahid, in the traditional sense. That 
is, the extent of the caliph’s power could no longer be sought out in the Qur’an and the Prophetic 
traditions.  
 The first Ottoman Constitutionalist movement  proved unsuccessful. However, it was an 
attempt, among other things, to specify the limits of the Sultan/Caliph’s power. In fact, the 
constitution was a means for transforming him into a constitutional monarch.
234
 With the 
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inauguration of Constitutionalism, the caliph was bound, at least in theory to follow the 
constitution as his decrees no longer constituted the law of the land.
235
 It is important to point out 
that such a blow to the (assumed) traditional view of the caliphate caused no outrage in either the 
Muslim world at large, or within the Empire. This in and of itself evidences that, despite the 
significance of the event, the Sunni Muslim community did not perceive those structural changes 
caliphate as an encroachment on Islamic tenants. The final draft of the 1876 constitution 
contained a stipulation stating that “the Sultan cannot be held accountable,”236 a clause that in 
fact meant that he had no responsibilities. This paradox signaled the gulf between the ideal and 
the real constitutional power structure.
237
 And yet, at the same time, it also illustrated the 
indefensibility of the older approaches to the caliphate.  
 In essence, Constitutionalism marked the end of the caliphate as it was known. 
Nevertheless, the second phase of Constitutionalism received a great deal of support from high-
ranking clerics.
238
 For instance, the famous Kurdish scholar, Bediüzzaman Said-i Nursi, spent 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Your majesty my king! The goal for drafting [the constitution] and for the declaration of the 
principals of Constitutionalism was: To end autocracy (istibdad), to inform (ikaz) you about your 
responsibilities and to make the responsibility of the ministers known and appropriately assigned; 
achieve complete equality among our people; and for all of us to embark on true reforms, together. 
The reason for the declaration of the Constitutionalism was not just to bring a good resolution to 
the Eastern problem.  It was not a charming slogan for show to shut the Europeans’ mouths against 
us. I must clarify (izahat) certain issues to your majesty. First, your majesty, you have to be aware 
of all your responsibilities as the ruler.  In the nation’s eye (millet nezadrinda) you will be held 
accountable (mas’ul) for all of your actions … I, as your majesty’s humble servant, am extremely 
loyal to you.  Nontheless, I shall declare and excuse myself from your obedience in anything that 
may even slightly harm or contradict the interests of the nation. 
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two years of his life propagating the idea of Constitutionalism in Kurdistan. He even offered his 
own version of a constitutional caliphate.
239
 Needless to say, neither phases of Ottoman/Turkish 
Constitutionalism nor the eventual demise of the caliphate turned the Muslim world into a 
bloodbath. Yet especially in the field of Kurdish studies the caliphate has been assumed to be a 
universally followed religious institution. We are told that prior to the1920s, ethnicity “did not 
define boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in the imperial system. Rather…the Kurds 
considered themselves part of the dominant Muslim majority group.”240  
 Contrary to some scholars’ claims—particularly in the field of Kurdish studies—the 
debate must be understood in direct relation to the existing power dynamics, rather than as being 
an inseparable element of the Muslim faith. Unlike Metin Heper does, for instance, one should 
not assume “that the Kurds almost always preferred to live under an Islamic rather than an all-
unifying nationalist government. They displayed such a preference because they had always had 
a strong loyalty to the caliphate.”241 It is not rare to come across assumptions that regard the 
Kurdish revolts in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century as being devoid of any ethno-nationalistic 
character. Such views are foregrounded in the fact that those Kurdish revolts were mainly led by 
religious leaders in a tribal society. In his discussion on the 1925 Kurdish uprising, Heper claims 
that the leader of the revolt believed that the Ottoman “dynasty and caliphate were absolute 
necessities for the survival of Turkey.”242  
 Generally, the scholarship on Muslim history in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries 
                                                          
239
 Nursi, İçtima-I Dersler/ Social Lessons, 115; İçtima-I Dersler/ Social Lessons(Istanbul: Zehra Yincilik, 2009). 
240
 Denise Natali, The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, 1st ed., Modern 
Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2005), xviii. 
241
 Metin Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation(Basingstoke England ; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 148. 
242
 Ibid., 149. 
76 
 
perceives Muslims as a unified religious community free of ethnic self-consciousness.
243
 Thus, 
Muslim ethno-national consciousness and their break with the Sunni caliphate is deemed 
inconceivable. Therefore, “It should not be a surprise to the reader” Hakan Özoğlu claims that 
after WWI some Kurdish poltical factions were “against complete autonomy, for they believed in 
the unity of the Islamic ummah and until the end of the Ottoman Empire and even afterwards 
they saw the sultan as the legitimate caliph.”244 As shown in following chapters, neither the 
caliphate nor “tribalism” could prevent the rise of Muslim ethno-nationalist sentiments. Heper 
goes as far as to claims that 
an important factor that induced the [Kurdish] chieftains to seek no more than autonomy 
from the central government was the fact that chieftains had traditional and religious 
worldviews and, as a result, they identified themselves with the caliphate in Istanbul.
245
 
Furthermore, since the chieftains’ legitimacy had religious grounds, for them being part 




Religiosity is generally assumed to pre-date any type of nationalist tendency
247
 and therefore any 
claim about the existence of Kurdish nationalism even in the early 20
th
 century is supposedly 
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 At times, these studies have been under the direct influence of the official Kemalist 
historiography.
249
 The Turkish state tried to frame opposition groups, especially after the 
establishment of the Republic, as reactionary and attempting to revive the Ottoman past. In the 
early 1920s, there was a heterogeneous approach to the abolishment of the caliphate in the 
Turkish parliament. Major arguments in favor of the abolishment of the caliphate were made 
within the confines of Islamic religious discourse. Mustafa Kemal and his camp argued that the 
caliphate was not an institution prescribed by dogma but was instead the product of traditional 
juridical literature.
250
 As such, they contended that the original establishment of the caliphate 
was not a religious imperative. Neither did the caliphate’s abolition have any bearing on Islam.251 
The Kemalists argued that Islam solely requires the establishment of the state, which supersedes 
and encompass “the government, republicanism and the caliphate.”252  However, after 1925 the 
Kemalists, due to the geopolitical interests of their new state, described the caliphate as a 
backward notion. To legitimize their domestic policy of purging and suppression, they frequently 
accused their opponents of reactionism and longing for the past or the caliphate.
253
 
 Kurdish historiography, in its general invocation of  ‘the unbridgeable gap’ between 
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religion and nationalism, exhibits a partial adaptation of the Kemalist state discourse. This 
scholarship has adopted the Kemalist state narrative in which Kurdish movements are either 
portrayed as religious or nationalist. The Kemalist state tried to redefine itself as a modern and 
pro-West entity. In turn, it strove to paint its opposition—both Kurdish and non-Kurdish—as 
backward religious attempts to defend the past. Kemalist supporters also found it important to 
stress the impossibility of any fusion between religion and nationalism. They thus put forward an 
incoherent narrative in their depiction of Kurdish resistance and depicted it as nationalist 
sometimes and religious other times. Likewise, some studies on Kurds reject any possibility for 
Islamic and nationalistic tendencies to unite. 
 When it comes to their relations with the Ottoman Sultan, Sunni Muslims in general, and 
the Kurds in particular are perceived as a monolithic community, and the idea of the caliphate is 
thought of as being an immutable and undisputed religious concept throughout Islamic history. 
For instance, some Western scholars described the 1925 Kurdish revolt as the expression of 
“Mohammedan fanaticism [that] was outraged by Mustapha (sic) Kamal’s policy of 
secularization”254 began with the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate, “which was the very 
embodiment of Islam.”255 There are historians who assume that the Sunni participants in early 
Kurdish uprisings had incontestable allegiances to the Ottoman Caliph.
256 
However, Turkish 
statesmen themselves were aware of the inaccuracy of such generalizations. In 1924 during the 
debates the abolition of the caliphate, the Turkish Justice Minister admitted that the scholars in 
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Kurdistan had never ascribed any legitimacy to the Ottoman Caliphal claims.
257
   
 Mischaracterization of the debate and depiction of  the caliphate as if it was a pillar of 
faith that made it incumbent on every Muslim to blindly obey any self-proclaimed caliph gravely 
mystifies both the debate itself and the early stages of Kurdish nationalism. The following 
statement by Heper symbolizes such a mischaracterization when he claims that “it was 
particularly the Kurds, who, being overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim in religion, came to have an 
unqualified sympathy and support for their Sultan-Caliph, and considered him as both their 
religious and political leader.”258 Hence, when it comes to the Kurdish-Ottoman caliph 
relationship, it is not hard to see the impact of orientalist historiography and Kemalism, which 
the latter projects its own despised “oriental image” onto the Kurdish other.259 By labeling 
Kurdish movements as a mere longing for the Hamidian rule and irticai (reactionary), the 
Kemalist state on the one hand was hiding its double approach to religiosity, and on the other 
perpetuating the age-old-Ottoman orientalization
260
 of the periphery.    
  The aim here was to show that the caliphate did not always mean the same thing and the 
rulers’ claims to the caliphate did not automatically result in people’s submission, and the Kurds, 
as shown in the following chapters, were no exception to this rule. When comes to later Ottoman 
Caliphes such as Abdülhamid II, many contemporary Muslims were well aware of the fact that  
he propagated Muslim unity in the hope of assimilating non-Turkish into a campaign for 
confronting the European challenge to the empire.  
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Ottoman/ Turkish “Official Nationalism” 
I think…as history, nationalism’s autobiography is fundamentally flawed. 
- Partha Chatterjee261 
 
Getting history wrong’ is the precondition of nationalist history. 




Having discussed aspects of caliphate debate, it is now essential to attend to one of the 
most significant historico-political sources of the Hamidian regime, i.e.; “official nationalism.”263 
The Hamidian regime inherited a tradition of political, bureaucratic, military and cultural 
reforms, which had been initiated many decades earlier.
264
 This era of reforms can also be 
recognized by a semi-global trend which had affected the self-perception of the Ottoman state as 
well as surrounding states. This trend is what Anderson calls official nationalism. Official 
nationalism is described by Anderson as “a discernible tendency among the Euro-Mediterranean 
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monarchies to sidle towards a beckoning national identification.”265 The attempt here is not to 
attend to the Ottoman Tanzimat in depth but to show: Firstly, the discrepancy in the literature on 
the late 19
th
 century Ottoman official nationalism. Secondly, the Ottomans were by no means 
immune to official nationalism because of their religion and thirdly, Hamidian official 
nationalism (discussed in the next chapter) was a culmination of a trend that had started in the 
preceding decades. 
After Bernard Lewis’ 1961 The Emergence of Modern Turkey,266 it has become 
commonplace in the scholarship on Ottomans to defend the latency of Turkish nationalism. 
Lewis claimed that “The Empire had been a nonmodern state system designed to govern a vast 
multiethnic, multilinguistic, and multireligious population. The ‘Turkish’ and ‘Islamic’ people of 
Asia Minor had therefore remained unconscious of themselves as a people in the course of 
making and sustaining it.”267  In essence, Lewis’s claim is based on a hierarchal Eurocentric 
understanding of “world history” in which any nation that has not undergone a complete process 
of “Westernization” is deemed “pre-modern” and for the same reason cannot be considered self-
conscious. This type of hierarchical conception of “world history” is best manifested in Hegel’s 
conception of history, in which he divides nations into those with a clear consciousness of history 
and those with a murky one when he says:  
Nations whose consciousness is obscure, or the obscure history of such nations, are . . . 
not the object of the philosophical history of the world, whose end is to attain 
knowledge of the Idea in history—the spirits of those nations which [have] become 
conscious of their inherent principle, and have become aware of what they are and what 
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Lewis’s own classification of the Ottomans as “nonmodern” is sufficient enough for him 
to brand them as peoples with a lack of national self-consciousness or, to use his own term, 
“unconscious of themselves.” The religion of the majority of the Ottoman polity, i.e. Islam, of 
course will add to the layers of this “unconsciousness.” For Lewis, the real nation was born after 
the creation of a “secular, Western oriented, and civic nationalist Republic;” the people made a 
leap from pre-history into the history of consciousness and became the subject of their history.
269
 
This is how “The ‘Turkish’ and ‘Islamic’ people of Asia Minor had consequently become 
conscious of themselves as they moved from the imperial to the national phase of their 
history.”270 In this evolutionary reading, after the end of the old regime, there begins another 
phase in Turkish history, where a new “modern state” suddenly “emerges.”271 With the 
emergence of the modern state, Turkey supersedes the condition that Hegel identifies as the “so-
called unity of the spirit with nature which we encounter in the Oriental World.”272 
Generally, the thesis of the latency of Turkish nationalism, until the First World War, is 
defended along these lines. In more recent works, the so-called non-modern characteristic of the 
Empire has been dropped.  However, the essence of the argument for this ‘latency’ remains the 
same. For instance, Taner Akçam, in his work From Empire to Republic, defends this view when 
he states that “due to the multiethnic character of the Empire, the Ottoman ruling elite was 
unable to offer a stable national identity” and Turkish nationalism thus remained latent.273 He 
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also maintains that “Turkish nationalism, as a political movement, arrived only in the 20th 
century.”274 Although the second assertion may not be inaccurate, the lack of political movement, 
per se, does not necessarily mean the lack of a national identity, “stable” or otherwise. As 




 Akçam, in part, bases his claim on what he sees as the lack of the centrality of the ethnic 
Turk’s history in Ottoman literature, particularly in Ottoman textbooks prior to the 20th 
century.
276
 As shown in the following chapter, Turkishness and Turkification had a central role in 
the state’s educational project from the mid-1870s onward. It is striking that the multiethnic and 
multi-religious character of Ottoman society is seen as a major reason for the so-called Turkish 
lack of “self-consciousness” to use Lewis’s phrase. In fact, this very factor was one of the 
greatest internal threats to the Empire’s integrity. In his discussion on Habsburg and Russian 
Empires, Anderson shows that in the 19
th
 century, such socio-political contexts were particularly 
conducive to the emergence of official nationalism. 
277
 In essence, nationalism is dialectical and 
in the absence of the ethnic, cultural or religious Other, nationalist self-consciousness would not 
be possible.  
Akçam enumerates a number of other reasons for the supposed absence of Turkish 
nationalism before 1912.  It is not surprising, however, that Islam is cited as another important 
reason for this ‘latency’ since “in contrast to other Islamic countries, among the Ottomans, 
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Islamic identity developed in tandem with the lapse of any sense of Turkishness.”278 As banal as 
this might sound, many of the later Islamic countries were still domains of the Ottoman Empire.  
At best, Turkish nationalists, just like any other nationalists, could be oblivious to their own 
nationalism and “always seems to [have] locate[d] nationalism on the periphery.”279 Additionally, 
such an argument reveals an understanding of religion as a universal and uncontaminated 
phenomenon that is inherently resistant to the impact of any local or ethnic interpretations.  
  It is also important to state that from the 1840s on, the state/religious establishment 
underwent dramatic transformations as a result of the Ottoman state’s extensive reforms aiming 
towards the integration of non-Muslims. Henceforth, “managing religion” took a different form 
due to centralization polices, notwithstanding the fact that the state’s instrumental use of religion 






 In a way, the attempts by non-Turkish 
communities to differentiate Islam from Turkishness demonstrate the influence of such policies. 
As will be illustrated in the following chapters, some prominent Kurdish religious leaders were 
adamant about differentiating the two. The Kurds, whose nationalism was supposedly even more 
latent than that of the Turks, started separating their own Islamic identity from their Turkish co-
religionists as early as 1880.
281
 The renowned Kurdish Naqshbandi Leader, Sheikh Ubeydullah, 
in his letter to the foreign councils, went so far as to differentiate Kurdish religion from that of 
the Turks.
282
 By the turn of the century, Turkish intellectuals were debating which choice suited 
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the empire better: Pro-Muslim unity (Îttîhad-î Îslam) or pro-racial unity (Îttîhad-î Anasur).
283
    
    The practical limitations of the ruling group, argues Akçam, was another reason for the 
latency of Turkish nationalism. He states that “the multinational character of the Ottoman state 
forced the ruling national group into a strange dilemma. Because the main goal had been the 
preservation of the multinational state, the members of the ruling nation could not openly claim 
their own national identities.”284  The “strange dilemma” of the ethnic Turks unveils the 
complexities of Turkish nationalism rather than the absence of Turkish national identity. There 
must be a difference between lacking a national identity and being reticent about its existence. 
The above complexities and dilemmas were rooted in the nature of official nationalism. Official 
nationalism, which fostered the “merger of nation and dynastic empire,”285 was a common trend, 
at least, in the late 19
th
 century. “The key to situating ‘official nationalism’” argues Anderson, “is 
to remember that it developed after, and in reaction to, the popular national movements 
proliferating in Europe since the 1820s.”286  
 In the 19
th
 century, Turkish nationalism, like that of other empires was, to borrow Krishan 
Kumar’s phrase, enigmatic, and had its own peculiarities. It exhibited some of the characteristics 
of English nationalism that are discussed by Kumar.
287
 This enigmatic aspect adds to the elusive 
and complex nature of empires’ nationalism that makes both denying it and situating it in the 
right historical context difficult.  
 What Kumar calls “missionary nationalism” is quite useful in understanding Turkish 
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nationalist tendencies in the early 19
th
 century. One can say that like other imperial nationalisms, 
in its early periods, Ottoman/Turkish imperial nationalism was: 
A type of nationalism [that rested] not so much on the nature of empire as a general 
political form as on the perceptions of particular groups within it. It is these groups that 
may exhibit ‘missionary’ nationalism, sometimes to the point of threatening the 
imperial structures that allow them this sense; and if, as several scholars claim, we can 





From the era of Tanzimat (reorganization and reforming the state structure), the state aimed at 
creating a cohesive society in which its members would feel a strong sense of belonging to the 
central state.
289
 This mission, for reforming the state and society, gained legitimacy under the 
rubric of medeniyet (civilization). As Karpat points out, the state began to perceive itself as the 
agent of medeniyet—a tool in the hands of bureaucrats and intelligentsia to create its own 
identity. Therefore, a centralized state was not only deemed as more modern institution capable 
of greater social and economic achievements, but was also seen as the legitimate agent that could 
guarantee the ruling group’s supremacy.290 The state’s civilizing practice or “borrowed 
colonialism…pushed [the non-Turkish] periphery …into a colonial status.”291 Ottoman official 
nationalism in action is best described by Murat Ergin as “Defining the center into which all 
differences would assimilate; defining the boundaries of an unmarked territory into which all 
others would walk after leaving their particularities behind, produce a multitude of attempts to 
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invent ‘us’.”292 Hence, to defend the thesis of latency of the Turkish nationalism, one must, like 
Bernard Lewis, assume the “unconsciousness” and the innocence of these institutionalized 
practices.   
As mentioned earlier, the Ottoman state was not alone in its undertaking of reform 
projects. This type of modernization and restructuring of the state was to follow along the lines 
of reforms that were taking place in Europe. In the early decades of the 19
th
 century, the Ottoman 
state and, to a certain degree, the Qajars in Iran - though in a sluggish and much less orderly way 
- were also trying to adjust to the  requirements of the new age. Centralization, in conjunction 
with a certain nationalist bent along the lines of the French Revolution, was the order of the day. 
In addition, the Ottoman state aimed to adopt “Civilization” with certain qualifications in order 
to remain viable and to be able to stave off mounting European aggression. 
 In the early 19
th
 century, following the French model, European statesmen generally 
resorted to the strategic goal of centralizing the state and extending its control of the population, 
rather than adopting the systematic practice of imposing the ruling ethnic group’s identity. It 
must be emphasized that “the project of building and shaping an identity is an aspect of 
nationalism.”293  
 The Ottoman state’s population politics showcases a gradual and measured appearance of 
emphases on Turkishness. It must not be a mere accident that the French version of the 1844 
census contains the hyphenated category of Turks-Ottomans (Türk-Osmanlı).294 In this 
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classification, Türk-Osmanlı was clearly distinguished from other ethnic groups such Albanians, 
Arabs, Kurds and so forth.
295
 These policies were not devised as outright Turkism. However, 
they aimed to obfuscate the nationalism of the Other. Like European states, “what mattered to 
them was the Napoleonic example of imposing legal and administrative uniformity as a way of 
eliminating ‘the dangers of anti-national, regional or ethnic identities.”296 Even though the ruling 
ethnicity did not declare the state identity to be coterminous with its own, since the state was the 
agent of propagating its own culture, language, and conception of the state and society, the 
centralized state was also, in the end, a nationalizing agent. Ottoman Turks’ attitudes in “the 
beginning of the age of nationalism” and their hesitation to declare their own ethnic identity as 
the identity of the sovereign much resembles the attitude of Germans in the Habsburg Empire.
297
  
However, Turkish language and culture, as the predominant language and culture of the state, 
like “German [in the Hapsburg Empire] increasingly acquired a double status: ‘universal-
imperial’ and ‘particular-national’.”298  Although the ruling ethnic group may have exhibited a 
certain degree of reticence in declaring the sovereign’s ethnicity in the beginning of the 19th 
century, no dominated groups were hesitant to call them Turks.
299
 The Turks, as guardians of 
their Empire, conceived of a stronger centralized state as a solution to the threat posed by the 
development of other ethnic nationalisms. Even in its early stages, Ottomanism was seen as a 
compensation for possible Turkish reticence to self-identify publicly, since it could help to forge 
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a unifying identity under the patronage of the state, which, according to Karpat, had long 
emphasized its own Turkish character. Karpat maintains that                         
in truth, the language of the Ottoman state always was Turkish, and the Enderun, the 
famous palace school that trained top-level administrators used Turkish as the language 
of instruction throughout its existence. It is not surprising, therefore, that these facts 
supplied the arguments to claim that political leadership in the Ottoman state had 
always been ‘Turkish.’300 
 
 As indicated in the outset, in the scholarship on Ottoman history, there is a great deal of 
resistance to the possibility of the existence of Muslim nationalism prior to Frist World War. The 
Republican historiography is based on the denial of the preexistence of Turkish nationalism. The 
early republican ideologues tried to define themselves as the real messengers of Turkish 
nationalism, claiming that it was completely distinct from Ottomanism. To justify this discourse 
of rupture and the absolute lack of affinity with the recent past, early Republican historiography 
strives to show that Republican ideologues created their nationalism ex nihilo.
301
 Yet, there exist, 
at least two readings of the late Ottoman era by ideologues of Turkish nationalism, and these 
readings have affected Ottoman historians’ views as well. History writing is not easily freed from 
the impact of official accounts. At best, it remains a criticism of state narratives, whose content, 
according to Hegel, “not only lends itself to the prose of history but actually helps to produce 
it.”302 
In the early Republican period, nationalists strove to completely distance themselves 
from the recent Ottoman past. Therefore, they categorically denied the existence of Turkish 
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nationalism in the pre-CUP era. By labeling the CUP period an era of catastrophes and treason, 
they further dissociate themselves from it.
303
 Thus, “it is possible [to] argue that the Republican 
regime in general projected an image of the entire late Ottoman period as the historical 
‘other’.”304  This radical rereading of past takes place, in Shissler’s terms, as part of the process 
of “the transformation of nationalism into Kemalism,”305 by the expurgation of nationalism in the 
pre-Republican history. Kemalism consolidates its power by reinterpreting the past to settle its 
present internal conflicts and to readjust itself, through the state, in accordance with new 
geopolitical realities.  
Republican ideologues, as illustrated in Tekin Alp’s writings, were adamant about 
renouncing late Ottoman history and characterizing it a wholly religious other.
306
 For instance, 
Alp claims that Ottomanism lacked the capacity to become an inclusive system.  The multiethnic 
character of late Ottoman society, Alp claims, was the source of discriminatory practices, as 
opposed to inclusive Republican nationalism.
307
 In his 1927 work, Türkleştirme/Turkification, 
Alp refers to Republican nationalism as a melting pot in which people’s ethnic and religious 
backgrounds—once prominent in the Ottoman system—were to dissipate in the new era. 308 Alp 
categorically denies that Ottomanism had any nationalist elements. He contends that “in the era 
of Türkluk (Turkishness),” i.e.; Republican nationalism, “concepts such as Muslim and non-
Muslim or subject and non-subject cease to exist. Every individual’s membership in the nation is 
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actualized with her/his service to the nation.”309 According to Alp, such categories belong to the 
past. They would no longer determine the people’s social standing or citizenship.310  
Setting aside the inaccuracy of Alp’s claim, in theory the Tanzimat reforms (in the 19th 
century) were also introduced  to universalize Ottomanness as the sole identity of all Ottoman 
subjects. Makdisi argues that the Ottoman “official nationalism launched in the wake of the 
Tanzimat was a project of modernization that strove to cohere different ethnic groups, different 
religious communities, different regions, and, above all, different stages of progress within a 
unified Ottoman modernity.”311 Yet, a unified Ottoman modernity the Republican ideologues 
claimed to have obscured Turkishness. 
 Alp contends that the definition of Turkishness in the Ottoman context was a confused 
one. This was the case since anyone who converted to Islam or was already a Muslim was also 
considered a Turk.
312
 For Alp, this implies that the identity of the ruling ethnic group was a 
solely religious one; Turkish ethnicity had become invisible.  
Fuat Dündar has shown that as early as the 1840s, Ottoman state statistics demonstrate 
frequent instances of the ethnic classification of the polity
313
  and Ottomanism was not an 
equalizing concept. The late 19
th
 century Ottoman intellectuals were generally hesitant to equate 
their own modernized Islamic understanding with that of the “savage” periphery.314 Moreover, 
despite the importance of religious identity in both the pre-Republican and Republican eras, 
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religion was never the singular marker of identity in Ottoman Turkey. Nonetheless, from the 
early Tanzimat era onward, Islam ultimately becomes a greater instrument of government in the 
hands of the dominant ethnic group
315
 to justify its rule and to assimilate dominated 
populations.
316
 Yet, in the Republican reading of Ottoman history, as articulated by Alp, the 
Turks were victims of  their religiosity: they “were supposed to be the ruling ethnic group [but in 
reality they] were the most forgotten one in this vast and borderless Empire.”317 
 According to Alp, the lack of nationalism in the later Ottoman period, in part, was 
because the Turks did not play their role as a majority and therefore could not suppress non-
Turkish ethnic politics. The Turks, in his words, did not have tehekkum, coercive rule, due to 
their lack of cohesive (bir hahlde olmayinda) national consciousness.
318
  To Alp, the sheer 
inability of the Ottoman Turks to assimilate the rest of the population attests to their lack of 
national consciousness.  
Tehekkum, according to Alp, is a manifestation of the will of the majority imposed on 
minorities. As such, the majority “should crush” a minority if it resists the will of the majority.319 
Contrary to the Ottoman period, which was plunged in ominous (menhus) ethnicity politics, the 
new Turkey will not allow ethnic policies to surface.
320
 In the new Turkey, national life (milli 
hayat), for those who wish to be a part of it, leaves no choice but to become a Turk.
321
 This 
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national life is a forceful imposition of the majority’s will and its identity. In the words of the 
first prime minister of the Republic, İsmet İnönü, it is “the mission for Turkifying whoever lives 
on this land regardless of the cost.”322   
Certainly, there are some novel approaches to the rule of majority, as posited by Alp, 
which became the public discourse of the state after 1909.  In Abdülhamid’s period the state had 
declared privileging Turkish as a right, and had Turkified education and the language of 
bureaucracy, but had not gone so far as to declare that all its citizens were either Turks or that 
they had to become Turks.
323
 The Republican nationalism was exceptionally bold and certainly 
had no chance for success in earlier periods. This new nationalist discourse was adamant and 
unequivocal about its assimilationist character while simultaneously claiming to be inclusive. It 
was overtly racial and entailed an outright denial of the other. However, it always remained 
vigilant against other nationalisms and crushed and labeled them as “exclusionary and retrograde 
(irtca-i).” This nationalist discourse was unprecedented in late Ottoman history, at least until the 
end of the Hamidian period.   
It it impotant to note that Republican ideologues were not alone in their dissatisfaction 
with nationalism in their imperial past. It seems that no nationalizing tendencies have been 
considered satisfactory by the succeeding radical statist/nationalist generations since they created 
a particular dilemma for the ruling elite, who can be seen as both champions and traitors. 
Comparing the later rereading of this situation in both Ottoman and Hapsburg contexts, 
Anderson maintains that “In much the same way [as the Hapsburgs], the Ottomans came to be 
hated by the Turkish-speakers as apostates and by the non-Turkish-speakers as Turkifiers.”324   
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It is not a matter of little significance, however, that prior to the Republican period major 
Turkist and nationalist ideologues like Yusuf Akçuraoğlu (1876- 1932) and Ziya Gökalp (1876-
1924) not only acknowledge some type of state nationalism in the Tanzimat era, but also declare 
that one of the ultimate goals behind the Tanzimat reforms was the assimilation of non-Turkish 
subjects. To them, the Tanzimat reforms represented the state’s homogenizing policies in 
disguise.  
 Some aspects of Ottoman official nationalism did not escape Akçuraoğlu’s keen eyes, as 
he declared that the French model was ineffective in solving the crisis of the Ottoman state.
325
 In 
his words, in the 1850s, the Ottoman state adopted the policy of assimilation (temsil) of the 
dominated ethnic and religious communities in the hope of unification of the elements 
(imtizaj).
326
 In fact, Akçuraoğlu refers to a type of missionary nationalism that had been adopted 




  In his Üç Tarz-i Siyaset,
328
 
initially published in 1904, Akçuraoğlu refers to Ottomanism as a failed policy; he sees the pre-
Hamidian period as the origin of this type of politics.  
 It was an era of the French type of missionary nationalism, which Akçuraoğlu considered 
to be misdirected. Unlike the German type, which conformed to his more recent views on 
nationalism, the French model did not emphasize racial and linguistic factors. To him, a proper 
and realistic Turkish nationalism would be a type that was based on Turkish ethnicity with no 
considerations for geographical boundaries.
329
 This was in contradiction to the views of the 
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earlier elite and statesmen, who attempted to forge an identity for Ottoman subjects with no overt 
emphases on ‘irk (ethnicity).330 The earlier Ottoman statesmen were emphatic about their 
mission to keep the empire intact by entrenching an identity that could supplant all types of 
religious and ethnic loyalties except for the one desired by the state.  
 Drafting a constitution and creating a parliament was long considered vital to the 
Ottoman state’s world standing.  The state was intent upon readjusting itself with its status in the 
new world system, and to legally move beyond the social division inherent in the entrenched 
culture of the former millet system. However, Ali Paşa, a powerful statesman in the 1850s, whom 
Akçuraoğlu considers to be one of the greatest proponents of Ottomanism,331 vehemently 
opposed this idea. He rightly argued that a constitution and representative assembly would grant 
a political platform to the very people whose secessionist tendencies were a threat to the 
Empire.
332
 Makdisi points out the Ottoman paradox in the 19
th
 century: the state tried to integrate 
the periphery, but the very attempt of integration for their assimilatory nature caused further 
segregation between the center and the periphery.
333
 Indeed, the real reason behind the façade of 
religious equality was to remove differences at the expense of dominated groups. An Ottoman 
statesman such as Ali Paşa knew that instead of eliminating differences, a constitution very well 
legalize them and strengthen the budding nationalistic desires present in dominated communities. 
Undoubtedly, the Great Powers, such as Britain, France, and Russia were also keenly aware of 
this fact and therefore they increasingly pressured the Ottomans for reforms they hoped would 
make the Ottoman empire more open to the capitalist market, and more open to a process that 
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would result in the eventual disintegration of the empire by way of “according autonomy and 
independence to its Christian subjects, whose middle class had developed substantially.”334  
 The Ottoman fear of the non-dominant groups’ nationalism was real and present.  It is 
clear which groups would see themselves as the beneficiaries of a possible state disintegration 
and why. Therefore “[al]though empires usually have recognizably dominant ethnic groups – 
Germans, Russians, Turks – to identify the empire with these groups would risk bitter resentment 
and possibly dissolution.”335 When an ethnic group is privileged and dominant, it would be 
unwise on its part to trumpet its own privileged position and cause unwarranted challenges.  
Thus, “[r]uling groups are aware of the need to distance themselves from any one ethnicity, to 
appear, at least, impartial as between the various peoples that make up the empire.”336  
 To come back to pre-Republican readings of the late-Ottoman history, a Turkist thinker 
such as Akçuraoğlu was able to see beyond the guise of so called Ottomanist and “pan-Islamist” 
policies.  Akçuraoğlu  considered  these policies  to be genuine attempts to save the Ottoman 
state. Yet, he believed they were outdated and unpersuasive as ideologies, since he asserted that 
ethnicity did not constitute the pillar of these policies.
337
 Thus, when Akçuraoğlu critiques pan-
Islamist policies or emphasizes Turkism, he should not be necessarily seen as anti-religious.
338
 
However, as a statist nationalist, he no longer believed in defining the identity of the sovereign as 
Islamic or Ottoman rather than Turkish (let’s assume the last two are different ). In the age of 
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nationalism, argued Akçuraoğlu, neither Ottomanism nor Islamism could save the empire, which 
was seen as the common strategic goal of all those policies.  
           In brief, Yusuf Akçuraoğlu intended to make clear the unrealistic nature of the two 
approaches that were previously devised and adopted in the hope of saving the Ottoman Empire. 
Since neither Ottomanism nor Pan-Islamism were publicly advocating “race” as the basis for 
defining national identity, they were both inefficacious.
339
 He unequivocally “sought the eventual 
dominance of Turkism and the transformation of the Ottoman State into a Turkish homeland.”340   
Ziya Gökalp makes a similar observation with respect to the real aims of the Tanzimat 
reforms. Until 1912, when the state lost almost all of its European lands in the Balkan Wars, he 
still hoped that the political ideology of Ottomanism might someday come to fruition. However, 
as early as 1913, Gökalp expressed his disillusionment, noting “…that Tanzimat leaders341 and 
Young Turks were not sincere in their recognition of the rights of the various communities, but 
used the ideal of Ottomanism as a cloak for the Turkification of the state.”342 Gökalp goes a step 
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further and introduces the entire enterprise of Ottomanism as well-thought out state policy for 
assimilating non-Turks as he declares that  
The reformists (Tanzimatçılar) tried to disguise Turkishness. There was not a national 
Turkish language; Ottoman was the interethnic (unsurlar arası) common language. By 
comingling all the elements, they were trying to create a new national breed (bir kavmi 
tip), a historical race, a derivative (türemiş) Ottoman nation. Just as the new nation 
would have had a unique language, it also would have owned a unique history. No 
ethnic group was deceived by such a lie. In their own schools, every ethnic group 
taught their children their own history and language.
 343 
 
With the progression of time, as Gökalp insinuates, Turkification became a major concern for 
non-Turks. He contends that 
in the aftermath of Constitutionalism,[from the perspective of the state] this mask 
[Turkification] gained more significance; ethnic groups began to shout “you are trying 
to Turkify us.” In reality this Ottomanization policy was a disguised instrument for the 
Turkification
344
 [of non-Turks]... Since Ottoman was nothing other than the Turkish 
language, then, if the goal was to create a nation whose language was Ottoman, this 




In reality, as shown in the following chapter, Ottoman officials were much bolder on the Turkish 
language than Gökalp gives them credit for. Ottoman adminstrative documents show that state 
officials were not at all reticent either to call the state’s language Turkish or to make it a 
compulsory subject of study.  Even though Gökalp rejects this type of Turkification for its 
secretive nature, he acknowledges the existence of Turkism (Türkçülük) in other forms, for 
example, in real language reform tendencies propagated by intellectuals.  The prior existence of 
this Turkist tradition is essential for Gökalp, because without it even modern Turkey would not 
be possible. Gökalp thus asks what would have happened after the fall of the Empire,  
if Turkism had not left many of us with a unique national life, separate from the 
Ottoman Empire, [or with] a homeland with its boundaries drawn in accordance to the 
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In Gökalp’s opinion, all this indicates that if the Turks had used “the sacred (mukkades) and 
auspicious (mübarek) word Turk” to refer to themselves, there would not be any confusion.347 
When did Turkism emerge and how it was disseminated among the Turks?  Gökalp 
opines that the appearance of Turkism in the Empire coincides with the creation of modern 
schools. This is what Anderson calls “Hobsbawm’s dictum that ‘the progress of schools and 
universities measures that of nationalism’…”348 To Gökalp, these new institutions signified the 
dysfunction of the old ones, which in turn represented the unsuitability of the old socio-religious 
bonds among Turks. In Gökalp’s own terms: 
The first fathers of Turkism (Türkçülük) were two [mid-19
th
 century] institutions of 
ours:  Darülfünun and the Academy of War (Mektebi Askeriye). It would not have been 
possible to open Darülfünun, if the Medrese [the traditional school system] could have 
preserved its strength… Turkish feelings of a bond with the Umma too began to fade 
away. The renewed attempts to reorganize Darülfünun and the Academy of War in the 
last years of the reign of Sultan Abdulaziz (1839-1876) were again an indication of the 
weakening of the [Turkish] bonds with [the Islamic Umma].
349         
 
Akçuraoğlu and Gökalp’s designation of the preceding generation of Ottoman statesmen 
as masked nationalists is worth noting, particularly because claims about the latency of Turkish 
nationalism and its sudden appearance in 1908 or 1912 fail to see the complexities of the official 
nationalism. Instead of perpetuating this claim, it is more helpful to pay attention to how Turkish 
nationalism was formulated during and after the Tanzimat era, be it Ottomanism, “pan-Islamism” 
or an outright Turkism. 
         Abdülhamid II’s policies, in many ways, were the culmination of this trend, i.e. 
                                                          
346




 Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 71. 
349
 Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları/ the Principles of Turkism, 57. 
100 
 
Ottomanism, which had started long before he came to power. Ottomanism was a policy to end 
the traditional state-subject relationship which had differentiated Ottoman subjects based on their 
religious affiliations. The Ottoman elite declared their intention to rectify inequalities among 
subjects stemming from the fact that their rights and social standing were directly affected by 
their religious faith. In the mid-19
th
 century, Ottoman leaders were supposed to grant subjects 
equal legal protection regardless of their religious backgrounds. It was declared “that all the 
subjects of the one state are members of the same nation.”350 This is how the state-religion 
relationship was to be replaced by that of state-nationality. Such policies aimed at redefining the 
Ottoman subject's relationship to the state-nation, and shifting their loyalties and obligations 
away from communal and religious identities. This shift in the state’s emphasis, as Karpat 
convincingly argues, “inadvertently moved toward giving political expression to the individual’s 
primordial identities within the nation-state. This individualistic orientation, however, arose 
within the organizational and institutional framework of the ‘Turks’’ political culture, which was 
premised partly on the supremacy of state authority.”351 
            In its essence, this modern redefinition of the subject under the guise of Ottomanism 
naturally resulted in the redefinition of the sovereign, by which the traditional Muslim-Turk was 
replaced by the Turk. As such, Turkishness was no longer simply the sovereign’s incidental 
ethnic lineage; it became the source of politico-cultural restructuring of society. The emphases on 
markers of Turkish identity were becoming clearer by the 1870s—the first constitutional era.  In 
the second half of the 19
th
 century the idea of racial and linguistic unity beyond the state’s 
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boundary was gaining currency.
352
 Sati‘ al-Husry asserts that al-istitrak, Turkification,353 of the 
language, was popular only among small circles of literati. It began with the Tanzimat reforms 
and was later followed by the Turkification of history and the state.
354
 Şerif Mardin has shown 
the significance of Young Ottoman works in their use and revival of the Turkish vernacular along 
with their romantic nationalism. Namik Kemal, who in 1872 declared “the desired future 
prosperity of the Islamic caliphate will be the contribution of the Turks in the first degree,”355 
was a Young Ottoman poet whose “patriotic poetry [was] filled with exhortations to save [the] 
fatherland…”356 He was even more rigorous than his “precursors [in his efforts for] the 
simplification of the Turkish language.”357 
It was against this background of the increasing emphasis on the ruling group’s ethnic identity 
that the 1876 Ottoman constitution declared Turkish as the official language of the Empire. 
However, despite this new legal and social valorization of and status conferred upon the Turkish 
language, and naturally upon its speakers in the multilingual Ottoman society, major components 
of Tanzimat reforms remained intact. Some issues were religiously more expedient to ignore; for 
example, “the principle of Ottomanism and equality of all regardless of religion was established 
                                                          
352
 Ergin, "Chromatic Turkishness: Race, Modernity, and Western Scholars in the Construction of  Turkish National 
Identity " 152. 
353
 As a policy, if it refers to something other than the politics of language, al-istitrak could mean the will to become 
a Turk or self-Turkification, since it contains the element of volition as opposed to al-tatrik, which is forcible and 
means to forcefully turn a non-Turk into a Turk.  
354
 Abu Khaldun Stai' Al-Husri, Muhadarat Fi Nushu' Al-Fikrah Al-Qawmiyah/ Lectures on the Idea of 
Nationalism(al-Qahirah: Matba'ah al-Risalah, 1951), 126-27. 
355
 Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," 771. 
356





with the inclusion of non-Muslims deputies…”358 
 The 1876 Constitution, even though it was soon to be overridden by the Sultan’s 
autocratic policies, still carried the goals and the ethos of Tanzimat and Ottomanism. The 
constitution was the legacy of bureaucrats and did not reflect the aspirations of Ottoman society 
at large “but [was a tool] designed to reshape society and legitimize control of government 
power.”359 
             The first Ottoman constitution as well as the Sultan’s so-called pan-Islamist policies 
should be looked at as political strategies devised as responses to increasing internal and external 
pressure that forced the state to reformulate its strategy of survival. However, on the whole, this 
strategy signified the increasing political will of the state to reshape its own society and to stave 
off increasing foreign pressures. As such, in addition to the reorganization of the state 
bureaucracy, the elites hoped to bring legitimacy to the state both internally and internationally. 
These changes had a long lasting impact on Ottoman-Turkish politics and thus understanding this 
era accurately is key to our understanding of the later Republican period.
360
 Abdülhamid II was 
the supreme player in this environment and his policies should be seen in this new context of 
ever dominating Turkish official nationalism.
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Abdülhamid II’s pan-Islamism/ Nationalism 
 
Abdülhamid II’s pan-Islamism was not a revival of Islam as a religion per se;361 it was the 
revival of Muslim subjects’ political identity within a Turkish cultural context inside Ottoman 
boundaries. It should also be viewed as an attempt to create a unified stance against European 
colonialism. However, the religious discourse of the state and the reinvigoration of an Islamic 
identity was one of the most effective strategies that the Hamidian state had adopted for the 
survival of the empire. This is how Abdülhamid II tried to veil the state’s official nationalism 
internally and to preserve the Empire’s universalist image in the Muslim world at large. To 
explain the façade of an ‘Islamic revival’ within a Turkish cultural framework, we shall attend to 
three important components of the Ottoman official nationalism: Ottoman Islam and linguistic 
nationalism, the history of educational and linguistic Turkification, and nationalism and the 
politics of pan-Islamism. 
 
1. Official language and Turkification  
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  Anderson’s insights with respect to other empires are also applicable to Ottoman official 
nationalism.  As noted before,
362
 reflecting on the unfolding official nationalism of the Hapsburg 
empire, Anderson claims that German was “increasingly acquiring a double status: ‘universal-
Imperial’ and ‘particular-national.’”363 It seems that in the Ottoman case, both Islam and Turkish 
acquired a similar double status: Turkish-Islam among Muslim subjects, and Turkish among all 
Ottoman subjects. Islam represented this double status of the Ottoman Empire as Turkishness 
increasingly fused into official Islam. The double status persisted with a greater public emphasis 
on Islam along with a gradual shrinkage of public space for the manifestation of non-Turkish 
identities. Moreover, Ottoman officials increasingly Ottomanized Islam in tandem with rigorous 
attempts at civilizing the periphery.
364
 The Ottoman elite or “the White [Men] wearing a fez,”365 
as Deringil labels them, progressively strove to turn Islam into a colonizing instrument.
366
 
Ottoman Islam gradually became infused with Turkishness and, according to Deringil, became 
“the condition of the difference” between the center and the periphery. It should be indicated that 
Turkishness and Islam had been mingled long before Abdülhamid II's accession to power, but not 
the way that some orientalist scholars have conceived of it.
367
 Also, Islam, in the pre-Republican 
period, did not make the Turks unconscious of their ethnic identity. On the contrary, Ottoman 
archival documents and papers reveal that the Turks were quite conscious of their ethnicity.  For 
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the Ottoman elite, Turkish language literacy was a criterion by which they could sometimes 
determine the degree of non-Turkish subjects’ loyalty. Inability to speak Turkish could be viewed 
both as a sign of backwardness and of disloyalty to the state. For example, in 1889 a protracted 
dispute between Christian and Muslim subjects resulted in the replacement of the bishop in 
Çeşme/Izmir. The bishop is referred to as one of the actors behind the prolongation of this 
dispute. He is accused of being under the influence of sources with “evil intentions” and is 
alluded to as someone who “did not even know Turkish (Türkçe bile bilmeyen).”368  
 Conceiving of Turkish as a factor that could ensure Ottoman subjects’ Muslimness (or 
Ottomanness, in the case of non-Muslims) seems to have had long roots in the Tanzimat period. 
Subjects who were not fluent in Turkish were seen as being amenable to foreign influence. 
Ottoman archival documents explicitly state that this language gap could represent both religious 
and political dangers.
369
 From the perspective of the elite, a person or a group who did not know 
Turkish could readily adopt non-Muslim culture, especially in the European side of the Ottoman 
territories.
370
 This notion of Turkishness becomes the intersection of Islam and nationalism, as 
Turkish language was perceived as a protecting shield against foreign cultural invasion. An 1865 
report by the inspector of the Third Army explains why Turkish, “the sublime language of the 
state,”371 should be taught in Kigalık and Toskalık, part of Ottoman territory in Europe.372 This 
document is evidence that even in the Tanzimat era, the Ottoman state considered other religions 
as threats to its integrity. Additionally, the report not only underscores the centrality of Turkish to 
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official policy, but also reveals the connections made between Turkish language and Islam. It is 
stated that because of their lack of Turkish literacy, most of the people in that region had 
embraced Greek costumes (meşreb) and religion, which could result in grave consequences for 
the state.
 373
  At the end, the report recommends the instruction of the “sublime language of the 
state” as a panacea. The inspector, along with other officials in the region, proposes Turkish 
instruction as the best deterrent to the infiltration of foreign religion and culture and therefore to 
a potential loss of those territories.
374
 It is clear that the Ottoman elite’s perception of Turkish, 
both as a unifying factor and, more interestingly, as a proselytizing medium, goes back as far as 
the 1860s.  As stated, all high-ranking local Ottoman officials unanimously held that the Turkish 
language could safeguard both Islam and Ottoman lands in those regions.
375
 Hence, these 
officials unanimously wrote the Minister of Education about the vital role of Turkish instruction 
in halting the people’s assimilation into a non-Muslim culture.376  This document reinforces the 




The Ottoman elite’s attitudes legitimated the civilizing role of Islam in the center.378 
Furthermore, it underscores the fact that in the Tanzimat period Islam continued to be a major 
component of Ottomanism and remained an important aspect of the Empire’s identity. This not 
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only demonstrates an embedded utilitarian view about Islam, but also throws the inclusiveness of 
Ottomanism into question. The ethnic bent of Ottomanist Islam becomes particularly clear in the 
context of official reliance on the Turkish language as a vital medium for the spread of Islam, 
especially in the Empire’s European domain.  
 In the eyes’ of the Ottoman elite, the nature of Islamic understanding in the periphery was 
located outside the cultural framework of Turkishness. This view constituted the locus of the 
Ottoman Turkish elite’s specific mission and unique role.379 The aforementioned examples 
illustrate that the elite saw themselves as the only capable agent for a true interpretation of Islam; 
an interpretation that, among other things, generally takes places in accordance with the Empire’s 
interest and integrity. Strong support for this interpretation can be found in Namik Kemal’s 
poem, Vatan, which advocates the elimination of any non-Turkish language to ensure the unity of 
the homeland.
380
 Turks were perceived as being different from all other Muslims. Thus, within 
Ottoman-Turkish Islamic discourse, agency is completely stripped from the periphery, as 
Ottoman-Turks exclusively bore the responsibility for modernizing Islam and society. In the 
early 1870s, Namik Kemal was explicit about the central role of Turks in the Empire. Despite 
their past contribution to the Muslim world, Kemal could only imagine Arabs as passive 
beneficiaries of the Turkish contribution to the “future prosperity of the Islamic caliphate.”381 
Though religious discourse was dominant, especially during the reign of Abdülhamid II, ignoring 
the nationalist character of this Islamic discourse obscures our understanding of what was really 
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going on. State discourse emphasized Islam as the common bond, but “ultimately justified 
Ottoman Turkish rule over Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, over Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, 
Bulgarians, etc.”382  
 During the first constitutional period, the Ottoman elite “had a clear notion that the Turks 
constituted the ‘fundamental element’ (unsur-u asli) of the empire,”383 a belief that even the 
Sultan was not hesitant to express.
384
 Abdülhamid II himself believed in the instrumentality 
Islam for assimilating the non-Turkish populations, such as that of the Kurds, especially in 
Anatolia. The Sultan’s remark that “we need to strengthen the Turkish element in Anatolia and 
[at the same time] give priority to making the Kurds part of us”385 clearly reveals the Ottoman 
state’s ethnic assimilationist policies. 
  In the eyes of the Ottoman elite, the gap between Turks and other Muslims was 
significant. To Ottoman officials like Osman Nuri Paşa, the Vali of Hijaz, only non-Turks’ 
abandonment of their identity—which the Ottomans generally viewed as mere manifestations of 
savagery and backwardness—could bridge this gap.386 What Makdisi calls “Ottoman 
Orientalism” can be situated in this very perception of the other, which was nurtured within 
Ottoman Islamic discourse.
387
 Thus, Ottoman Islamic discourse was exclusionary and 
ethnocentric. Embracing a full-fledged cultural Turkishness was a step in the right direction 
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because this was the only equalizing possibility for non-Turks.
388
 Traces of this cultural 
definition of Turkishness are visible in Republican discourse as well, where Turkishness is 
defined as a type of cultural gestation or as a process of becoming. However, in the Republican 
definition of Turkishness, Islam is less visible (yet, still present and regulated). 
 Ottoman officials’ increasing emphasis on the central role of the Turks in the protecting 
Islam and the state and reveals their utilitarian view of Islam. They saw the instrumentality of 
Islam: a) in the state’s civilizing practices that pitted “our” Islam vs. “theirs,”389 b) in the state’s 
call for general Islamic unity in the face of European aggression, since these calls were 
predicated on the supposed Islamic unity of the empire and on a shared understanding of Islam 
by all Muslims, whereby Islam was an equalizing element. However, these calls for Islamic unity 
were paradoxical, because the Ottoman elites’ civilizing mission was based on the invalidity of 
all other existing interpretations of Islam. That the Ottoman state advocated a universal Muslim 
unity only when it corresponded to its own interest highlights the instrumental use of Islam. c) 
The Ottoman state also utilized Islam as a legitimizing tool; the others’ Islam was only affirmed 
when it could entrench the subordinated status of the periphery in the absence of the state’s 
military might.
390
 In other words, it was invoked only when it functioned as “a hegemonic 
totalization.”391 These explicit contradictions in the state’s Islamic discourse seem to be one of 
major the causes for the emergence of peripheral Islamic nationalist discourse. 
 This instrumental use of Islam is further apparent when we note that Ottoman policy 
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privileged Turkish over Arabic, which has historically been an integral part of Islamic culture. 
Emphasizing the uniqueness of Turkish Islam required decoupling Islam from Arabic, and a new 
interpretation of the religion more in tune with the rise of nationalistic tendencies. As philology 
gained greater currency in Ottoman circles, language, progress, and ethnicity were increasingly 
tied together and affected the elite’s reinterpretation of Islam along with their views of others. An 
1885 debate over the connection between the Arabic language and Islam strongly exemplifies 
these new developments.  
 In 1885, an Arab journalist named Nacib Nader wrote, “in my opinion, in Arabic unlike 
European languages (elsiney-i ifrenciye), which look like children’s toys, we can express any 
ideas in the most eloquent manner.”392 He added that “up to this day, the Turkish language has 
yet to have a grammar that it deserves (layikine). Therefore, the truth is, without knowing proper 
Arabic, writing good Turkish is almost impossible.”393 These assertions outraged some of the 
most prominent Ottoman intellectuals. People like the renowned Ottoman lexiconist, Shams al-
Din Sami, mocked Nader publicly, calling him “a vagrant Maronite from Lebanon.” Sami wrote 
that he understood neither Nader’s intent nor his point in making those remarks. He added: “may 
God turn me (not into an Arab) [but worse,] into a black Arab
394
 (bendeniz bundan bir şey 
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 Erâb, according to Sami’s own Turkish dictionary (Kamûs-ı Türkî), is “a black Arab, [the term is] used for those 
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anladımse ‘arab değil’ erâb olayım),395 if I have understood any of this and pretend that I have 
not.” 396 Sami also objected that no Ottoman, by which he meant no Turk, could agree with 
Nader Efendi’s assertions about the Ottoman language. For Sami, unlike Arabic, the real 
Ottoman language was neither concealed in books, nor had it degenerated. Furthermore, no one 
needed Arabic to write in proper Turkish since the two are from completely different language 
families: one is Semitic and the other is “Turani.”397 These polemical writings continued for 
about a fortnight until the palace ordered an end to the discussion over “Arabic language and 
Arabic sciences, since [it] could confuse people’s minds.”398 The debate, however, lasted long 
enough to reveal the Ottoman elite’s view of Arabic and its connection to religion, progress, and 
the sciences.  
 In his initial reaction to Nader, Sami compared Arabic to European languages like 
English, French and German and claimed that these three languages were perfect as they 
constituted the pillars of modern civilization, sciences, and technology.
399
 Sami’s claim regarding 
the connection between language and civilization illustrates the influence of the philological 
discourse of the period that held that there was a direct corollary between people’s progress and 
the language they used.
400
 In some instances, his remarks much resemble Renan’s famous line 
about Semitic and Aryan languages, especially when he notes that Arabic is a great language for 
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expressing poetic imagination (hiyalat-i şairane), but when it comes to its application to 
technology and science, Arabic is not even “comparable to third rate European languages like 
Russian.”401 Here, Sami is almost copying Orientalists such as Renan who believed that “the 
sensual nature of the Semitic tongues is well suited to the singularly affective character of 
Semitic poetry.”402 Despite this unique poetic capability, however, Renan claimed that Semitic 
languages were inept at articulating “abstract terms and concepts born of rational effort.”403  
Sami’s critics had defended Arabic as a language that was uniquely developed due to its great 
grammatical features, like numerous dual and plural pronouns and conjugation not present in 
many other languages. However, Sami disagreed with this interpretation, contending that though 
the languages of some “savage peoples in Africa” have the same features, this does not mean that 
their languages are well-developed.
404
   
  Sami had recently written a linguistic book based on “a science that is called ‘linguistic’, 
in the civilized world … For the first time, I presented this humble work in our own language by 
consulting all the available literature, in different languages on this specific science.”405 It is clear 
that philological studies were popular in Ottoman intellectual circles and even outlandish 
speculations made by philologists as part of their construct of an Aryan-Semitic myth seem to 
have been taken seriously by Ottoman intellectuals. The philological discussions over Adam’s 
language in the Garden of Eden, is one such example. In questioning the sacredness of Arabic, 
Ahmet Midhet, one of the most prolific Ottoman intellectuals, refers to a book revealed to Adam 
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in Eden, supposedly in Sanskrit.
406
  
 It should be noted that these discussions also attest to the fact that not every Ottoman 
subject was considered Ottoman. With regards to the Asian territories of the Empire, philology’s 
racial and linguistic classifications of “Semitic” people deepened the existing chasm between the 
center and the periphery. This can be inferred from the utterly scornful responses of Ottoman 
intellectuals to the Arab journalist, Nacib Nader, when he criticizes them for preferring French 
terms over the existing Arabic equivalents in Ottoman textbooks.
407
 Midhat expressed his 
outrage over Nader’s criticism by using some common stereotypes about Arabs and wrote that 
we advise him to go and teach [his nonsense] in Palestine, in Morocco or in whatever 
hellish place (cehennem) he could teach it. The Ottomans do not really need this…In 
the age of modernity and progress they [the likes of Nader] cannot convince us to 
incorporate their nonsense in the Ottoman educational system… If they are intent to 
serve, we will help them, otherwise it is up to them whether they want to spend their 
times in taverns or Arabia, they should just go and get lost; amidst serving our nation, 
we have no time for their gibberish (turrahat).
408
 (Emphases added) 
Like most literature in this period, this debate also illustrates that the Ottoman elite was 
not contemptuous of the Turks or the Turkish language. On the contrary, they took great pride in 
their Turkishness and in reforming Turkish, what Midhat terms as “serving our nation.” Some 
like Midhat went so far as to say that “we are basically the zealots409 of the Ottoman410 
language.”411 This was Midhat’s reply when a young poet accused him of failing to exhibit his 
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usual forcefulness to emphasize that Turkish was on par with French in its development. 
412
 
 The most revealing aspect of this debate, however, is the way in which it symbolizes the 
Ottoman elite’s dilemma regarding the ties between Islam and Arabic culture and language. It is 
hard to determine how much their views had been affected by philological studies; however, 
philology introduced newer ideas about the connection of race, language and progress, which 
figured prominently in Ottoman elite’s nationalist thought, especially in the last quarter of the 
19
th
 century. While Muslims consider Arabic the medium of revelation, it gradually came to be 
known as the language of the “Semitic people,” which philologists claimed was stuck in an 
infantile stage of development. On the one hand, as Muslims, the Ottoman elite, like Sami and 
Midhat, had to acknowledge the absolute truth of the revelation through Arabic, and on the other, 
philologists like Renan designated Arabic as a ‘Semitic language,’ “incapable of articulating 
abstract terms.”413 The elite’s ready embracement of these pseudo-scientific views of Arabic as 
deficient and backward increasingly made it tempting to decouple Arabic from Islam. The 
following passage from Ahmet Midhat vividly shows such an attempt to distance Islam from 
Arabs and Arabic, when he declares: 
They say Arabic language is sacred, why is that? Because, [we are told that] the holy 
Qur’an…is in Arabic. Great! Does this mean only the ignorant are Muslims? We are all 
Muslims. With our service, we have already proven that we own a greater Islamic zeal 
than they do … Is the language of the Qur’an the same as the gibberish of Arabic 
(acwakli fulanly) spoken by Najib Nader? This is just impossible; because since the 
time they set foot on the earth, to the day on which the Qur’an was revealed, and now 
thirteen hundred years to that day, the Arabs have yet to be able to imitate or to produce 
a single verse as eloquent as, and as supreme linguistically (i’cazi fashat) as the Quran. 
This means that the Qur’an is not the word of Arabs; it is not Arabic; it is Allahce414 
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(the language of God).
415
 
To resolve the incompatibility of the Qur’an with “the science of philology,” and to 
relegate Arabic to a secondary role to Turkish, Midhat dissociates the Qur’an from a “primitive 
Semitic” language. Apparently, for Midhat, the commonly held Muslim view about the 
miraculous inimitability of the Qur’an (i‘jaz) was not reconcilable with its revelation through a 
“Semitic language.” 
 Unlike Midhat, Sami refrained from questioning ‘the sacredness of Arabic language.’ 
Perhaps hoping not to offend conservative groups or to throw his new philological findings about 
Arabic into question, Sami tried to find a middle ground. He even went so far as to state that all 
Islamic languages are sacred and Arabic is the most sacred of all.
416
 By way of giving examples, 
Sami strove to show that the weaknesses of Arabic were real but they had no bearing on the 
sacredness of language. For instance, stated Sami, an architect builds a mediocre mosque and a 
house that is spectacular in every sense.
417
 The mosque’s structure is in no way comparable to 
that majestic house, but despite the mosque’s great architectural deficiencies, it is holy and the 
house is not. In this way Sami hoped to assure his audience that when he talked about the 
deficiencies of Arabic, he had only its scientific flaws (fununce nuksani) in mind. He also 
challenged his opponents and contended that if they possess any knowledge of this ‘new 
science,’ they should make their arguments accordingly.418 Of course, Sami’s respect for Arabic 
could not be extended to Arabs or even to contemporary Arabic—the first were viewed as 
“primitives” and the second as “degenerated.” To Sami, for the past several centuries, the overall 
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Arab contribution to Islam had been negative. Addressing the Arabs, he noted that 
for the last seven to eight centuries, those who have tried to protect Islam for the cause 
of Allah were not Arabs, but Turks and other nations who joined the Turks in that 
cause, whom are not well known to be adored by you. In this entire time, the Arabs 
have not done anything but to prove and unveil their primitive ignorance and to label 
Turkish mujahids…as Christians.419   
Now, it becomes clearer that the insertion of the language clause in the final draft of the 
1876 Constitution under the aegis of Abdülhamid II was not a mere accident. The language 
clause was part of the most significant text in Ottoman history that illustrated the ruling elite’s 
thoughts, views, and philosophy for ‘the reordering or reassertion of things’ in late Ottoman 
society. The Constitution was a text, and as van Dijk maintains, a text has to have a context or a 
discourse,
420
 which in this case gave a centrality to the Turkish language. In modern times, 
language, any language, is more a political phenomenon than a cultural one, and therefore 
modern states’ policies and attitudes regarding language must not be perceived as being 
apolitical.
421
 Declaring a particular language as the official one in a multilingual context signifies 
the change in this context, or as James Scott and Eugen Weber have suggested, unveils the 
domestic colonization of the other.
422
  
 No Ottoman Sultan besides Abdülhamid II had ever been so attentive to giving a religious 
outlook to his politics. While Arabic, unlike Turkish, was traditionally supposed to be the 
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language of religious instruction, it received no official attention under the Sultan’s rule.423 This 
very attempt in and of itself was an official declaration of the secondary role assigned to all 
languages and their speakers. Through such a linguistic hierarchization, “[t]he organization of 
power… telling us who is included and who is left out, it also differentiates the bounded political 
community internally. This it does by acknowledging different kinds of identities in law.”424 
Considering the historical context of his accession to power and his ostentatious claim to 
religiosity, Abdülhamid’s action was overtly unorthodox. Why the ruling ethnic groups’ language 
was declared official when the state was adamant about radically reasserting its religious 
identity? Is this paradoxical?   
 The language issue clearly represents another aspect of ‘the double status’ of Turkish and, 
in a sense, another area of contestation between the dominant and the dominated. Unlike 
dominated groups, the Ottoman officials, however, did not view it as a paradox. As indicated 
above, they had already particularized Islam, the universalist aspect of the Empire, in their 
hierarchal (re)interpretation. This interpretation itself represented the merger of Ottoman-Turkish 
Islam with their official nationalism. Also, it was a step further in the recognition of their own 
ethnicity as the “foundational element” of the Empire. The Ottoman linguistic hierarchy, which 
the new constitutional stipulation introduced into a multilingual and multiethnic context, reveals 
the new aspects of “us” versus “them.” Therefore, from the perspective of Ottoman officials, 
granting Turkish a unique status was not a contradiction, but rather a reinforcement of their 
already hyphenated identity: Turkish-Islamic identity. Both Islam and the Turkish language were 
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domains of negotiating the differences between the dominant and the dominated. The uniqueness 
of Turkish Islam, understood as the unique role of Ottoman elites
425
 and their capability in 
serving Islam,
426
 overlaps with the Ottoman definition of Khilafa as well.
427
 Others were seen as 
lacking these qualities and therefore learning Turkish would have provided the right tools for 
them to remain both Muslim and Ottoman. Hence, both Islam and Turkish constituted the main 
conditions of difference and inequality and became manifestations of positions of power. As in 
their study of Habsburg multilingualism Schjerve and Vetter tell us, “investigating these 
inequalities means that we approach a closer understanding of how the respective languages and 
their speakers negotiate their different power positions and, ultimately, what kind of conflicts 
these negotiations were to bring about at a specific historical time.”428  
 It should be stated that in the same period, the Russian and Hapsburg Empires too were 
grappling with competing nationalisms and were forced to deal with and to produce specific 
national language policies. These changes in various multilingual settings were to take place 
within a specific discourse of official nationalism. Therefore, “We must … bear in mind that 
diglossic relations are constituted through discourse, since discourse provides for the ideological 
                                                          
425
 Zürcher points out that at the end of the 1860s, with the publication of Mecelle by Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, the 
Ottoman elite’s Islam began to diverge from other interpretations. According to Zürcher, the Ottoman elite were 
“[i]nspired by positivism, they were vehemently anti-clerical, but with the possible exception of Abdullah Cevdet, 
the ‘atheist philosopher’ (dinsiz mutefekkir) every one of them saw in a ‘true’ or ‘purified’ Islam, a ‘rational’ 
religion, which was open to science, a valuable building block of Ottoman reconstruction and a social cement.” 
Zürcher, "The Importance of Being Secular: Islam in the Service of the National and Pre-National State," 60. 
426
 See: Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism." 
427
 As state  above, the Ottoman rule defended that the establishment of order per se was considered as a service to 
Islam regardless of how the caliph ruled. 
428
 Rosita Rindler Schjerve and Eva Vetter, "Historical Sociolinguistics and Multilingualism: Theoretical and 
Methodological Issues in the Development of a Multifunctional Framework," in Diglossia and Power Language 
Policies and Practice in the 19th Century Habsburg Empire ed. Monica Heller  Richard J. Watts(Berlin ; New York: 
Mouton de Gruyter, 2003), 39.  
119 
 
basis upon which diglossic is produced, maintained and eventually changed.”429 
 As indicated earlier, both Deringil and Makdisi argue that Ottoman colonialism or 
Orientalism was some type of adaptation of the enemy i.e., the West’s strategy in restructuring its 
periphery. The Ottomans were not acting much differently in their adaptation of linguistic 
strategies either, as shown by one of Abdülhamid’s decrees in 1894.430 When their Turkification 
policies regarding language are compared with that of the other empires, such as the Russian and 
Hapsburg empires, the Ottomans appear quite up to date in their official nationalism. The 
Hapsburgs were actually much more accommodating and unlike that of the Ottomans, the 
Hapsburg “constitution of 1867 decreed that every ethnic group should have the right of 
maintaining and protecting its nationality and language.”431 The language policy reflected in the 
first Ottoman constitution was more like that of the Russian state’s language policies during “the 
Reign of Alexander II (1881-94) [in which] Russification [became] official dynastic policy: Long 
after…other nationalisms had appeared in the Empire.”432 It seems there was a general and an 
evolutionary trend that showed greater state emphasis on language corresponding to the gradual 
invigoration of official nationalism.  
 In the Ottoman context, this greater emphasis on Turkish was followed by certain 
practical limitations and excessive sensitivity to the linguistic demands and activities of 
dominated groups. In 1907 Said Nursi, a renowned Kurdish scholar, requested the inclusion of 
the Kurdish language in the education system. As a result he was transferred to a mental hospital, 
                                                          
429
 Ibid., 38. 
430
 BOA : Dosya No 1312/1, Gömlek No: 27, Fon Kodu: M/101, i. HUS. [ 07.26. 1894]. This letter is attended to in 
some length in the next section below.  
431
 Susanne Czeitschner, "Discourse, Hegemony and Polyglossia in the Judicial System of Trieste in the 19th 
Century," in Diglossia and Power Language Policies and Practice in the 19th Century Habsburg Empire, ed. 
Monica Heller and Richard J. Watts(Berlin ; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003). 
432
 Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism: 87. 
120 
 
which marked the culmination of a trend that illustrates the Ottoman state’s reaction to the non-
Turkish Other’s ethnic and linguistic demands. Attending to this event in his book on Nursi, Şerif 
Mardin explains Abdülhamid II’s reaction as his extra sensitivity to the state’s unity, thus 
ignoring the ethnic aspect of Nursi’s demand.433 Mardin is right in pointing to Abdülhamid’s 
sensitivity. However, he overlooks language as one of the battlegrounds of nationalism and 
therefore relates the event mostly to Abdülhamid’s personal paranoia.434 Abdülhamid famously 
“ordered huzur dersleri (lessons in ‘royal’ audience), where young scholars could challenge the 
established ulema, to be given in Turkish rather than in Arabic, as it had long been the 
tradition.” 435  
 The weight that a modern state ascribes to a particular language in a multilingual socio-
political context unveils the nature of the ethnic and linguistic power relations. Therefore, it 
should not be isolated from the overall nationalist tendencies of the ruling nations. The issue of 
language and its connection to the integrity of the nation-state or its creation has been a matter of 




 century, nationalists, dominant 
and otherwise, have taken this issue of language and its connection with political power very 
seriously. Nationalistic tendencies, in multilingual social contexts are much concerned with “the 
diglossic distribution,” to borrow Schjerve and Vetter’s phraseology. Therefore, “language 
domain behaviors” 436 are fertile grounds for detecting nationalistic tendencies.  
 It the era of nationalism, the fear of a polity with a diverse linguistic make up has always 
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been present. In Conner’s terms, it is seen as a factor that in the event of crises could easily turn a 
country into pieces.
437
 In the modern era, “[t]his way of thinking is not new. In the eighteenth 
century, Herder and Fichte were declaring that the basis of a nation, and its genius, lay in its 
language.”438 As shown below, Ottoman state documents reveal that Ottoman elite generally 
considered language as “the basis of the nation.”   
 The issue of official language is central to the project of modern nation-state building and 
nationalism. Charles Taylor, elaborating on Gellner’s insight, points to the importance of the 
issue of official language and linguistic demands in modern nationalist rivalries. He states: 
What Gellner has done, which is very valuable, is define some of the very important 
stakes of a nationalist struggle. Just because the modern state does sustain an official 
language/culture, it becomes of ultimate significant to those with a strong national 
identity to get some kind of control of the state.
439
 
Yet, despite its significance, Hamidian linguistic nationalism has rarely been attended to, some 
aspects of that period’s “obsessive linguistic talks” have been the focus of a few important works 
by the historians of the late Ottoman Empire.
440
 The fights and wrangling over languages, 
official and otherwise, in the modern era, are directly connected with the fight over controlling 
the state and therefore it is a nationalist fight.  
 The linguistic and ethnic policies of the Hamidian regime seem to be among the least 
studied subjects partly because of this regime’s insistence on its religious character. This is in 
addition to the later Kemalist depiction of it ‘as the wholly religious other.’  As shown below, the 
Hamidian regime had a systematic project of linguistic Turkification, which their contemporary 
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non-Turkish Muslims were well aware of. 
 The emphasis on language and its political nature in the Hamidian era should be seen in 
the context of nationalism. The late 19
th
 century language debates illustrate the fact that the 
Empire’s different groups were becoming increasingly aware of the connection between the role 
of language and political power as they embraced nationalist views. Renowned Muslim revivalist 
Rashid Rida’s views best represent the language and ethnic politics of the era within a religious 
framework. Rida’s views are a paramount example of the interconnectivity of religion and 
nationalism, and the respective role of language in the late Ottoman context. 
 In the late 1880s, as the Hamidian regime pushed for stricter Turkification policies in the 
realms of education and state-bureaucracy, Arab revivalists like Rida were also advocating for 
Arabic to be recognized as the empire’s official language. Such efforts at first glimpse might 
seem to be rooted only in the likes of Rida’s religious concerns and sensitivities. However, the 
subtext of his writings continually shows that his concerns go beyond pure religiosity and reflect 
the ongoing battle of the time.
 441
 They show that the politics of language of that time could not 
be easily separated from its racial and nationalistic politics. As Haddad has shown, Rida was well 
aware of the nationalistic and political implications of diverse languages for the state when 
advocating that Arabic be granted the status of the sole official language in the Empire: 
The society should…strive to unify the language of religion and of the state by making 
Arabic the official language of the Ottoman state. Rida held that such unification would 
result in both secular
442
 and religious benefits. It would spread the language of religion 
and abolish the racial differences between the Arabs and the Turks. For Rida, at that 
point, language was the criterion of race, and competing languages would breed 
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conflicts between the races of the Ottoman Empire in the same way they bred conflicts 




It is important to remember that at the turn of the 20
th
 century, some Kurdish activists 
also used language as the main platform to further their national cause. As an Ottoman Kurdish 
intellectual, Bàbàn posited, “the basis of the liberation of a nation is not national liberation but 
education. The key to education is language. The gate to civilization will be opened by this 
key.”444 Persian and Turkish reformists, who were striving for the creation of a strong nation 
respectively, deemed language as one of the most important building blocks of the nation. It is 
not surprising that from the second half of the 19
th
 century onwards, they advocated purifying 
their respective languages as a way of eliminating their Others in their linguistic space. They 
thought that a simple, publicly accessible language, along with a modernized education system 
could provide sufficient tools for their nations to enter the gate of ‘Civilization’ and to survive in 
the face of European colonialism. It was in this context that Mirza Aqa Khan-e Kirmani (1854 - 
1896/97), who spend the later years his of life in Istanbul, stated that the “nation is a polity 
(Umma), which speaks a single language” and its “strength (qavam) is founded in its 
language.”445 Hence, it was not an accident that “Sultan Abdülhamid II…was also for increasing 
administrative efficiency through the use of a single language.”446  
 Language was becoming one of the important battlegrounds of nationalism, and modern 
linguistic policies generally reflected this dialectical relationship between opposing 
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nationalisms—of the dominant and dominated ethnic groups. Dominant nationalism usually 
takes its right to sovereignty for granted, while from a dominated ethnic group’s standpoint this 
assumption could be the loci of the dominant Other’s hegemony. Again, the domain of language 
becomes the battleground for different ethnic groups to engage in “claiming [or reclaiming] one’s 
nation” to use Janet Klein’s phrase.447 
 It is against the background of linguistic nationalism in the Ottoman context that by the 
end of the 19
th
 century some Kurdish intellectuals decided to publish an Ottoman-Kurdish paper 
called Kurdistan.
448
 It was an attempt on the part of those intellectuals to revive and modernize 
Kurdish language, while Ottoman officials regarded this journal as the “accursed Kurdish 
(Kürtçe mel'ûne).”449 By the last quarter of the 19th century, the overall emphasis on one’s 
language and place in connection to one’s ethnicity increasingly became an issue for communal 
rivalries.
450
 As Ottoman state documents demonstrate, rewards given to one’s own language, on 
the part of the dominated groups, could signify the fading of their sense of belonging to the 
dominant language and the official nationalism.
451
 The Ottoman state’s severe reactions to the 
linguistic activities of the dominated ethnic groups are also a testimony to the then growing 
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linguistic nationalism. The Hamidian state went so far as to collect
452
 traditional Kurdish 
religious books such as elegiac poetry that praised the Prophet of Islam (naat) or  the Albanian 




2. History of Educational and Linguistic Turkification 
Why has the phenomenon of linguistic nationalism in the late Ottoman period been 
generally overlooked? As indicated above, Kemalist and orientalist depictions of late Ottoman 
state and society as the universe of the homo religiosus should not be overlooked. Even in the 
face of indisputable evidence of linguistic discrimination, the Kemalists persist in denying that 
the Hamidian state was biased in favor of Turkish. For instance, they claimed Kurdish was 
forbidden as a language of instruction
454
 not because of the preferential status accorded to 
Turkish, but because Kurdish was an “unsophisticated language.”455  
 There is important body of scholarship, which does not question arbitrary beginning for 
the emergence of Turkish nationalism. For instance, Hasan Kayalı states that “the main 
proposition of [his] study is that among the chief Muslim groups of the Ottoman Empire political 
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nationalism was not a viable force until the end of World War I.” 456  Yet, others scholars claim 
that the major display of Turkish nationalism was: “In the second annual convention [of the 
CUP], which met in Salonica in November 1910, it decided that the Turkish language be 
employed in all schools throughout the Empire, aiming at denationalization of all non-Turkish 
communities and instilling of patriotism among the Turks.”457 Nevertheless, as shown below, 





Another reason might be the slower pace of Turkification policies in the Ottoman Empire 
compared with that of the Republic. The enormous population of the empire, most of whom were 
unable to communicate in Turkish, was a major obstacle to the Ottoman state’s project to 
universalize its language. Therefore, one must not try to understand the Turkification of the 
Ottoman language by comparing it to that of the Republican project. The Kemalist state dealt 
with a more manageable population in which Turks constituted the majority. The enormous 
population and the vast geographical territories are mainly to blame for rendering the Empire’s 
linguistic policies less visible. More than anything, these realities should point to the fact that the 
Hamidian regime could not act identically everywhere all the time. Although the Hamidian 
state’s official nationalism could be considered a major component of its survival strategy or a 
paradigmatic requirement, the state would have had to compromise it in the face of more urgent 
and pressing necessities. Therefore, many of the state’s documents, directives and regulations 
had to be translated into non-Turkish languages before regional policies could be put into 
practice. However, even in such circumstances, the use of non-Turkish languages has always 
been referred to as an exception and a temporary measure. The code for making such exceptions 
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is the phrase “because this region’s people do not know Turkish.”458 This was the case from, at 
least the early 1880s onward in all Ottoman regions from Libya to Kurdistan.
459
  
 Archival documents such as those referenced above support al-Husri’s 460 contention that 
there existed a gradual Turkification of language from the Tanzimat period onward. Clearly, in 
this period a traceable trajectory and a steady growth of language nationalism are observable. It 
should be noted that the Hamidian regime’s censorship policies were notorious and could lead to 
misinterpretations of the intentions behind the state practices.  
 There could be instances that make it difficult for one to say whether it is nationalism, 
paranoia, or both, that can best explain the state’s restrictive policies with respect to non-Turkish 
languages. The rapid increase in the censorship policy of the Hamidian state in comparison with 
its predecessors might tempt one to dismiss the state’s behaviors in the linguistic domain. 
However, the richness of Ottoman archival documents makes such a dismissal impossible. They 
clearly show how the state recognized the ruling group’s language with a unique status and 
restricted other languages. As mentioned above, these behaviors in the language domain are 
sometimes confusing. However, by the end of the 19
th
 century the language of archival 
documents becomes clear enough and does not leave much room for misinterpretation. 
 It is common to interpret Abdülhamid’s language policies in the light of his regime’s 
security concerns, as we saw earlier in Şerif Mardin’s take on the Hamidian Palace’s reaction to 
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No:65, Fon Kodu: DH.MKT. Tarih: 29/Ş /1312/ (Hicrî) [1895]; BOA: Dosya No: 2646, Gömlek No:11, Fon Kodu: 
ŞD. Tarih: 22/Ra/1313/ (Hicrî) [1895]. 
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Said Nursi’s language reform proposal. We should bear in mind that the state, any state, has a 
variety of reasons for declaring one language as the official one. This very attempt is an official 
declaration and a legal reaffirmation of the privileged status of the ruling nation. In the age of 
nationalism, hardly any language receives official recognition without some ideological bases for 
this recognition, and therefore these types of politics cannot be innocent. 
 The Hamidian regime saw Turkification policies as a supplement to its security and 
disciplinary measures. The state was aware of the significance of its Turkification polices as an 
instrument of governmentality. Mere security approaches to official language cannot entirely 
reveal the embedded and hidden nationalistic view of “us” verses “them” in a diglossic context 
like that of the Ottoman Empire. Viewing such policies as security imperatives should not make 
us oblivious to the covert ethnic-based divisions in them.  
 From the mid-1880s onward, the state embarked on a dual policy of security and 
Turkification. Those policies concurrently aimed at the creation of a more Turkified public and 
the introduction of new security and disciplinary measures that could increase the state’s control 
simply by universalizing Turkish.
461
 In 1886 for instance, state laws had already criminalized 
advertisements of theatrical and other artistic activities
462
 (Tiyatro ve benzeri hususlara) even in 
foreign papers unless they appeared along with their Turkish rendition.
463
 In the following year, 
the state banned any language other than Turkish from being used in sending telegrams, both 
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within and outside Ottoman domains.
464
 Realizing the difficulties these restrictions had created 
for Europeans, about a decade later the state relaxed some of the communication-related 
restrictions. Subsequently, foreigners could use English, Italian, French and German in sending 
telegram messages.
465
 However, these provisions were not extended to non-European languages; 
restrictions remained in effect for Arabic, Persian or any other non-European languages.
466
 
Another example of the application of such disciplinary measures was to be seen in prisons, like 
the one in Kastamonu, which housed many prisoners from different backgrounds.
467
 Based on 
these new measures, inmates could not use any language other than Turkish in their 
correspondence with the outside world. Their letters had to be written in Turkish so that they 
could “be opened and read by postal workers in the local post office.”468  
 The Turkification of language followed a linear trajectory in the Ottoman Empire. The 
inauguration of the Tanzimat period in the first half of the 19
th
 century also marked the beginning 
of thinking of Turkish as the language of the state. From this period on, the spread of Turkish 
became part of the agenda of the Ottoman state. The thought behind a unified language could 
very well be a byproduct of the creation of the modern army, which also necessitated a singular 
medium of communication. Although Ottoman Administrative Records do not mention any type 
of language reform in the earlier periods of the 19
th
 century, there is evidence that in 1838 
attempts were made to teach soldiers Turkish in places like Erzurum, in Eastern Anatolia.
469
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 I have not yet encountered such documents in my research. However, this does not mean they do not exist. 
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According to archival records, efforts to spread Turkish among non-Turks took place less than a 
decade later.
470
 These records reveal that the people of Libya were perhaps among the first 
targets of state-led educational missions. In 1847, the Committee of Public Education (Maarif-i 
Umumiye Meclisi) attempted to establish a school in this region, in which Turkish would be the 
sole language of instruction.
471
 Arabic instruction in that school was deemed to be unnecessary 
since the people in that region “were all Arabs and already knew Arabic.”472 All teachers had to 
be sent from Istanbul. The document cites “the exceptional benefits of this measure” by referring 
to the fact that those people would learn “the language of the state (devletin lisani).” As such, 
they would have access “to the unmediated diktats and notifications (emr ve tenbih)” by the state 
and its officials.
473
   
 How do these behaviors “reflect the ideological background of specific diglossic power 
manifestations?”474 Are these practices not common state practices in the modern era? They 
surely are, and for this very reason, unlike what orientalists such as Bernard Lewis, and Kemalist 
historiographers want us to believe, these practices contain a great deal of assimilatory intent on 
the part of the dominant group. Ottoman archival documents show that in the beginning of the 
second half of the 19
th
 century, officials strove to turn the Turkish language into a means of 
creating a sense of loyalty to the state. Even if the 1847 education mission to Tripoli and 
Benghazi
475
 can be construed as a benevolent act to educate ‘poor African Arabs,’ teaching 
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Turkish to the Christian subjects of the empire in Paris does not look like an act of mere 
goodwill. In 1856, the aforementioned Committee (Meclis-i Maarif) decided to send a number of 
teachers to teach Turkish to the Christian subjects of the empire living in Paris.
476
 The 
Committee also declared its commitment to bear all the costs of this educational mission and to 
give financial aid to all the Christians who were residing in Paris and willing to study Turkish.
477
 
The state’s missions to teach Turkish do not seem to be limited to sporadic instances or to non-
Muslims subjects living abroad. Non-Muslim communities remained one of the major targets of 




 This seems to validate the above claims by 
Akçuraoğlu and Gökalp that the main objective of Ottomanism was the Turkification of non-
Turks.  
 Up to the mid-1880s, the general policy of the Ottoman state focused on giving 
incentives and encouragement to non-Muslim religious private schools. The state reimbursed 
private schools for all expenses incurred by teaching Turkish.
479
 According to the Education 
Department’s Regulations (Maarif nizamnamesine göre), even though non-Muslim private 
schools did not receive any governmental financial aid, Turkish instruction was regarded as an 
exception (müstesna) to this general rule.
480
 The Turkish language teachers in those schools 
received their salary directly from the Education Ministry.
481
 It became the official policy of the 
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state to help private religious schools with Turkish instruction. If a non-Muslim private school 
decided to hire a Turkish language instructor, s/he would have received her/his salary either from 
the Education Ministry or from the Treasury.
482
 The state, as indicated earlier, followed this 
policy until almost the mid-1890s. However, to carry out its Turkish language instruction 
policies, the state introduced a tough monitoring regime by the late 1880s.  
 In 1888, Ottoman officials were alarmed by a report that all the guards of the foreign 
councils in Salonika carried arms and that the local Christian schools did not comply with the 
Turkish education policy.
483
 After the immediate investigation, the authorities found out that 
though the first piece of news was not entirely accurate, Turkish was not being taught in Salonika 
schools. The Education Ministry received a warning that such a violation of the state’s Turkish 
instruction policies would hamper the universalization of Turkish language (türkçe te’mimi).484  
 In the 1890s, non-Muslim private schools faced even greater pressure to implement the 
state’s Turkish language instruction policy. In 1894, these schools received warnings that they 
were legally obliged to include Turkish language in their curricula.
485
 The Palace issued a decree 
claiming that European states were imposing their own languages without hesitation, not just in 
their own homelands, but even in lands they temporarily occupied.
486
 So, as the Christian schools 
in Ottoman domains were actively disseminating their own languages, they had to be forced to 
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teach the Turkish language.
487
 The Education Ministry was to plant an informant (muhbir) in the 
schools to observe student progress in learning the Ottoman language.
488
 This Ministry was also 
to appoint an inspector to closely mentor and examine the Turkish language proficiency of the 
students.
489
 If any school faltered in its compliance with these measures, it would face closure.
490
 
These new measures resulted in a scandal when the American embassy sent a protest letter to the 
Ottoman Foreign ministry. The letter was written by a schoolteacher in Beirut and harshly 
criticized the newly introduced language instruction policies.
491
 The letter even warned that the 
new Ottoman regulations could have breached mutually signed political protocols by the two 
states.
 492
 Though the Ottoman state had the right to impose the teaching of a specific language or 
religious belief in its own schools, such impositions on Christian schools, which were funded by 
the American people for the sole purpose of teaching Christians, according to the letter, could not 
be lawful at all.
493
 Almost a year later, the Ottoman Porte informed the Foreign Ministry that 
upon the Sultan’s order all foreign and non-Muslim schools had been notified about the benefits 
and significance of Turkish instruction. Additionally, the Porte’s letter indicated the suspension 
of the obligatory Turkish instruction in non-Muslim schools.
494
  
 From the Hamidian state’s point of view, Turkish language instruction had a strategic 
importance. Turkish instruction was seen as an extension of the state’s presence. The lack of 
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Turkish instruction at any school within the Empire’s domain was viewed with suspicion. 
Therefore, the state resorted to whatever means it could to guarantee the infiltration of Turkish in 
foreign and non-Muslim schools in its domain.  After the temporary suspension of obligatory 
Turkish instruction, the Hamidian state started giving incentives to Christian schools for teaching 
Turkish. So, it was only a few months later, in Balkan territories, that non-Muslim middle 
schools (rüşdiye) were promised official recognition and financial support if they complied with 
the state’s language policies.495  
  How one can be certain that the Hamidian state’s focus on language represented anything 
other than its security concerns? Were the state’s anxieties in any ways nationalistic?  
As mentioned earlier, if Benedict Anderson is right, official nationalism was “developed after, 
and in reaction to, the popular national movements proliferating in Europe since 1820s.” In some 
ways, the  later Ottoman state’s nationalism similar to that of other empires. The special weight 
that the Ottoman state ascribed to the official language was connected to the spread of 
nationalism since language has been a battlegrounds for competing nationalisms. 
 The ideological approach to language is clearly manifested in the concerns of Ottoman 
officials. A fascinating letter written by the Vali of Ankara to the Ottoman Education Ministry in 
1895 unveils the Ottoman official’s conception of a unified language as the guarantor of state 
unity.
496
 In his letter, the Vali offers a counter strategy to what he sees as the spread and success 
of Armenian and Greek languages in the educational sphere, specifically in their private 
Anatolian schools. The Vali states that up to a few years ago the Greeks and Armenians in Adana 
could only communicate in Turkish. However, just in few years, they were able to spread their 
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language successfully even in Anatolia. Now, their children easily communicate in their own 
languages.
497
 To the Vali, this amounted to a great loss and a threat. Therefore, he asserted that 
the state must act immediately and had to use its financial and spiritual means to bring those non-
Muslim schools under its control to educate them in accordance with its own policies. If the state 
delayed, warned the Vali, its non-Muslim subjects (zir destan) might entirely lose their Ottoman 
feelings (hissiyat) and costumes, as had happened before in Izmir and Edirne.
498
 In the last 
paragraph of his letter, the Vali indicated that though it was beyond his authority to take up such 
a role, yet, he had allocated some money for teaching Turkish to non-Muslims. He then 
concludes that the Education Ministry should take full control over
499
 non-Muslim schools with 
compassion (dilnevazi) and “spread Turkish” among them, since “spreading (vüsat) the language 
constitutes one of the foundations
500
 of the state’s unity.”501 
 It must be kept in mind that the Ottoman state’s linguistic Turkification policies do not 
appear different when it comes to dealing with its Muslim subjects. During the Hamidian regime, 
linguistic and cultural activities became the subject of much tougher measures in general. Before 
Abdülhamid came to power, the state had mostly resorted to giving incentives and awarding all 
Muslim and non-Muslim subjects for their efforts in learning Turkish.
502
 In some instances, 
officials rewarded parents for teaching Turkish to their children.
503
 Along with this, in 1870, the 
Education Ministry pushed for teaching Turkish and adopting it as a medium of communication 
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and instruction in various academic and scientific institutions like the medical academy and 
observatories— and to replace French with Turkish.504 Some instructors resisted the language 
change in the Imperial Medical Academy and insisted that the lack of a sufficient number of 
medical doctors had nothing to do with non-Turkish instruction.
505
 In addition, there were still 
not enough textbooks available in Turkish.
506
 (The report does not specify whether or not there 
were foreign professors among those who opposed the language change). However, the 
committee agreed with instructors. The committee’s report, to the Seresker, the Defense Minister, 
indicated that “originally foreign language was adopted because there were no Turkish 
instructors who could teach medicine.”507 The report also maintains that the lack of Turkish 
medical textbooks and instructors “did not mean that there was no obligation to teach in Turkish 
unless to do otherwise was unfeasible.”508 Whatever the reason “for neglecting obligatory 
Turkish instruction might have been,” stated the report, “the gradual use of foreign language 
eventually” replaced Turkish instruction in its entirety.509  
 The Ottoman intelligentsia provided theoretical grounds for many of these Turkification 
measures. Therefore, the state’s policies, in many ways, were foregrounded in the overall 
growing nationalistic tendencies among the elite. As stated earlier, a closer study of the Ottoman 
documents and literature with respect to linguistic issues should lead one to conclude that the 
Ottoman elite were not contemptuous of the Turks and Turkishness. On the contrary, they were 
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proud to promote Turkishness and Turkification policies, especially from the 1870s onward. For 
instance, in 1871, in a laudatory column, the Ottoman journal Terakki regarded the replacement 
of French instruction by Turkish, in the Imperial Medical Academy, as “a colossal change (tebdili 
cesime).”510 These changes had engendered debates among the elite, especially after some people 
had expressed their dissatisfaction with the replacement of French in the study of medicine. 
Apparently, some Ottoman medical doctors, along with foreign journalists, had raised questions 
about whether Turkish was sufficiently developed
511
 to be employed for medical studies.
512
 
These debates clearly unveil the prevalence of Orientalist and philological approaches to 
language. Also, the justifications for Turkifying the educational system manifest important traces 
of the growing nationalist sentiments.  
 These discussions on the replacement of French were replete with nationalistic 
expressions. The arguments for Turkish instruction were mostly nationalistic, even when such 
arguments were made in the form of analyzing the costs and benefits of foreign language 
learning. Writers of the Ottoman journal Terakki, who seem to be among the major proponents of 
both language reform and Turkification of the education system, saw resistance to Turkification 
as unpatriotic, if not stemming from outright ignorance. In an article titled taaccüp 
(astonishment), the columnist sounds appalled that there could be Turkish doctors arguing in 
favor of keeping French. Thus, he states: 
It is regretful (taasüf olunur) to see that there are Ottomans who even resist the idea of 
the translation of the science of medicine into Turkish (fen tibin türkçe tercümesi). 
Because what is expected from any individual is to demonstrate some zeal (gayret) and 
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patriotism (hamiyet) about the nation to which s/he belongs.
513
 
It is hinted that the intent behind the reforms was primarily to preserve Turkish language 
and dress. The foreign journalists’ argument against Turkish instruction is seen as normal.514 
However, some compatriots’ resistance to Turkish is viewed as troublesome since it could signify 
either their lack of patriotic zeal or lack of appreciation for education in Turkish. Nonetheless, 
the article asserts that the first was not the case. So, their resistance had to be rooted in their lack 
of self-confidence
515
 since it is ‘obvious’ that 
every nation has to safeguard its language and its costumes and has to be proud with 
the progress of its language. If we say that our language is not reformable and 
incapable of incorporating (ihate) [the technical terms of] the science of medicine, we 
make ourselves laughable before Westerners (ferankler)… These types of talks, which 
patently signify the lack of knowledge, are against the interest of the sons of our nation 




With the passage of time, these views become more entrenched. In 1875, the state made it 
a requirement for every secondary school (rüşdiye) in the empire to receive a copy of Takvim-i 
Vekayi on a regular basis.
517
 This new requirement aimed at helping this age group of students to 
become accustomed to reading Turkish.
518
 Introducing newspapers to school students was 
necessitated, as Anderson’s would say, by a certain “mode of apprehending the world.”519  
 In 1878, just two years after Abdülhamid’s accession to power, the journal Tercüman-ı 



















 appeared. Unlike Takvim-i Vekayi, this new weekly journal was published 
exclusively for students in secondary schools. Tercüman-ı Hakikat Weekly provides a window 
into Turkish official nationalism, Turkish self-perception of the time. This journal helps to grasp 
the ways in which these phenomena were inserted into or reflected in the students’ reading 
materials.  
 The journal was published by a group of intellectuals who were heavily under the 
influence of the new philological views on race, language, and progress discussed earlier. 
Therefore, the diglossic display of language in Tercüman-ı Hakikat Weekly is one of the more 
fascinating aspects of this paper. In general, it focuses on language reform. In a number of issues, 
an important portion of the journal is devoted to questions directed at students, such as: What is 
the origin of the Ottoman language? Does the Ottoman language need reform? Can it be purged 
of Arabic and Persian vocabulary and grammar? And finally, how should this language reform 
take place?
521
 Some of the responses to the above questions were published, since their content, 
we are told, corresponded with the publishers’ politics of language. The publisher awarded these 
respondents by giving them a book titled Philology
522
 for their contributions.
523
  
 The journal does not claim to be the first to initiate such a reform. On the contrary, the 
publishers seem to be grateful to changes due to some language reforms that had been initiated at 
least 15 years earlier. In one of these articles, it is stated that their current “literacy progress” had 
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become possible as a result of the previous 15 years of purging Turkish of Arabic and Persian 
vocabulary, without which “we would have still used those meaningless (soğuk ve tatsıs) Arabic 
and Persian words.”524 The article, however, does not refer to any individual or group who had 
been involved in those language purification efforts.
525
 We are told that it was not possible to do 
away with much of the Arabic and Persian vocabulary. However, most Arabic and Persian 
grammar could be weeded out of Turkish.
526
   
 Probably the most important aspect of the Tercüman-ı Hakikat Weekly is the weight it 
ascribes to Turkish language at the expense of other languages. In this journal, Turkish is usually 
referred to as the mother tongue of students who attend Ottoman secondary schools. The 
Turkishness of Muslim students is taken for granted. The hierarchical classification of the 
languages is also treated as a natural thing. For instance, references to the Arabic language 
surface in a series of articles but their appearance is relational. Arabic is talked about in relation 
to Turkish and discussed in the context of its usefulness to Turkish learning.
527
 There is a section 
on Serf (Arabic Sarf: grammar/conjugation) in most of the issues of the journal. The section 
starts with the justification for the discussion on Serf. We are told that the Ottoman students 
could study Serf for two reasons: a) to read Arabic books, and b) to learn “our language better,” 
which relies on Arabic, and that “our investigation here takes place for the second reason.”528    
 The way the writers of this journal contextualize the Turkish language is very revealing, 
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and can unveil a great deal about the ideological intent behind the paper’s publication and the 
language politics of the time. Turkish is generally referred to as “our language” along with 
references to the empire’s domains as “our homeland,”529 as if the empire was a single nation and 
Turkish was its only language. For instance, someone by the name of Nazim writes that 
the wellbeing of our homeland (vetanimizin) is my highest wish…therefore, as my 
obligation to the sons of my race,
530
 I am ready to proudly acknowledge…that as long 
as the Ottoman grammar is not reformed in accordance with the spirit of our language 
(lisaniminzin ruhu)…not only does it cost our citizens (vetandaşlerimizin) their 
progress in the literary field, but in all other types of scientific endeavors as well. For 
those who appreciate the value of our language, this is a matter of an extraordinary 
grief…if our language’s grammar comes to be known with all clarity and simplicity 
…and the modern press and newspapers observe these rules…[then] no matter how 
long it may take … it will be the cause (asbabi) for the progress of our nation. 531 
(Emphasis added) 
These remarks not only throw into question all claims about ethnic Turks’ lack of self-
consciousness but also highlight the validity of Makdisi’s insights regarding Ottoman 
Orientalism. It is clear that this literature, which was officially sanctioned and provided for the 
Ottoman schools, either does not see the non-Turkish population as noteworthy, or explicitly 
excludes them from “our citizens, our progress, our race and our homeland.” 
 The above behaviors and attitudes of the ruling ethnicity are further evidenced by the 
casual disregard of the presence of non-Turks in the schools or in society at large. For example, 
in an article in which the importance of women’s education and its impact on the learning of 
one’s mother tongue is being discussed, it is implied that every student in the Ottoman schools 
was a Turk and his/her mother tongue was Turkish. So, when the writer of the articles asks 
rhetorically, whom did you learn Turkish from? “Without any doubts, you will reply, from our 




 (Ohdeyi çakiraneme duşan hayiri min gayri hadd abnayi cinsme.) 
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mothers,”532 he adds. This ‘taken-for-grantedness’ is observable in all the issues of this 
publication.
533
 In another piece, which defines progress teleologically to mean that each 
generation supersedes the previous one, it is stated that for a child whose “father only knows his 




 As indicated earlier, it seems that the nature of Ottoman subjects’ relationship to the state 
was increasingly determined by their reception or rejection of the Turkish language. This 
becomes abundantly clear in a piece in Tercüman-ı Hakikat Weekly, which attends to the 
significance of language learning. It is stated that “Jewish and Christians schools in our 
homeland (vetanimizda bulunan) are now keen in teaching Ottoman language, which means they 
are trying to advance their current citizenry
536
 relationship with us.”537 It should be reiterated 
that this journal constitutes part of the reading material for Ottoman secondary schools. 
However, it highlights the nature of power relations in Ottoman society in the late 1870s. It also 
explains who “we” are, or whose language is celebrated, and which language plays what role in 
the Ottoman state-society relations. Moreover, this “we,” which stands for the Ottoman Turks, 
reveals the identity of the sovereign. Turkish is not only declared as a marker of the sovereign’s 
identity but also becomes a yardstick for determining the degree of the citizenship of others in 
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this hierarchical socio-political context. Here, non-Muslims’ advancement towards full 
citizenship or subjecthood is obviously tied to the efforts they put into learning “our language.”  
There is no doubt, however, that this state of limbo of non-Muslim citizenship turns it into 
something that is either conditional or in progress; as such it has been deferred to the future. The 
social standing of non-Turkish Muslims has also been obscured. Their presence cannot be 
imagined unless they are thought of as being a part of “us”. This is the case since the criterion for 
citizenship or subject hood is Turkish language, not Islam (alone). It is Turkish instruction or 
learning that could improve non-Muslims’ socio-political standing and pave the path for progress 
toward full citizenship.  
 After Abdülhamid’s accession to power, the focus on Turkish significantly intensified. 
The Hamidian regime introduced more rigorous language policies in order to give a central role 
to Turkish in its education system. In 1881, in order to emphasize the importance of Turkish,
538
 
the Ministry of Education ordered the removal of French from the first year of the middle 
schools and as well as its overall reevaluation and reduction in the higher grades.
539
 However, 
French still kept its prominence along with Turkish in official correspondence, issuing passports 
and other bureaucratic matters. During the reign of Abdülhamid, Turkish occupied a much 
greater space in the state policies; so did education itself.
540
 However, as mentioned earlier, it 
was still the continuation of a trend that had started much earlier.   
 The Ottoman state imagined itself as Turkish or saw Turks as its fundamental element, as 
Abdülhamid once put it. At least by the mid-19
th
 century, the Turkishness of the state or Turkish 
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as the official language of the state was ‘taken for granted and this is manifested time and again 
in the state’s practices all over the empire. State records attest to the fact that the Ottoman elite 
saw their language as the official one, long before its constitutional stipulation in 1876. However, 
it is hard to tell when exactly they started referring to Turkish as the official language (resmi dil). 
Yet, if “the official language” and “the state’s language” have the same connotations, Ottoman 
records show that the latter was in use as early as 1847.
541
 Henceforth, the term was in use 
regularly.
542
 This declarative aspect, however, only sheds light on one angle of the Ottoman 
state’s practice. In reality, the Turkification of bureaucratic language, no matter its pace or 
success, was an ongoing process in the 19
th
 century.  
 As early as 1861, the Highest Council of Judicial Regulations (Meclis-i Valay-ı Ahkam-ı 
Adliye) decreed that all records in penal system were to be kept in Turkish.
543
 As a letter by the 
Vali of Bagdad indicates, the Sublime Porte expected the new law to go into effect immediately. 
However, the Local Council ostensibly did not believe in the practicality of the new law and 
therefore requested its modifications.
544
 The Local Council of the Vilayet elucidated that the 
suspects (ashabi tohmet) only knew Arabic. Therefore, they should be required to sign the 
Turkish paperwork only after the content of their interrogation records was explained to them in 
their native language(s).
545
 Another document indicates that the suspects and criminal offenders 
knew either Arabic or Kurdish or Persian but had no familiarity with Turkish.
546
 Hence, even in 
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non-Turkish regions, the interrogation forms (istintaknamelere) were kept in Turkish.
547
 Such 
policies not only reveal the place of Turkish in the state practice but also signify the eventual 
goal of the Turkification of the entire bureaucratic system. Had these policies proven successful, 
their implications would have been grave for the non-Turkish regions of the empire. Eventually, 
illiteracy in Turkish would have become a great impediment to the entry of non-Turks into the 
state bureaucracy even in their own localities. After a certain period, those who could hold 
sensitive positions would have to be either Turkish or well versed in Turkish language. 
 It should be noted that the state documents show that in a big Vilayet like Baghdad, the 
Turkish literacy of the general population was almost non-existent.
548
 However, they would have 
to interact with a penal system that communicated only in a foreign language. These attempts at 
Turkification were not taking place “for increasing administrative efficiency through the use of a 
single language”549 as Turkish nationalists claim. As Charles Taylor, in a slightly different 
context, puts it, arguments for the efficiency of a single language in a multilingual context “are 
generally technological pretexts for chauvinism that does not declare itself openly.”550 Based on 
the state records these linguistic regulations engendered some problems rather than solutions. For 
example, when inmates appear before judge they question
551
 the accuracy of their paperwork and 
claim that their records did not reflect what they confessed to before their trial.
552
 
  In his insightful paper on Turkification, Mahmud Haddad notes that “Abdülhamid 
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decreed for the first time that Turkish be the language of correspondence among the different 
branches of the provincial administration.”553 He bases his claim on a report published by al-
Ahram in 1913.
554
 Turkification in correspondence between different branches of the government 
reached a new level in the Hamidian period. However, as the state records reveal, this tradition 
had existed long before Abdülhamid’s reign. The phrase “official language” appears in state 
records in the early 1870s.  In that period Turkish was regarded as the official language. 
Nonetheless, the context of such utterances is worthy of a greater attention. It seems there was 
often an association between the context of these utterances and the state’s assimilationist 
policies or ‘Ottoman Orientalism.’ For instance, in 1874, there was a project to establish a 
teacher’s college (darülmuallimin) in Syria, in order to train enough teachers for elementary 
(sıbyan) and secondary schools (rüşdiye), in highly populated Arabic neighborhoods.555 The 
primary goal of this project was to “prepare teachers capable of teaching the official language”; 
i.e. Turkish.
556
 It is worth noting that, in general, this was the context of declaring Turkish as “the 




 Up to 1876, the context of the use of these phrases generally reveals some type of 
interactions between the state and the non-Turkish populations of the empire. However, these 
interactions either, as in the above example, render the state a modernizing agent, or, enunciate 
and reinforce the state’s own ethnic identity. The latter phenomenon is visible in the prominence 
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that Ottoman officials gave to Turkish. For instance, in 1875, in an Arab city like Beirut, the 
Ottoman officials fired an Arab teacher merely for his unfamiliarity with “the official language” 
and replaced him with someone who knew Turkish.
558
    
 By the 1890s, the state’s linguistic Turkification polices had rapidly evolved. In this 
period, Turkish no longer holds its ambiguous status. By this time, the state clearly uses its 
language as a means of assimilation. For instance, in an Arab city like Basra, if a teacher could 
teach Turkish in a middle school, he was not required to know Arabic. He would not be forced to 
take any Arabic courses either. Nor would he be replaced with another teacher who knew both 
Arabic and Turkish.
 559
 The justification is even more telling: according to the new regulations 
(talimat gereği) starting with the elementary, all schools had to be reformed and all students were 




 By 1893, every school in the empire, whether in Istanbul or 
elsewhere, had to follow the same guidelines. The year 1894, when the Government initiated a 
project for a full-scale reform (ıslah) of Turkish (Türk lisanı) language, seems to be another 
pivotal point in the state’s policy of accelerating Turkification. It ordered the establishment of 
various scientific associations (cemiyyet-i ilmiyyeler açılması).562 Based on these new 
regulations, Turkish was the first thing that each student had to learn in school. In addition, the 
state strove to universalize (make it the language of all subjects), and determine the periods of 
education (tahsil müddetleri), the subject matters (müfredatı), the content of the lessons, and the 
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tuitions (ücretleri) throughout the empire.
563
  
 In the Hamidian period, language-based discrimination became increasingly worse. 
Hence, to claim that in 1900 “the Ottoman educational system did not pay attention to ethnicity 
and differences of language. Instead, it stressed the unity of faith in order to keep together all of 
the Muslim subjects of the empire,”564 flies in direct contrast to what Ottoman records reveal. 
There are various examples of the state’s repressive policies favoring the universalization of 
Turkish. For instance, in 1896, the Minister of  Education sent a warning to the local branch of 
the Education Department (mudiriyet) in  Beirut, remarking that Turkish was not being taught 
there with due diligence.
565
 He added that he had learned that teachers were chosen from among 
those who were not up to the task of teaching Turkish.
566
 He noted that since the official 
language was Turkish, all elementary students must learn Turkish. Moreover, learning Turkish 
was necessitated by the fact that after elementary school all the lessons were in Turkish.
567
 He 
went on to say that while foreign and non-Muslim schools were complying with the requirements 
of Turkish instruction, Muslim schools remained indolent. For him, Turkish language 
competence was to be of a particular (bilhasse) consideration in hiring all the teachers.
568
 Even 
those teachers who were hired and paid by the local people had to be summoned and reoriented 
based on these new regulations. In the event of non-compliance they were to be removed from 
their jobs and those who had hired them were to be properly informed in accordance with the 
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 By the turn of the century, in the school environment the state had become extremely 
intolerant toward non-Turkish languages. The following are some excerpts of a formal letter to 
the lieutenant governor in Deir ez- Zor, which highlights the value attached to Turkish by the 
state. The letter warns 
we have learned that the lieutenant governor does not agree with Turkish instruction in 
the elementary and middle schools since the textbooks are all in Turkish, which have 
been assigned by the Ministry of Education…instead he has personally assigned Arabic 
books on Arabic language, which have been printed in Beirut…in the well-protected 
domain of the Empire, like any other country, education and all other bureaucratic 
works must be in the official language that is Ottoman…the value of opening schools… 
is as much in universalizing (te’mim) the state’s official language (develetin resmi 
lisanı) as it is the spread of  knowledge itself…the use of any book, in any school: 
elementary, middle or high school is categorically banned; unless it is in the state’s 




The language Turkification policies of the Ottoman state clearly display some sort of 
longevity and a traceable history. The state’s policies with regards to language, especially from 
the early 1870s onward, manifest all the signs of modern governmentality. In the Hamidian 
period language became a handy tool for the state assimilationist policies. Thus, Haddad’s 
description of Abdülhamid’s Turkification policies is accurate when he asserts that Abdülhamid 
employed Turks rather than Arab Syrians in some sectors of the local administration 
and apparently Turkified the higher positions of the local civil and judiciary 
bureaucracies. Under his rule, many teachers in state secondary schools (rüşdiye), 
including teachers of Arabic, were Turks sent from non-Arab provinces. 
 The culmination of this trend is visible in 1910, when the Baghdad governorate declared 
that since the state’s official language was Turkish, it would not accept any petition in any 
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language other than Turkish.
571
 Seeing the people’s reaction, however, the Ministry of Interior 
revised this policy and asked the local officials to adopt a more lenient strategy toward the Arab 
population of the Vilayet. However, it insisted in its later directives that no petitions in Arabic 
should be accepted from Ottoman subjects of Iranian, Chaldean, and Jewish origins.
572
 The 
documents instruct the local officials that they must do their best to universalize (ta’mim) 
Turkish. They were to follow this course since even the sudden introduction of the new law—
save a few opportunists (menfaatperest)—had not angered anyone. 573 However, they were still 
advised to act moderately, since the majority of people in that region did not know Turkish.
574
 
This also indicates the fact that previous directives had mandated that every member in the City 
Council of Baghdad know Turkish. Yet, the letter suggested that it was more adviseable to take 
people’s sensitivities into consideration and to relax those rules for the time being.575 
 There were similar attempts by the state in other areas of life, which rendered that with 
the progression of time, the systematic Turkification of the language domain became 
increasingly invasive. Another area which showcases the state’s language Turkification policies 
was the shrinking of space for cultural and literary production by dominated Muslim groups such 
as the Albanians and the Kurds. In reading Ottoman archival records, one finds much greater 
restrictions on issuing publication permits to non-Turkish journals and papers. Before the 1870s, 
this ‘diglossic power relation’ was still “hidden”576 to the extent that local councils could give 
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publication permits even to foreigners.
577
 However, in later periods, the room for non-Turkish 
Muslim groups’ cultural activities became increasing slim. In the 1870s, there seems to be an 
important shift in the state’s policy about regulating print and publication. To a certain degree, 
the Hamidian state inherited its paranoia and vigilantism from the preceding regulatory 
tradition(s). In the early 1870s, the state was the sole publisher and distributer of the Qur’an 
itself and did not allow its import or its distribution by anyone or any groups.
578
 Only the 
Ministry of Education (Maarif) had the authority to print the Qur’an, be it in part or in whole. 
Thus, it seems the Hamidian state had inherited some of its restrictive policies from its 
immediate predecessors.
579
 However, the pressure on non-Turkish cultural activity became 
monumental in the Hamidian era, to a degree which turned the dawn of the 20
th
 century into the 
dusk for non-Turkish Muslim publications. These restrictions reached a point where even 
traditional religious books, notwithstanding their prior legal permits, were to be collected.
580
 The 
state’s hostility to non-Turkish books and publications, particularly to those of Kurds and 
Albanians, increased greatly. The state ordered the Customs and Border Patrols to bar the import 
of Kurdish and Albanian books even if they came with their legal permits (resmi ruhsatı olsa 
bile).
581
 When the Ministry of Education made an inquiry as to why Albanian and Kurdish 
dictionaries and alphabetical books should be collected, the Palace replied: “printing and 
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disseminating such books in Albanian and Kurdish languages, is extremely (fewkaladeh) harmful 
to the state’s policies.”582 
  There are many scholars who defend the view that the above political trend, 
notwithstanding its intensity and longevity, was nothing more than innocent centralization 
attempts on behalf of the Ottoman state.
583
 They see the Ottoman state’s effort to universalize its 
language as free of nationalism and argue that it was simply a policy of centralization. 
Centralization as a policy was the outgrowth of a certain worldview that deemed it necessary to 
homogenize the polity in a way that was unmanageable otherwise. Even if this enterprise was 
informed only by the bureaucratic manageability of the population, the compartmentalization of 
existing languages, privileging the language of the ruling ethnic groups over the rest was neither 
arbitrary nor innocent. Contrary to commonly held views, Ottoman officials denied neither their 
ethnic lineage, nor the value they attached to their own language. Nonetheless, the most innocent 
sounding attempts at identity formation by a state are not free of nationalism, and even if a state 
“denies particularistic ethnic loyalties or subordinates them, it has itself to create its own sense of 
belonging, and it does this very often for instance to the mother country or the fatherland.”584 
 As indicated earlier, at the heart of this denial of Ottoman/Turkish national consciousness 
there exists a claim to Muslim communities’ ethnic or national amnesia caused by their relgion. 
It is important to remember that Namik Kemal, the most prominent Ottoman figure who 
adamantly advocated for the revival of Islamic identity, also defended Turkification and the 
destruction (imha) of non-Turkish identities. In 1878, arguing in favor of restricting non-Turkish 
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languages, in a poem titled Vaten, homeland, Kemal asks: “if it is doable, except for Turkish, 
why should not we  eliminate
585
 all the existing languages…in our homeland ?…Is it right to 
hand [non-Turks their] grammar books that could be used as spiritual weapons for [the] 
disintegration?”586 One might think that Kemal’s religious devotion made him disregard ethnic 
and linguistic factors and that he therefore privileged Turkish over other languages only for 
practical reasons. However, he does not leave any room for such a misreading. So, he writes that 
“language is even a firmer (metin) deterrent than religion to an ethnic group’s (kavm) rebellion 
against the other.”587  
 It is striking to see that even Namik Kemal believed in the instrumental use of religion. 
However, what is even more fascinating is the then widespread belief among intellectuals in the 
assimilatory power of language.  Kemal goes on to say that we cannot 
universalize (te‘mim) our language among Bulgarians and Greeks but it is very much 
possible to do this among Muslims such as Albanians and Lazes. This becomes a reality 
only by the application of the right strategies; it is possible with opening schools.  In 20 
years, even by the implementation of our current insufficient educational laws, 
languages like Albanian and Laz will be completely forgotten.
588
 (Emphasis added)  
The Ottoman Muslim intellectuals’ attempt at and hope for eliminating non-Turkish 
languages constitute the real socio-political and cultural background of the Hamidian Islamic 
discourse and Islamic unity. The influence of the Young Ottomans on Abdülhamid is well known. 
 
3. Nationalism and the Politics of Pan-Islamism 
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 The disastrous Ottoman defeat at the hands of Russians during the 1877-1878 War is 
generally cited as one of the overarching causes for the Hamidian regime’s redefinition of 
Ottoman identity along religious lines.  This defeat resulted in the empire’s loss of half of its 
non-Muslim population, which now constituted approximately 20% of the entire Ottoman 
population.
589
 This led Abdülhamid II to come to the conclusion that Ottomanism, as had been 
formulated before, was a failing policy and did not persuade non-Muslim subjects to perceive 
themselves as Ottomans. Therefore, it made sense for him to reformulate Ottoman identity with a 
stronger emphasis on its religious aspects.
590
 It is this shift in Hamidian policies and the 
redefinition of the identity of Ottoman subjects, along with general anti-colonial sentiments in 
the Muslim world, that are labeled as “pan-Islamism.”  
          “Pan-Islamism” was a European fabrication and an ideological label that portrayed the 
Muslims as a monolithic entity, which collectively and blindly obeyed a retrograde Sultan.
591
 The 
increased Muslim awareness of European colonialism took various locally inflected forms of 
expression which were not always in line with the respective policies of the Sultan.  Despite 
common views about European colonialism, both the Sultan’s and other Muslims’ politics were 
devised as a response to their own local needs. However, these responses were generally 
interpreted as fanatical Muslim reactions to progress and European civilizations. Such themes are 
perpetuated even in some recent works, where it is claimed that pan-Islamism is “based, first and 
foremost, on the commonality of religious sentiment which one can take for granted while 
devoting the attention […] to politics and economics as perceived and employed by Pan-
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Islam.”592 Sean Oliver-Dee applies the term to most of Muslim history without hesitation. In his 
view, Muslims, at least around the 1900s, had a mentality naturally alien to the west, which did 
not accept the separation “between the church and the state.”593 
 There is no doubt that there were many calls for Muslim unity against European 
colonialism, and Abdülhamid II hoped that he could make good use of Muslims’ growing anti-
colonial sentiment for his empire’s interests. He hoped that his proclaimed religious status as a 
caliph would give him a greater political advantage among all Muslims. However, it does not 
mean that even Abdülhamid II was deluded enough to think that the entire Islamic world could 
be turned into a single political entity to be administered under his rule, as was the case in the 
Umayyad era. The unity of the Muslim world aside, even all the Ottoman Muslims were not 
ready to follow Abdülhamid II or any other ruler blindly. All that Abdülhamid II hoped for was 
that all Muslims would take a unified stance against increasing European pressure. His 
celebratory approach to the caliphate was “… a diplomatic ploy aimed at doing unto Europeans 
what they were doing to the Ottoman state through their patronage of various non-Muslim 
millets.”594 Thus, the uniformity of Islam in a real sense did not exist. Such a perception of a 
unitary Islam was, rather, the outcome of a European attempt to define its identity in opposition 
to the non-European other in general and to the Muslims in particular.
595
 Therefore, Europe 
portrayed itself as one entity, while picturing the other, i.e., heterogeneous Muslim anti-
colonialism, merely as the manifestation of Islam with the Ottoman caliph being its absolute 
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embodiment. However, it is clear that pan-Islamism was not a purely religious or political 
sentiment for Abdülhamid or other Muslims. For Abdülhamid the enterprise, as Zürcher 
describes, was “an ideological counteroffensive, which Poulton has likened to Bismarck’s 
Kulturkampf.”596 
           Pan-Islamism should be seen in the context of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries; and 
the term mostly reflects the different concerns and politics of the period, which, as Khalid puts it, 
were “completely at home with discourses of progress, nation and ethnicity.”597 Alongside 
European pressure, there were nationalists, secessionists and cultural and political challengers to 
Abdülhamid II’s rule. To advance their competing agendas, those challengers also took up the 
very same religious jargon and discourse utilized by the Sultan himself. When Turkish 
opposition literature is compared with Iranian reformist literature from the same era, it is clear 
that religion figures much more prominently in the literature of Abdülhamid II’s opponents.598 
Iranian reformists also claimed that their reformist views were compatible with Islamic 
teachings. However, since in the Iranian context the emphasis was generally on the religious 
necessity of the constitution as opposed to the state’s religious monopoly, the use of religious 
discourse seems to be less than in the Ottoman case.  In the Iranian context, reformists mostly 
attempted to gain the support of Shi’i clerics rather than challenging the state’s religious claims 
and interpretations, since the Qajar state was far less capable of managing religion and generally 
could not independently claim religious legitimacy.
599
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 The Ottomans had already drafted a constitution that was put on hold by Sultan, a self-
proclaimed religious leader of the Muslim world. His opponents thus attempted to cast doubt on 
his religious legitimacy for a variety of reasons. However, they primarily pointed to the Sultan’s 
disregard for the principal of consultation, Şura (Ar. Shura), which they propagated as the 
essence of constitutionalism and a parliamentary system. Hence, Abdülhamid II’s opponents 
advocated for consultation as a religious obligation for the ruler based on Qur’anic teachings and 
the Prophetic traditions. The Sultan’s disregard for the principal of consultation was used as a 
powerful tool against his general disregard for the constitution.  
            It should thus be no great surprise that not all Muslim intellectuals in the Ottoman context 
were happy for their anti-colonial stances to be interpreted as a sign of their endorsement of the 
Sultan’s pan-Islamism. Some of them were abundantly unequivocal in expressing their 
displeasure with respect to the mischaracterizations of their struggle. They contended that “[t]he 
aim of Pan-Islamism then is to liberate these three hundred millions of human beings from any 
yoke whatsoever that would maintain them in a state of ignorance and degradation [it is a 
struggle] against the aggressor, be he the Pope or Khalifa.”600 Some non-Muslim activists and 
leaders clearly saw the local aspect of pan-Islamism as an anti-colonial movement. Surely it must 
be interpreted as such; otherwise non-Muslim leaders like Mahatma Gandhi could not show their 
solidarity with a “movement,” if it was nothing more than a manifestation of Muslim religious 
solidarity.
601
 All accounts that overlook competing claims and Muslim rivalries of the time 
within their greater anti-colonial politics, known as pan-Islamism, and perceive it as a sheer 
manifestation of religious conviction, commit the great sin of reductionism. Studies that are more 
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recent show that not only the Ottomans but also the British, Germans and Bolsheviks were all 
entertaining the idea of Khilafa for certain political interests.
602
  
 What is called pan-Islamism in the Ottoman-Turkish context, with its statist 
qualifications, had roots in the pre-Hamidian era. Abdülhamid II’s adamant claim to the caliphate 
created the grounds for intense religious criticism of his policies shortly after his accession to 
power. A cursory look at some of the Ottoman newspapers, such as İstikbal,603 in the late 1870s 
shows a very robust intellectual opposition to Abdülhamid II’s rule with equally deep religious 
and nationalist-populist overtones, as does the publication Şura-yi Ummat. Of course, the 
Sultan’s instrumental use of religion is well known. The writers of İstikbal posed a serious 
intellectual challenge to Hamidian rule on almost every ground with their sophisticated religious 
jargon. The newspaper not only portrays Abdülhamid II as an unfit, anti-constitutional autocrat, 
but also attempts to falsify his religious claims based on the same religious discursive framework 
that he used to discredit his opponents. İstikbal’s writers utilize nas (the Qur’an and Hadith), 
history and major canonical Islamic sources for their theological-political fight against the 
Hamidian regime. They contend that Abdülhamid II’s caliphate was no more legitimate than that 
of Yezid, who murdered Husain, Muhammad’s grandson.604   
            Generally, these arguments and the way they formulate their religious opposition to 
Abdülhamid II’s claim to the caliphate ostensibly to appealed to the traditional Sunni clerics. In 
addition, their religious objections and arguments in part resemble some of the objections that 
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were raised against the Ottoman Sultan in the 16
th




 In some ways, Abdülhamid II had based his interpretation of the caliphate on Lütfi Paşa’s 
defense and redefinition of it.
606
 He confronted the Muslim opposition and “countered the British 
by reviving the sixteenth-century Ottoman argument that service to Islam, rather than Quraish 
descent, was most important to the legitimacy of the caliphate.”607 Prevalent populism and the 
instrumental use of religion as the mark of the era aside,
608
 their argument bears witness to the 
unending debates over the  Khilafa throughout Islamic history. Their challenge also reveals the 
fact that the Khilafa had become the battleground where the fight for the Sultan’s legitimacy was 
taking place. As the Sultan’s bureaucracy attempted to increase the state’s religious façade, his 
opponents strove to show the ‘profanity’ of his rule. For example, İstikbal reports609 that the 
Şeyhülislam (Sheikh al-Islam) had published a booklet informing Muslims of their obligations in 
both Arabic and Turkish. The article indicates that the state intended to distribute the booklet in 
North Africa, Arabia and India. It is said that the booklet consisted of three parts: 1) a definition 
of Muslims’ duties and their responsibilities before God;  2) an enumeration of their obligations 
and duties to “the shadow of God” and “the Prophet’s caliph”; 3) the claim that all Muslims, no 
matter where they might live, are religiously obliged to obey the caliph’s order for jihad against 
non-Muslims even if the caliph errs in his call.
610
  The newspaper then attends to every major 
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point in the booklet in an attempt to refute them on religious grounds. Therefore, parallel with 
the arguments of some Sunni scholars, the writers of İstikbal a) claim that all the Islamic sources 
and the Prophetic traditions evidence that the true caliphate was that of Rashidun which lasted 
only for thirty years and thereafter there will only be a sultanate. b)  Abdülhamid II is not even a 
just Sultan and has violated the principal of equality. Unlike the era of Rashidun when the judge 
could rule in favor of non-Muslims against the caliph himself, in the Hamidian regime an 
independent judiciary is unimaginable. c) The Sultan has violated the principal of consultation as 
required by the Quran. d) The Sultan has annulled the principal of enjoining good and preventing 
evil, which, based on Qur’anic teaching is the duty of every individual Muslim. e) In addition, 
since he is the appointee of the very same illegitimate Sultan, the current Şeyhülislam has no 
more religious credibility than the Sultan himself.
611
  
 The aim in citing these detailed examples is to point to the complexity of the political 
context of the Hamidian era. Undoubtedly, all the political players were aware of the importance 
of religion and the degrees of its instrumental use. If the understanding of a political ideology is 
merely based on the use or the application of slogans and jargon, then it would be impossible to 
make any sense of the literature produced by the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) and 
other opponents of Abdülhamid II. Şura-yi Ummat, a CUP publication, which had as its logo a 
Qur‘anic verse about consultation, describes the mission of the paper in its first issue as follows: 
Şura-yi Ummat is the publication of an association whose goal is to bring happiness to 
all the Ottomans and to save them from current calamities…this association both hopes 
and makes its duty to preserve the unity of the sublime Ottoman state, safeguard its 
political independence, to protect it from any type of foreign meddling in its affairs, and 
to revive its glory…to defend the rights of the Umma, to work for the betterment of the 
welfare …of the Ottomans… [the goal of this publication is] to bring unity of their 
views … to unite all Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans based on their patriotic and 





humanistic sentiments…to bring to power those who understand the requirements of 
our ages …612 
Save for the first word in the publication’s title, Şura, consultation, and “the current calamities,” 
Abdülhamid II would have endorsed the paragraph in its entirety. It contains all the popular ideas 
of the time such as Umma, Ottomanism, Islamic unity, and national unity. The paragraph, on the 
other hand, puts on display the conditions of a polity i.e., the Ottomans, who experience a myriad 
of contestations, contradictions, fears, and uncertainties that neither can be ignored nor easily 
resolved. However, what should not go unnoticed is the fact that religiosity is only one issue 
among many. Regardless of religious faith, the entire population is considered as the Umma. The 
Ottoman Umma is the entire Ottoman population including all non-Muslims, which the CUP 
tries to unify based on their sense of belonging to what was once the glorious Ottoman state. This 
glorious state was to be revived under truly modernist CUP leaders, who were trained and 
educated in the modernized education system that was itself put in place by Abdülhamid II. That 
is why some Ottoman scholars generally warn against espousing simplistic binaries in analyzing 
the complexity of Ottoman society in general or existing trends of the period such as nationalism, 
Ottomanism or Hamidian pan-Islamism in particular.
613
  
 The caliphate and “universal” Muslim obedience to it was far from any reality, not just in 
the entire Muslim world, but even within Ottoman borders. Ottoman state-society relations were 
fraught with too many contradictions, challenges, conflicting policies and agendas. Abdülhamid 
II’s rule was faced with a multitude of challenges, foreign threats and encroachments on his 
domain. In order to neutralize such foreign threats, Abdülhamid II sometimes had to make 
“unholy” alliances with those powers like Britain whose strategic goal in the region was to 
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undermine his rule.  
 Abdülhamid II greatly feared the political force of the idea of an Arab caliphate and its 
possible ‘misuse’ by foreign powers like Britain. To combat the notion of an Arab caliphate and 
growing nationalisms, and to decrease foreign influence in the fringes of the empire, Abdülhamid 
II strove to spread Sufi orders that preached absolute obedience to him.
614
 These types of 
activities, however, did not always produce the intended result and it was not rare that his calls 
for jihad were ignored even in places that were close to the dar al-khilafa, such as Central 
Asia.
615
 Shortly after his accession to the throne, Abdülhamid II faced turmoil in some of the 
Arab lands, like Syria.
616
 It is believed that his attempts to spread Sufi orders such as that of the 
Rifa‘i, who eagerly advocated obedience to the Sultan, were a counter-offensive measure against 
growing dissatisfaction in that region. The Sultan had chosen one of his major propagandists 
from among the Rifa‘is in Syria; there was a great amount of publicity from 1880 onward that 
aimed “to defuse… incipient Syrian nationalism.”617 
            In other parts of Arab lands, too, the Sultan was not perceived as a God-send or as the 
successor of the Prophet. One of the Sultan’s greatest worries was Arab nationalism, religious 
and otherwise, which was forming around the discourse of an Arab caliphate.
618
 The Wahabi 
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defiance to Ottoman rule and their constant challenge to the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphs 
had a long history. Wahhabis had no qualms in seeking foreign support, i.e. British, against the 
Ottomans. During the Hamidian reign the ‘ulama in Mecca had declared Britain as “the greatest 
Muslim power” and had recognized India under the British rule as dar al-Islam, and as such had 
granted British colonialism with the loyalty of the vast majority of Indian Muslims.
 619
  
              Muslim revivalists, too, had ambivalent feelings about the Sultan and his policies. Their 
ambivalence was rooted in both nationalistic and religious feelings. They had not remained 
unaffected by increasing nationalist and anti-colonialist sentiments. It should be obvious that the 
revivalists’ interpretations, like any new interpretation, were to take place under the influence of 
or within a simultaneously nationalist, modernist, and anti-colonial socio-political and cultural 
environment. Like any other interpretations, religious interpretations, rigid or flexible, contain 
elements of both continuity and specificity of context. A cursory reading of the works produced 
by religious scholars of the time leaves no doubt that their literature shows its racial and ethnic 
bent quite clearly. This signifies the fact that religious interpretations cannot be detached easily 
from their historical circumstances and socio-political contexts. As such, even ethnic influence 
on people’s religious interpretation may entail both continuity and context specificity.  
 Competing nationalist ideas of different Muslim groups were reflected in their religious 
expressions. The paramount example of the ascendency of nationalistic expression in the 
caliphate debates was showcased in the 1926 Muslim Congress in Cairo. The congress was 
formed for the purpose of reviving the Islamic caliphate, and mainly took place because of 
Rashid Rida’s efforts. However, instead of supporting the Ottoman caliph, except for a few 
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persons, “each participating delegation wanted to make its own ruler caliph.”620 The nationalist 
tendencies in revivalist literature were not limited to the influence of the idea of the nation-state 
and the way it informed debates over the caliphate. Without paying attention to the influence of 
nationalism and racial claims, there is no other way to reconcile prominent religious scholars’ - 
such as Rashid Rida or Bediüzzaman Said Nursi -  remarks in praising their own ethnicity for 
possessing “distinct ethical qualities.”621 Rida’s views were not just an instance of the outburst of 
racial tendencies, as summarized below by Haddad: 
Arabs were more courageous, and more steadfast in adherence to Islam, Rida wrote. 
Unlike the Turks, who usually followed their leaders unquestioningly, Arabs were 
prone to political power struggles. But in Rida's view, this fractiousness, while not 
promoting unity, reflected the Arabs’ closer adherence to the Islamic “democratic 
principle” and an independence of mind and will.622 
To return to the revivalist’s relationship with the Sultan, aside from other relevant 
political factors, for both parties, nationalism was a dividing factor and anti-colonialism a uniting 
one. The overriding factor for Muslim unity, as pointed out by Mushirul Hasan, was the Sultan’s 
ability to defend Islamic holy places, especially Mecca and Medina, in the face of a possible 
European incursion. British documents also evince the fact that the Ottoman caliphate was not 
loved by the Muslims in India or Arabia, though its demise was seen as the end of the Muslim 
world as it was known to them.
623
 This remained a determining factor for major figures like Rida 
even after the dethroning of Abdülhamid II in 1909. In Rida’s view, although “the Arabs [had] 
supremacy in the religious sphere … the Turks [had] supremacy in the attributes of political and 
                                                          
620
 Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman 
State: 257. 
621
 Nursi, İçtima-I Dersler/ Social Lessons. 
622
 Haddad, " Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashīd Riḍā's Ideas on the Caliphate " 257. 
623




military power, at least since the emergence of the Ottoman Empire.”624 This makes clear that for 
Muslim figures like Rida, Muslim unity, strong or loose, was more a political expediency due to 
the threat of colonial presence than a strong religious sentiment that was aroused by faith.  
            Muslim revivalists were well aware of Abdülhamid II’s intentions and agenda and did not 
see them as especially religious. Abbas Mahmud al-‘Aqqad (1889–1964) testifies to this reality 
and states that all the Du‘at (Muslim revivalists) knew the Ottoman state’s intention in 
employing the title of the caliphate and its instrumental use of Islam.
625
 The Arabs generally 
believed in an Arab caliphate. However, this did not make many avoid cooperation with the 
Ottomans when it came to their anti-colonial agenda. For instance, the renowned scholar Shakip 
Arsalan contended that the end of Rashidun era was also the end of the caliphate, in the true 
sense of the term. These views, however, did not stop him from cooperating with the Ottoman 
state. For all his anti-colonial tendencies, Arsalan acted almost like an Ottoman ambassador—
travelling back and forth between Istanbul and European capitals.
626
  
            Iconic revivalist figures such as Abdurrahman al-Kawakibi, Rashid Rida and others 
always had deep misgivings about any non-Arab claimants of the caliphate.
627
 Al-Kawakibi 
wrote two very influential books: Tabāyiʻ al-Istibdād wa Maṣāriʻ al-Istiʻbād, which later became 
a regional classic against autocracy, and Umm al-Qura, that was almost entirely a defense of the 
exclusive Arab right to the caliphate. The latter is basically al-Kawakibi’s programme for the 
reestablishment of an Arabic caliphate.
628
 Al-Kawakibi believed that the Ottomans’ use of the 
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caliphate was “only a diplomatic ploy, to perpetuate their rule over their subjects with ease and to 
scare Europe in the name of the caliphate and Muslim public opinion.”629 
 Kawakibi was unequivocal in stating that there was no path to the revival of Islam and no 
actual Prophetic message other than the reestablishment of an Arab caliphate.
630
 He also believed 
that an Arab caliphate was the only way to Arab liberation (falah).
 631
 Thus, al-Kawakibi quotes 
the renowned medieval Arab poet al-Mutanabih, announcing that “people are dependents on their 
kings for [any achievements] and there will never be an Arab deliverance under non-Arab 
kings.”632  
 It must be indicated that al-Kawakibi’s book was very popular among Muslim Arab 
revivalists. It was so popular that Sami Dhahran, one of al-Kawakibi’s biographers, claims that 
the book was “revised either by Abduh or by Rashid Rida,” two well-known revivalist figures.633 
To al-Kawakibi, Islam and the Arabs were almost inseparable. The Arabs were the only people 
who could have halted ‘the degeneration of Islam’ caused by the Turks and other non-Arabs. In 
essence,  
al-Kawakibi’s defense of Islamic civilization was a glorification of Arabs in the 
development of that civilization. The virtues of Islam—its language, its Prophet, 
its early moral and political order—were Arab achievements. In his view, the 
decadence of Islam was caused by the practices of the Turks and other non-Arab 
people had introduced into the umma, and he went so far as to express regret that 
the Turks had ever embraced the faith…al-Kawakibi called for the Ottomans to 
relinquish their unjustified claim to the caliphate and to restore the office to its 
rightful possessors, the Arabs.
634
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 The populist rhetoric
635
 of pan-Islamism, as characterized by Karpat, was certainly “at 
home with nationalism,”636 argues Khalid. Any revivalist who believed the imamate to be an 
exclusive right of the Quraish or was for Arab independence rejected the Ottoman caliphate,
637
 at 
least on a theoretical level. As such, all pro-independent Arab groups and figures believed that 
recognizing the Ottoman caliphate amounted to giving up the caliphate as their exclusive right, 
and that this would render their claim to a state of their own illegitimate.
638
 This was very much 
in line with pan-Arabism that also aimed at forging Arab unity under an Arab caliph. Depriving 
the Ottoman Sultan of this religious status would have provided Arab nationalism, religious and 
otherwise, with legitimate grounds for Arab independence, and this tactic was used as a weapon 
against the Sultan. Furthermore, pan-Arabists did not see their aspiration for independence as 
contradictory to greater Islamic unity in any way. However, they did not want the future of their 
people or religion to remain tied to the future of the Ottoman state or its policies.
639
 These 
examples not only demonstrate an extraordinarily complex situation but also render any attempt 
to detach these institutions, movements and socio-political and religious claims from their 
historical contexts and loci very problematic. 
            Any attempt to characterize even the revivalist movements of the time as unaffected by 
nationalist tendencies falls into the trap of essentialism. As indicated earlier,
640
 from its 
inception, lineage and some elements of ethnocentrism remained persistent in the debate over the 
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caliphate and therefore it was far from being a purely theological debate. The debate over the 
caliphate, especially following the murder of the third caliph, reflects socio-political conflicts 
and rivalries more than anything else. Muhammad Iqbal’s assertions illustrate this historical 
chasm and the gulf between the ruler’s claim to legitimacy and the collective consensus of 
Muslim scholars. According to Iqbal, the political environment was rarely, if ever, hospitable to 
independent collective juridical endeavors.
641
 However, the disparate and contradictory nature of 
the debate reveals the ethnic political interest of its participants as much as their religiosity. 
           When it comes to recent Ottoman history and the relationship between the caliph and 
Muslim subjects, the label pan-Islamism does not reflect the way Muslims viewed Abdülhamid 
II. Nor does the Sultan’s unyielding urge for recognition as caliph illustrate some type of 
decontextualized understanding of Islam. Abdülhamid strove to universalize Turkish cultural 
markers within Islamic discourse. As shown, through his Turkification policies he mobilized 
almost the entire state apparatus to create a totalizing discourse, since “a hegemonic tantalization 
requires a radical investment.”642   
 It should be noted that in modern times, greater emphasis on the state religious identity 
was not unique to Muslim rulers or to Abdülhamid II, for this matter. Nor was it an unfamiliar 
phenomenon in Christendom. Emperor Francis-Joseph II of Austria and Tsars Alexander III and 
Nicolas II and Queen Victoria in Britain had all posed as defenders of their faith and Christianity 
in one way or another.
643
  
             Abdülhamid II seems to have adopted a different policy from his predecessors, i.e. pan-
                                                          
641
 Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Batu Caves, Selangor Darul Ehsan: 
Masterpiece, 2006). 
642
 Laclau, On Populist Reason: 71. 
643
 Zürcher, "The Importance of Being Secular: Islam in the Service of the National and Pre-National State," 59. 
169 
 
Islamism. However, if his political priorities are ignored, in essence the new policies of 
Abdülhamid appear to be largely congruent with Ottomanism. Ottomanism, however, was 
supposed to be about religious equality,
644
 which hardly went beyond a pretentious claim.
645
 
Many modernizing policies continued with full force: “In 1879, there was a whole reorganization 
of the judicial system by the creation of a Ministry of Justice [that] was based on French 
jurisprudence.”646 Abdülhamid II also adopted a profoundly modern education policy.647 It is said 
that “the Hamidian period was a complex and inventive reaction to the blind Westernism of the 
Tanzimat.”648  
             Leading scholars of Ottoman history generally concur on the fact that, as opposed to 
previous, superficial adoptions of Westernism, Abdülhamid II’s policies were more in line with 
those of the Young Ottomans and should be seen as “an alternative vision of modernity that was 
emerging at this time.”649 Modernization policies followed, especially in the fields of education, 
infrastructure and state bureaucracy. Overall, however, “Pan-Islamism” was a response to long 
lasting internal and external problems.
650
 It is commonly held that there is a great deal of 
similarity between the Hamidian period and the reign of Selim III and Mahmud II (1789-1839) 
and the Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876); these periods are characterized by attempts to unify and 
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centralize the state. These periods are known for the state’s struggle to create “legal-rational 
norms along Western lines, yet they are differentiated by degrees of intensity and styles through 
selective borrowing from more successful rivals.”651  
          As previously shown,
652
 Abdülhamid II’s policies in the areas of language instruction, 
education, and bureaucracy were becoming increasingly Turkified. Notwithstanding the intensity, 
the succeeding regime’s Turkification policies were more evolved and represented the 
culmination of the Hamidian regime’s policies. The Hamidian era is seen as the matrix of the 
manifestation of Turkish nationalism in all its later forms. Therefore, the Kemalist narrative of a 
break with the recent Ottoman past has been criticized in recent studies by major Ottomanist 
historians.
653
 They contend that Hamidian pan-Islamism was not merely a religious doctrine, nor 
did the Kemalist state a complete abandonment of that era’s socio-political and religious legacy. 
More importantly, Kemalist statism, in some important ways, is viewed as a continuation of 
those policies, ideas and reforms. In other words, “… without [Hamidian] improvements the 




             Abdülhamid’s legacy was not limited to the above-mentioned reforms that were followed 
by later generations of Turkish political leaders, with varying speed. One of his legacies was 
their adoption of the policy of combating ‘tribalism’ by ‘civilizing’ their sons and introducing 
them to the modern sciences and the ‘true Islam’. In 1892, a year after introducing Hamidiye 
                                                          
651
 Sohrabi, Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran, 1902-1910: 32. 
652
 See, section two of the present chapter. 
653
  Cf. Deringil, The Well-protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 
1876-1909. Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the late Ottoman Empire. Erik-Jan 
Zürcher. The Importance of Being Secular. in Kerem Öktem and Philip Robins(Ed).Turkey’s Engagement with 
Modernity; Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century. (Palgrave. New York. 2010) 
654





 which was aimed at making Kurdish tribes dependent on the state and preparing 
them for any possible conflicts with Armenians, the state opened tribal schools (Aşiret 
Mektebleri). The sons of disobedient tribes,
656
 who were famed for their lack of loyalty, 
rebelliousness and refusal to pay taxes, would be brought to those schools to be educated and to 
become better subjects.
657
 Among other things, the students at the school would have learned “to 
pray together and express their submission to Allah, the Prophet, and the Sultan’s guidance,658 
‘so that they would abstain from falsehood.’”659 
             One of the most remarkable aspects of the Hamidian legacy was what Erik Zürcher calls 
the state’s “religious management.”660  Karpat finds the genesis of this policy in the Tanzimat and 
describes it as the end of the traditional religion/state separation.
661
 It is hard to agree with 
Karpat’s characterizations—the traditional religion/state separation—since the two had probably 
never been separated, at least from the perspective of the state.
662
 However, Karpat’s claim is not 
entirely invalid in the sense that the nature of state dealings with Islam was transformed 
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dramatically. It was in the Tanzimat era that the state started to regulate religiosity as opposed to 
the earlier eras in which the state’s regulation of the religion lacked the same sophistication. 
 In Abdülhamid II’s period, this process of regulating Islam was intensified by the Sultan’s 
struggle to restore the caliphate as a form of a religious Leviathan that would increasingly 
centralize Islam along the state lines and reintroduce a dual Turkish and state-sanctioned Islamic 
identity. In Abdülhamid’s era, the state became the sole source of “true religiosity.” From 
Abdülhamid’s reign onward the Ottoman/Turkish state reserved for itself the exclusive right of 
determining correct Islam, as opposed to a false Islam, or Irtica, any form of religiosity or 
religious interpretations that strayed from officially sanctioned religiosity. The Hamidian policy 
of managing religiosity and religious interpretations continued to be the state’s practice long after 
of the creation of the supposedly ‘militant secularist state’ in 1924.663 The Hamidian regime 
turned Islam into a political battleground that forced the opposition to contest it within the 
framework of its own discursive parameters.  Ironically, Abdülhamid’s rule was ended with 
significant support from Ottoman clerics. On April 15, 1909, even before the Liberals changed 
their stance, the higher-ranking clerics in public declarations stated … the constitution’s 
compatibility with şeriat beyond a shred of doubt, going so far as to call its defense a religious 
duty. Furthermore, by recounting the religious book burning at the Gülhane Park during the 
despotic period, they highlighted their hostility toward the Palace.
664
 
 This further evidences the complexity of the Hamidian period. Despite the pervasiveness 
of religious discourse and competing claims to religious legitimacy, religion was not and could 
not become the sole determining factor in state/subject relations. Even the concept of the unity of 
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Islam was ‘a condition of difference’ since the Ottomans did not see every Muslim group or 
country as being civilized enough to be a part of this unity.  
 As indicated from the outset, pan-Islamism was a term coined by Europeans. The unity of 
Islam (İttihadi İslam) advocated by Muslims, including the Hamidian regime, was not equivalent 
to pan-Islamism. It never lost its local characteristics and was probably never understood by all 
Muslims as meaning the same thing. As far as its Hamidian version is concerned, it mostly 
remained nationalistic. It gave a central role to state interests, and interestingly enough, bore all 
the marks of the Ottoman Orientalism. The Ottoman elite’s view of Iranians highlights this 
attitude and their selective “pan-Islamism.” Not only did the Ottomans have laws banning 
Ottoman women from marrying Iranian men,
665
 Iran as a state too was seen as unqualified to be 
part of Islamic unity. This becomes evident in an article titled “The Unity of Islam” (İttihadi 
İslam), published in Tercüman-ı Hakikat in 1880. The article is a response to a piece that had 
been written earlier by an Iranian that stressed the need for unity between the two Muslim states. 
Despite the fact that the writer concurred with his Iranian interlocutor on the strategic importance 
of this unity, he did not see Iran as qualified to be a part of it.
666
 One might naturally expect the 
Shi‘i religion to be a major impediment to the unity between the two states. However, the article 
does not even touch upon this issue. Instead, Iranian hatred for Turkmen and Turks (tayfey-i 
Atrak) on the one hand, and Turkish reaction to this hatred on the other, are regarded as the major 
obstacles to a possible unity.
667
 It is worth noting that the Ottoman refers to his interlocutor 
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somewhat contemptuously as the “Asian individual” (Asiali zat).668 This again reflects the 
Ottoman elite’s orientalist attitudes towards Muslim others, which become increasingly apparent 
as the article enumerates reasons for the impossibility of unity between the two states.  
 The centrality of Istanbul’s role in civilizing and enlightening the rest of the Islamic 
world is seen as a condition for this unity, since Istanbul was perceived to be the carrier of 
modern civilization. Istanbul was no longer under the influence of the old Asian civilization 
(Asya'nın Medeniyeti kedimesi).669 The writer states that Nasser al-Din Shah’s recent visit to 
Europe was part of his outstanding achievements (neticey-ı semeratı berguzide) in recognizing 
the significance of modernity (teceddüd). However, the idea of modernity had yet to gain 
popularity (henuz te’emum etmemişter) in Iran.670 This imagined distance of Iran from modernity 
is the major hindrance to an Islamic unity with the Ottomans. However, the writer did not believe 
that Iran was capable of stepping onto the path of modernity independently, a requirement for an 
Islamic unity with the Ottomans.
 671
 Then, “perhaps in order to arrive at the stage where it could 
serve the unity of Islam, yet again, Iran has to receive an array of light from the enlightenment in 
the Dersaadet (Istanbul).”672 The writer’s overall assessment of Iran’s degree of modernity leads 
him to conclude that Iran is not ready for service to the unity of Islam and it is therefore too soon 
to impose such a unity on Iran.
673
  
 If we free ourselves from essentialist approaches to religion, we could be open to the idea 
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that religious concepts too can function as empty signifiers,
674
 especially when religion becomes 
a hegemonic identity. As Laclau has shown, “the hegemonic identity becomes something of the 
order of an empty signifier.”675 This is how religion can be an instrument of governmentality, a 
legitimizing tool in the hands of the Hamidian state, to justify its civilizing mission in the 
periphery and accommodate its official nationalism and orientalism. The Sultan used his 
religious status as a caliph to further his project of Turkifying the language, education, and the 
state bureaucracy. Simultaneously, opposing nationalist groups could interpret the same religion 
both as a unifying factor against Western colonialism and as a weapon at their disposal against a 
religious autocrat such as Abdülhamid II. 
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The Kurds and “Crafting of the National Selves”676 
 
Having discussed the Hamidian state’s religious discourse as both a condition of totality 
and that of difference among the Muslims, we shall now turn our attention to the Kurdish case in 
the 19
th
 century to see how this difference plays out. Contrary to somewhat commonly expected 
view,
677
 I argue that Islam was not a deterring factor for the Muslims’ ethno-nationalist self-
consciousness. As shown in the previous chapter, those views denying Muslims’ ethno-
nationalism in the pre-WWI period are not congruent with what can be gathered from the state’s 
archival documents, Ottoman journals, papers, and other available literature.  For instance, in the 
late 1860s Frederick Millingen writes that he could “affirm, without fear of exaggerating, that the 
sentiment of nationality and the love of independence are as deeply rooted in the heart of the 
Koords as in that of any other nation.”678 He contends that his conclusion is based on his 
“personal experience, having been thrown into contact with many of the chiefs of the Koordish 
national movements.”679  
 Without forsaking their Muslim identity and beliefs, Turks and non-Turks could see 
themselves as having distinct identities while the Hamidian regime increasingly tried to suppress 
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those of the non-Turks as they were seen as a threat to the state’s integrity. The Kurdish uprising 
in 1880, discussed in the following chapter, reveals the existence of Islamic self-consciousness 
alongside the Kurdish ethno-nationalist aspiration. The intersection of Islam and nationalism 
becomes apparent in the documents produced by both lay intellectuals and by Sheikh Ubeydullah 
of Nehri, the leader of the uprising.
680
 The current chapter shall be devoted to the investigation of 
the religious nationalist discourse of the 19
th
 century by analyzing a number of articles written by 
the Kurds about the Kurds, that were published in the Ottoman newspapers. In this way, this 
chapter puts those articles in their historical context. This shall be done by way of exploring the 
contemporary Kurdish intellectuals’ journal articles published in Tercüman-ı Hakikat681 in 1880. 
This literature, which has not received any attention in the relevant scholarship, can provide us 
with a rare window into the contemporary Kurdish elite’s self-perception and the socio-political 
context of Sheikh Ubeydullah’s revolt (discussed in the next chapter).  
The Rise of Rival Nationalisms 
It should be kept in mind that the Hamidian state’s renewed interest in the institution of 
the caliphate points to the fact that this regime endeavored to offset the growing non-Turkish 
Muslim nationalist tendencies after the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877–78.  This war and the 
ensuing Berlin Treaty, as Karpat notes, “constituted the most important historical, cultural, and 
psychological watershed in the history of the Ottoman Empire. For the first time, both Ottoman 
statesmen and the public realized that the total collapse of the Ottoman state was an imminent 
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possibility.”682 Like other segments of Ottoman society, the Kurds too were more or less certain 
that the Empire would collapse and would mostly likely be divided between Britain and 
Russia.
683
 This consciousness of the Empire’s imminent demise was gaining currency both 
during and after the War. On top of this, Kurdish-Turkish interaction had left a very negative 
impression
684
 on the Kurds. The War had tremendously impacted communal and local relations, 
since during the War these communities had taken sides along religious lines. In the course of 
the two-year war between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, these divisions and communal rifts 
“worsened with the tsar’s issuing a proclamation extending protection to all Christians from 
Ottoman attacks and enjoining them to join the Russian army. At the same time, the Ottoman 
state also armed its constituencies on both sides of the border.”685 The War’s effect was far-
reaching and left a distinctive legacy in the borderland in terms of the “rise in the nationalist and 
sectarian sentiments.”686   
 After the War, the Ottoman domains in general and the Armenian/Kurdish regions in 
particular were becoming increasingly fragmented. These communal rifts and their loss of faith 
in the sustainability of the Empire made room for Kurdish nationalist tendencies to come to light, 
which was simultaneously a response to both Armenian nationalism and to the Ottoman and 
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Qajar states’ increasing pressure. Hence it was against this overall background that Abdülhamid 
attempted to revive the caliphate. Therefore, the Hamidian regime’s post-War revival of the 
institution of the caliphate was as much a response to the Muslims’ loss of faith in the Empire’s 
viability as it was to the loss of the major portion of its non-Muslim population. 
 When it comes to the Armenian/ Kurdish regions of the Empire, there was a very 
complex trilogical relationship among the states, the Kurds, and the Armenians. Neither the 
Armenians nor the Kurds should be perceived as having been completely unified entities or that 
they were clearly distinct from one another everywhere or all the time. Simultaneously, at some 
levels, their religious differences, as there existed during the War, could affect their greater 
translocal loyalties. Nonetheless, their respective active groups, notables and influential figures 
were trying to find a way out of these post-War uncertainties and hoping to utilize this situation 
for the creation of a new state that could be congruent with their own ethnic rule. Therefore, 
although at the local level both the Kurds and the Armenians were trying win over the other 
side,
687
 when it came to the portrayal of their relations with each other in the international arena, 
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their stories were different. Neither Armenians nor the Ottoman nor the European Powers 
considered the Kurds anything more than half-savage tribes who mostly indulged in banditry. 
The Ottoman newspapers’ contemporary references to the Kurds as beasts — the appellation 
“Kuyruklu Kürtler,” literally meaning “the tailed Kurds” testifies to this reality.688  The 
Armenian nationalists could not see the Kurds in a brighter light either. To them, the Kurds’ 
existence as a political collectivity was a fairy tale being narrated by the British and the Ottoman 
officials and therefore, 
writing in the aftermath of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78, Raffi
689
, one of the 
most influential early Armenian nationalist thinkers, argued that if ‘the unity of the 
Kurds’ (Krdakan miwutyune) was anything it was simply either a ‘dream’ of Ottoman 
officials in Istanbul or an ‘imaginary’ construct of the British consuls both parties of 
which, according to him simply, manipulated the Kurdish cultural virtues and coined 
out the term Kurdistan for political purposes.
690
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 Also, there were many attempt made by both communities to win over the other side. For example, “ the 
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Criticizing an Ottoman paper for its pro-Kurdish stance, another intellectual by the name of Tanil 
Baghdasarov writes, “imagine what might become of the readers of a journalist who tries to 
prove that the savage, murderous, subhuman (insanların ednası), and barbaric Kurds are greater 
in number than the Armenian nation.”691 
 While in 1880s Armenian nationalists excoriated the British Consul for creating a 
phantom-like entity by the name of Kurdistan, the British archives considered the Armenian 
nationalists as those they could rely on for obtaining accurate information about the reality on the 
ground. In one of these documents, the Armenians are divided into three categories: peasants, 
bureaucrats who work for the Ottoman state and the nationalists who strove to create an 
Armenian state. The latter were referred as those whose “ideas represent those of the country, 
and it is to them we must turn if we would learn what is going on.”692 This illustrates the degree 
of the Armenian nationalists’ influence on the British officials and missionaries when it came to 
their view on the Kurds and the people in that region.
693
 
 Non-local Kurdish and Armenian actors become stridently vocal in their mutual 
opposition as the Great Powers established a commission called the Kurdistan Commission to 
implement Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin.
694
 Armenians and Kurds alike were hoping that 
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But the third class which consists of the more educated Gregorian Armenians either men of family 
and influence long resident in the country, or else men of talent and energy imported from 
Constantinople are a very different character.  From motives either of patriotism or ambition they 
have the firm intention to deliver their countrymen from their oppressors and will go any lengths 
to accomplish it.  They are in constant communication with the Committee at Constantinople from 
whom they receive their orders which are passed on to the subcommittee in the districts.  Being 
also the men by whom the first class mentioned above are guided like sheep, their ideas represent 
those of the country, and it is to them we must turn if we would learn what is going on. (emphasis 
added) 
694
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they could use the post-war situation for the creation of their respective independent states. It 
seems, however, that both parties saw a green light and a possible support from the Great Powers 
as vital to the eventual realization of their political aspirations. Consequently, the Armenians 
were particularly disappointed and infuriated to hear that not only the commission’s name, but 
also the newly opened British consul in the region bore the name of Kurdistan. In the eyes of the 
Armenians, this was a tacit recognition of the Kurds and the Kurdishness of the land. They 
“grumbled at the conduct of the British Government which had trampled on the feelings of all 
Armenians by nominating a Consul to Kurdistan.”695 Apparently the Armenians preferred to 
refer to it as the commission to Armenia.
696
 The naming of the area became a major point of 
contestation between these communities, which paved the way for the expression of Kurdish 
reactions in Ottoman newspapers in 1880. 
 Similar reactions were reflected in a number of different articles, all written by different 
Kurdish individuals, in the Ottoman papers.
697
 Since these reactions offer some rare texts that 
were written in that period by Kurds themselves, they help us to make some sense of how the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The Sublime Porte engages to realize without further delay, the ameliorations and the reforms 
demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their 
security against the Kurds and the Circassians. The Sublime Porte will periodically render 
accounts of the measures taken with this intent to the Powers who will supervise them. 
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Kurdish intelligentsia perceived themselves and others. Their writings either point to the 
existence of Kurdish nationalism or they have to be treated as “anomalies and counterinstances 
[and] deviations from a set of expectations, those expectations are embodied in [a] paradigm,” 698  
which is generally regarded as ‘Kurdish tribalism.’  
 Ottoman newspapers in 1880
699
 reveal an astonishing degree of ethnic and nationalistic 
tensions. One could claim that Kurdish nationalism, which was supposed to be most latent in the 
region, was already on display.
700
 Probably for the first time, some pro-Kurdish articles, written 
by individual Kurdish intellectuals, appeared in the Ottoman paper. This was indicative of the 
precarious situation in which the ruling nation found itself. While they were alarmed by the 
prospect of an independent Armenia and the disintegration of the Empire as a possible outcome 
of the Berlin Treaty, Ottoman elites such as those of the circle around Tercüman-ı Hakikat gave 
some voice to the Kurds, who were still called beasts or “tailed Kurds”701 in other Ottoman 
papers.
702
 Despite their temporarily allowing the publication of some pro-Kurdish articles, the 
following paragraph establishes the Turkish intellectuals’ halfhearted-ness in their apparent pro-
Kurdish stance where they declare “our friends [in] Curia Durian703 [are] with those who label 
the Kurds communally (umumen haydut) as brigands. Yet, it even paints Tercüman-ı Hakikat as 
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 and this is how it whimsically brands [our newspaper].
705
   
 As much as this paragraph points to the communal contestations, ethnic consciousness, 
and the Ottoman elites’ respective political stances, it also reveals the elite’s perception of the 
hierarchized other. In reading this paragraph, one can easily discern that the Kurds are favored 
over the Armenians, but not to a degree that the Ottoman /Turkish elite wish to be identified with 
the Kurds. Even if against the Armenians, the Kurds’ religion is still a type of bond between the 
two, Kurdish ethnicity and their distance from the center represent an unbreachable gulf. 
Therefore, the writers of Tercüman-ı Hakikat seem disturbed to be identified as pro-Kurds as 
much as they are by the Armenian claims that represent a clear threat to the official nationalism. 
Although people from the periphery could count as fellow Muslims against non-Muslims, the 
Ottoman elites could not tolerate the idea of being reduced to their level since they saw them as 
backwards and savages or in Karen Horney’s phrasing, appeared as their own “despised 
image.”706 Interestingly enough, people from the periphery, including the Kurds, saw the Turks 
as fellow Muslims in the fight against non-Muslims, but at the same time as oppressive Turks 
who were imposing their rule on the rest.
707
   
 Kurdish intellectuals reacted to Armenian nationalism as they viewed it as a threat to 
their own nationalism or to the interests of the Ottoman Kurds in general.
708
 Neither did they 
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conceal their agitation at Ottoman elites’ portrayal of the Kurds as brigands or savages. As 
tension grew over the implementation of the Treaty of Berlin, Ottoman papers, particularly 
Tercüman-ı Hakikat, decided to make some allowance for the expression of individual Kurds’ 
views. These debates, which reflected the Kurds’ anxiety, began to appear in the Ottoman press 
as the possibility of the implementation of Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty increased. The Kurds 
seem to have perceived the reforms stipulated in Article 61 as a foreign platform for the creation 
of a potential Armenian state at the expense of obscuring the name of Kurdistan.
709
 A Kurdish 
notable gave voice to this fear among the Kurds when he stated that “even the most savage 
nations (Turkish: akvam; sing. kavim) in the world do not oppose reform. However, if these so-
called reforms are going to be similar to those in Eastern Rumelia,” and result in mass killings of 
local Muslims, then “the Kurds will categorically reject them.”710 He goes on to say that Kurds 
will follow their leaders and collectively fight against such impositions.
711
 It is claimed in 
another article that Armenians were defining their desired reforms so as to enable the creation of 
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an Armenistan. “In the final analysis,” the writer claims, that the Armenians assert “here is 
Armenistan and the Kurds have no place on this land; you either have to migrate to Iran or 
become our subjects … Is this a justifiable thing? Can a nation for the sake of its own survival 
threaten another’s existence?”712  
 These fears and contentious views were also manifested in the rereading of histories and 
redrawing of imaginary geographical boundaries by both sides in accordance with the naming or 
renaming of the land.
713
 The debate over whether the proper name of the land should be 
Kurdistan or Armenistan culminated in communal clashes followed by the state’s prohibition of 
the use of either of these names in Bitlis in 1881.
714
     
 These articles are sometimes equally critical of the portrayal of Kurds in the Ottoman, 
Armenian and European press and manifest the Kurdish intellectuals’ projection of the same 
negative views about them onto their neighbors—the Armenians. According to the first article, 
pro-Armenian papers had declared that the Kurds opposed the Reforms stipulated in the Article 
61, because, in the event of its implementation, the Kurds would no longer be able to use their 
only talent (san‘at)—looting and robbing Armenians.715 The writer of one the articles stated that 
his patriotism (hamiyet-i milliye) and the zeal for his ethnicity (‘asabiyet-i kavmiye) compelled 
him not to leave such allegations unanswered.
716
 Now, these writers tried to rewrite their own 
nation’s history while portraying their others, i.e. the Armenians, in the most degrading ways. 
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Hence, one of them portrays Armenians as illiterate, having no history, language, or culture.
717
 
However, aside from those residing in Istanbul, claims the article, the Armenians were many 
times more backward than the Kurds.
718
 Another individual who was introduced as a Kurdish 
notable (mu‘teberan-i Kürd dan) starts his article by pointing to the disadvantaged position of the 
Kurds. Without explaining why they previously had no access to the Turkish newspaper,
719
 the 
writer states that “now, we have become more aware of our plight due to lack of access to the 
press, even to the Turkish press, while Armenians have enjoyed easy access to the European 
press and have been able to portray the Kurds as savages.”720 Then he starts making comparisons 
of Kurds with Armenians and claims of Kurdish cultural superiority over Armenians, in which a 
significant racial bias can be sensed. He writes that while Kurds know Arabic, Persian, and their 
own language, for thousands of years the Armenians have remained as half-savages (nime vahşi) 
roaming aimlessly in a valley of ignorance.
721
 
 In another article, which is signed by “ ‘A. T.,” the Armenians are accused of 
stigmatizing the Kurds as people who “lack any desire for progress.” However, the same writer 
claims that “whoever knows Armenians attests to how far the Armenians lag behind when they 
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are compared with the Kurds.”722 ºA. T.’s self-congratulatory remarks know scarcely any limit. 
So what is his portrayal of the Armenians?  He goes so far as to say that the nomadic Kurds 
greatly value education and the arts, are extremely eloquent and poetic, and “we can say that no 
other nation (millet) has arrived at such an honorable stage.”723  Whereas Kurds possess these 
distinct qualities, the Armenians are just like solid objects, how can they even benefit from the 
Reforms? … First of all, they have no language of their own. If an Armenian is to become a 
human being, s/he must [first] learn other people’s languages... While from their early childhood 
they interact with the Ottoman Turks (Osmanlı Türkleri) and spend their entire life in the state’s 
offices and divans, they still sound Armenian (ermeni rayihası) when they speak Turkish.724 
 ‘A. T.’s writing displays how the nationalist elite in each community saw their other as 
nothing more than ‘sub-humans.’ These types of “shared emotional dispositions relate[d] to the 
attitudes members of a given ingroup have towards other members of that ingroup, as well as 
those towards members of an out-group.”725 ‘A. T.’s reaction exhibits the racialist views of the 
time and the usual, simplistic connection drawn between race, language and progress. This is in 
addition to a great deal of psychological distress for being accused as savage and uncivilized, at a 
time when such stigmas could amount to being jettisoned into the limbo state of 
“primitiveness”—their fates being left to the whimsy of civilizing powers.  
 ‘A. T. seems to be well versed in European literary canons and apparently he had been 
translating various European literary texts. In his narration of the Kurdish nation, he does not 
stop at comparing the Kurdish and Armenian languages and denying the existence of the latter; 
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he takes a further step by putting Kurdish language and literature on par with that of Europeans 
when writes: 
[it must be from] our language’s extraordinarily perfect development (fevk al-‘ade 
mükemmeliyeti ile) that whatever language we intend to learn, we learn it so easily and 
speak it as if it is our own native language… Our own language’s perfection and our 
literary works and poetry collections—which are comparable with the works of 
Lamartine, Homer and Voltaire—enable me to translate our contemporary [European 
canonical works] into Kurdish.
726
 
What is most striking is how, in this period, history was utilized and how a language’s 
having a high degree of development and having long roots in history were seen to legitimize 
contemporary nationalist political claims. Therefore, wherever nationalistic sentiments cropped 
up, histories and people’s pasts were blithely radicalized and nationalized. These Kurdish 
intellectuals’ attempts to rewrite history was not an isolated occurrence. However, even in 
rewriting ‘their most ancient past,’ European civilization loomed large. Thus, whenever a 
nation’s existence was imagined, even in the most fantastic, anachronistic way, it had to 
appropriate some aspects of modern European civilization for itself. Hence, the enterprise of 
rewriting the nation’s history is to show how ‘we’ were distinctly civilized in the past, just as 
Europeans are today. Here “nationality is narrated,” as Uri Ram would put it, “as a story which 
people tell about themselves in order to lend meaning to their social world.”727 In our case, they 
do so especially to put themselves on equal footing with other nations in terms of ‘civilizedness’ 
to legitimate their contemporary political aspirations.  Thus, ‘our Islamic past,’ which 
differentiates ‘us’ even from other Muslims and testifies to ‘our’ distinct place among ‘our’ 
coreligionists, demonstrates ‘our’ potential for progress — the sine qua non of the age of modern 
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nationalism. This was deemed necessary to be considered a nation. ‘A. T.’s writing exemplifies 
this sentiment when he contends that 
most people in the Arab Iraq,
728
 Aleppo, and all other regions in Sham, be they Turks 
or Arabs …cannot become scholars [plural ‘ulemâ‘; singular ‘alim] without knowing 
Kurdish. Among these ‘ulemâ are philosophers whose theological debates would 
overwhelm Voltaire—if he were resurrected from his grave and confronted with them.  
So he would have no choice but to bow to them and acknowledge their superiority.
729
 
This passage not only confers upon the Kurdish language a superior status over others but also 
insinuates that literacy in the Kurdish language was a sign of superior status of scholarship 
among non-Kurds, as if it were a lingua franca in the above-mentioned Muslim regions.  
Furthermore, it suggests that they were not just great scholars by the traditional standards of 
Islamic scholarship; even Voltaire’s acquaintance with their degree of erudition would have 
made him prostrate before them. The hyperbole and historical inaccuracy in these claims, in a 
way, may be a common characteristic in nationalist historiography. The point worth noting, 
however, is that traditional religious scholarship was venerated and conflated with ethnic self-
glorification in the modernist and ethno-nationalist claims cited above. 
 The claims made about the nature of the Kurdish contribution to the Islamic past, taken as 
separate from Muslim history in general, are striking. This Islamic past becomes primarily 
Kurdish with no reference to other Muslims, or for that matter to their shared historical, cultural, 
or religious past. Narrating the nation takes place through reinterpretation of shared experience. 
This reinterpretation, however, takes place by obscuring the shared aspect of that history and 
experience; by excluding the Other from the narrative to serve and suit the assumed continuity of 
the national heritage. In this nationalist historiography, not only is a religious hero like Salah ad-
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Din re-appropriated, but also one of the most significant Christian-Muslim encounters is 
represented as ethnic Kurds’ historical triumph. Also, the non-Kurdish share in this particular 
experience is potently mythicized. “This narration lends meaning and security to monotonous 
existence and ties everyday life to a ‘national destiny.’”730 Furthermore, the fuzzy division 
between Kurds and Armenians, a matter which at the time particularly in rural areas confuses 
historians and missionaries, is shoved aside by bringing the Islamic past into play. However, this 
is how “identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference. One is a 
Bosnian Serb to the degree to which one is not a Bosnian Moslem or a Croat.”731 
 This writer goes as far as to Kurdify the origins of European civilization—it was then 
generally referred to as ‘the Civilization.’ In so doing, however, he emphasizes a distinct Kurdish 
role. Such an approach to European civilization, claiming a Muslim or common origin for it, was 
to gain some popularity later among modernist Muslims and nationalist Arabs. However, this 
type of Kurdish nationalist narration of the Islamic past in such a rosy light, is of a comparatively 
rare brand. The writer of the article recounts some episodes of Islamic history with a clear 
Kurdish ethnic bent as the origin of the current European civilization when he writes that 
even now Western historians acknowledge that the Ayyubids, like Salah ad-Din, for a 
century fought the crusaders and put Europeans onto the path of civilization. … A few 
years earlier—in many of his speeches on the East with repeated references to Salah 
ad-Din—Mr. Gladstone recognized the Kurds’ service to the Civilization, praised and 
venerated this illustrious (necib) ethnic group [kevm]. … From the ethnological stand 
point, can anyone show any ethnic Armenian’s name mentioned with such a degree of 
reverence—in any old or modern European historical [sources].732    
  Despite the fact that these articles were not numerous, their writers were trying to utilize 
the scant opportunities they had to make a complete case for ‘narrating their nation.’  ‘A. T. tried 
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to rewrite some type of ‘history of Kurdish civilization’ to show a large footprint of Kurds in 
history, and portrayed the Other as having no presence in or relevance to his brand of nationalist 
historiography of “the Civilization.” There were other writers who strove to draw an eternal and 
immutable map of Kurdistan that existed since time of immemorial. In an article published in 
two parts under the title of “Kurdistan or Armenistan?,”733 the first part being on Kurdistan’s 
geography and the second on Kurdish ethnography, a Kurdish intellectual attempts to write a 
historical geography of Kurdistan that is claimed to span more than two millennia. In this case 
also “The thematic content of discourses of national identity encompasses the construction of a 
common past, present and future; a common culture; a common territory;
734
 and the concept of a 
homo nationalis.”735   
 With such emphasis on the imagined eternal geographical unity of Kurdistan, as 
expected, even Kurdistan’s contemporaneous membership in the Ottoman Empire is entirely 
“forgotten.”736 For that reason, these claims should not be seen as simple reactions, limited to the 
Armenian-Kurdish communal contestations. Despite its degrees of scarceness, this literature 
reveals a situation that is more than just the Muslims’ (Ottoman/Turkish-Kurdish) reaction to 
Armenian nationalism. As such, the piece on Kurdistan’s geography, in addition to telling the 
general story of the ‘personified’ nation’s ‘uniquely identifiable’ historical presence; traceable 
back to ‘mythical times,737 the nation’s geographical borders too are believed to have ‘remained 
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 One could summarize the objectives of these attempts at (re)writing the historical 
geography here as follows: 
 a) to prove the Kurds were not savage and therefore their claim to the land was legitimate. It is 
done to certify the Kurdish sole historical ownership of the land. As one of these authors asserts, 
the Kurds had communally been “depicted as ignorant and savages; now this must shock our 
friends, to see [the Kurds] indulging in sciences (fünun [sing. fenn]) like history and geography 
and [to see us] delimiting our nations’ land738 on the pages of the Ottoman papers.”739 
b) To claim that the Kurds are a distinct nation. Kurdish notables believed that they were on the 
losing side of the civilizational battle. They felt the battle could be a determinative factor for 
their collective destiny. One of the writers clearly gives expression to their common fear when he 
writes that “we” should end “our silence against all these lies and allegations written about our 
people (kavmiyetimize). Now, due to our silence, we are paying for how we have been depicted 
in the civilized world, i.e., Europe. We are forced to break our silence.”740 The entire 
civilizational discourse was about the legitimacy of the competing political claims and to prove 
which community was ‘evolved’ enough to be recognized as eligible for statehood. A great 
testimony to this view is the claim that the Armenians themselves were “not denying that they  
were ready to go as far as risk their political survival by turning it into a case to be decided by 
Europeans.”741 
c) Also, to prove that the land belonged to Kurds and to put an end to what they regarded as “the 
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greatest injustices;” that Kurds were so “scorned for calling [their] own homeland Kurdistan.”742 
 Despite the fact that the main interlocutors of all these articles are the Armenians, they 
clearly referred to the Kurds as a distinct nation. However, the required self-censorship for 
writing in the state-sanctioned Ottoman newspapers must not be left unmentioned. These 
writings do not seem particularly antagonistic toward the state. Nevertheless, the Kurds are 
generally portrayed with a distinctly primordial nationality and are dissociated from all other 
Muslims, including the Ottoman Turks. Thusly this point becomes clear in the Kurds’ rewriting 
of their historical relation with the Ottomans. The Kurds reinterpret the Ottoman Empire’s 
expansion in the 16
th
 century by which Kurdistan too went under the Empire’s control. This is 
recounted as the Kurds’ voluntarily acceptance of Ottoman rule.743 Such a revisionist account 
presupposes or retrojects the birth of the imagined Kurdish nationhood into the distant past.  
Also, the ‘imagined community,’ here, gains a historical agency and independent existence from 
the Ottoman state—almost as a partner for unity in the past.  In the early 20th century Kurdish 
intellectuals also repeated such claims. They further argued that since the Kurds had “voluntarily 
accepted this union in the past”—in the era of the nation-state—it was a moral imperative for the 
Turks to help Kurds to obtain their independence.
744
  
 As stated earlier, the concern about ‘the past’ in these writings is mostly an attempt to 
imbue contemporary political claims with legitimacy. The selective attachments to and 
detachments from the world and Islamic history by these authors aimed to create a past for Kurds 
as civilized agents. Also, it was an attempt to justify the present collective and independent 
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actions and plans—to proclaim a Kurdish awakening. Hence, it was said that “we too will be 
declaring our plans for the future and we will prove this.”745 The author goes on by stating that 
“we are now particularly worried, and our consciousness of the real nature of the [Great] Powers’ 
attempts [propagated as] Reforms… makes us even more resolute about determining our own 
future.”746 The author warns, however, that one cannot make any greater blunder than to assume 
that “the land of Kurdistan lacks any vigor and excitement (heyecandan ‘ari) and as you [all] 
know, the question of Sheikh Ubeydullah Efendi is still an enduring one.”747 
 The last remark indicates that these intellectuals also supported and were hopeful about 
the plans of Sheikh Ubeydullah—the subject of the next chapter’s discussion. However, since 
their identity is not revealed by the journal, it is hard to speculate on what kind of organic ties 
exited between them and the Sheikh.
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Exclusionary Islam and Kurdish Nationalism:  
The Case of the Naqshbandi Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri 
 
 
We only become what we are by the radical and deep-seated 





The current chapter shall be devoted to the religio-nationalist discourse of the 1880 
Kurdish uprising under Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri. This particular Kurdish uprising offers an 
important example of the fusion of peripheral Islam with Kurdish ethno-nationalist aspirations. 
Such a fusion between Islam and nationalism is evident in the documents produced by Kurdish 
religious leaders, especially the charismatic leader of the uprising, Sheikh Ubeydullah. This 
chapter discusses the Sheikh’s personal account of the major Kurdish-Ottoman Turkish 
interaction as documented in his Persian Mesnewi
749
 along with his personal letters. The religio-
political project of Sheikh Ubeydullah is analyzed in order to illustrate how his Islamic 
revivalism goes hand in hand with his Kurdish nationalism. I employ the Sheikh’s writings to 
shed some light on the Kurdish self-perception and the way they perceived ethnic Others. The 
1877-78 Russo-Ottoman war (and the resultant Kurdish interaction with the Ottoman army) 
constitutes the defining moment in the Sheikh’s ethno-nationalist consciousness.  
 In this chapter, I argue that Sheikh Ubeydullah’s writings indicate that he understood the 
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significance of self-referentiality in making collective political claims. Neither previous Kurdish 
texts nor Kurdish uprisings reflect the type of ethno-national consciousness that tied collective 
self-referentiality with the idea of self-rule. For instance, despite Ahmad Xani’s (the renowned 
17
th
-century Kurdish poet) emphasis on writing in the Kurdish language,
750
 his poetic oeuvre 
Mem u Zin does not evidence the presence of Kurdish ethno-nationalism.
751
 
 The concluding section of the current chapter offers a more theoretical approach to the 
Sheikh’s revolt. In particular, I will argue that the political statements by the Sheikh and more 
significantly his political demands could not take place outside the modern paradigm of 
nationalism. By way of analyzing Sheikh Ubeydullah’s writings, I venture to demonstrate the 
fusion of religion and nationalism. In doing so I intend to make sense of the Sheikh’s utterances 
in the light of works by John Langshaw Austin, Michael Billig, Judith Butler, Partha Chatterjee 
and Quentin Skinner. Borrowing from Austin’s phraseology, I argue that nationalism is a modern 
‘convention.’ Therefore, any utterances that signify the modern nationalist convention would 
have to be uttered to invoke such a convention. When it comes to the Sheikh, he did invoke the 
idea of modern nationalism through his religious idiom. Therefore, the Sheikh’s uprising has to 
be understood as a significant case of religious nationalism in the Modern Middle East. 
 
The Rise of Sheikh Ubeydullah 
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 Ubeydullah of Nehri (d. 1883) was a Naqshbandi Sheikh and a Kurdish religious scholar. 
His main Khanaqah (Sufi lodge) was located in the village of Nehri, in the borderland region 
between the Qajar and Ottoman states. He led rebellions against these states in 1879 and 1880 
respectively. In addition to his sporadic personal letters, the Sheikh wrote a Mesnewi
752
 to revive 
what he considered “the true Islam” and “authentic Sufism” to guide “the people of true 
religion,” i.e., the Kurds.753 He was probably the most prominent Kurdish Sufi Sheikh and 
community leader of his time. Describing the place of the Sheikh among Sunni Muslims, Speer 
states that “next to the Sultan and the Sheriff of Mecca the Sheikh was the holiest person among 
the Sunni Mohammedans. Thousands were ready to follow him as the vicar of God… He was a 
man of some real virtues of character, vigorous, just, and courageous.”754 
  The Sheikh must have been concerned about the prospect of an independent Armenian 
state.
755
 It is clear, however, that he did not share his contemporary Kurdish intellectuals’ 
negative views (discussed in the preceding chapter) about his Christian neighbors.
756
 There is a 
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significant amount of scholarship that views the Kurdish fear of the emergence of a possible 
Armenian state as the sole cause for the Sheikh’s revolt.757 However, it should be emphasized 
that the evidence used to substantiate this claim is itself contradictory and dubious. The source 
for the statement below, allegedly uttered by Sheikh, comes from an Ottoman official in 
Kurdistan who had an active role in campaigning against him.
758
   
The Sheikh is famously quoted as saying “what is this I hear, that the Armenians are 
going to have an independent state in Van, and that the Nestorians are going to hoist the British 
flag and declare themselves British subjects. I will never permit it; even if I have to arm the 
women.”759 No matter how celebrated this quote is, it should be regarded with great caution 
because: a) Captain Clayton, the British official who reports this, claims that he had heard it from 
Toussoun Pasha.
760
  Toussoun Pasha was an Ottoman state official in Hakkari, who had stated 
that he heard this remarks from one his subordinates. b) It seems that this statement has been one 
of the reasons that some scholars assume the prospect of an Armenian state was the prima causa 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“he was very fair to the Christians. Two years later when the Sheikh's dream had vanished and he 
was a prisoner in Constantinople, the Sultan asked him to write a paper describing the condition of 
the people in Kurdistan. The Sheikh wrote in his paper a great deal about the Nestorian Christians 
there, praising them as the best subjects of the Sultan. The Sultan objected to such language, and 
three times returned the letter for correction. Finally the Sheikh said, ‘I don't know much about 
politics, but I do know something about truth telling, and this is the truth.’” 
 Speer, The Hakim Sahib, the Foreign Doctor: A Biography of Joseph Plumb Cochran, M. D., of Persia, 
74-5.Also, in his letter to one of his own Khalifas, Ubeydullah notes that “I trust Armenians much more 
than the Persians and the Turks. It is much better for us to unite with the Armenians rather than with the 
Turks or Persians. The Persians hate us and the Turks want to use us as their tools.”  
Kavkaz, 1880; no. 343 and Megu Ayestani, 1880; no.98 cited and quoted in: Celîlê Celîl, 1880 Şeyh 
Ubeydullah Nehri: Kürt Ayaklanması/ 1880 Shaykh Ubeydullah Nehri's Kurdish Uprising, trans. M. 
Aras(Istanbul: Pêrî Yayaninlari, 1998), 109. 
757
 Cf. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds(London: I.B. Tauris, 2004).  Also, Özoglu, "Does Kurdish 
Nationalism Have a Navel?." 
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 Clayton to Trotter; Bashkala, 11
th
 July 1880. FO 195 / 1315/ No. 23 Political [Confidential]. 
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for the Sheikh’s revolt.761 This conversation between Clayton and Toussoun Pasha  occurred in 
July 1880, as Clayton notes that “since my arrival here Toussoun Pasha the Mutesarrif has told 
me that some little time ago he sent an officer” to visit the Sheikh.762 It should be kept in mind 
that before 1880 the Sheikh had become disillusioned with the Ottoman state and had revolted 
against it a year earlier. c) Toussoun Pasha relates this story along with two other important 
pieces of news: 1) Again according to the Pasha, the Sheikh was already trying to build a 
coalition with Nestorians and “ha[d] sent [a message] to Mar Shimoun to urge him to join forces 
against the Turkish Government and ha[d] made the same request to the chief Armenian 
ecclesiastic here, saying that he would protect the Christians.”763  The Sheikh had also urged for 
everyone to refrain from paying taxes to the government.
764
 2) In addition, the Pasha had told 
Clayton that “some little time ago” the Sheikh had been trying to send his son to Istanbul with a 
proposal to pay a large sum “to the Sultan by Bedir Khan Bey when semi-independent, and will 
offer to pay a still larger sum if his authority over Kurdistan is recognized and his rule is not 
interfered with.” 765 d) This quote could also be a rumor and part of the Ottoman campaign to pit 
different communities against one another. Clayton speaks to this reality when he recounts that 
“Samih Pasha told [him] also that he had heard that the Sheikh had a plan for exterminating the 
Christians in view of the talk that has been going on about the formation of an Armenian 
State.”766 Ottoman officials were trying to spread these rumors, especially after the Sheikh’s 
attack on Iran, to the extent that they were ready to hire Russian mercenaries to scare Christians 
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and simultaneously caution British Officials of “the Sheikh’s ulterior motives” and paint his 
revolt as entirely anti-Christian. Clayton relates that 
there is a certain Russian ‘loupeur’ named Tchilingiroff, a restless adventurer, who has 
been acting as a sort of factotum of the Sheikh and has recently been brought here by 
the Turkish authorities.  This man has been telling the Armenians that they all owe 
their lives to him, that the Sheikh intended to massacre them, but that he had persuaded 
him to turn against the Persians instead.
 767 
(Emphasis added) 
To come back to the Sheikh’s appearance on the Kurdish political scene, Ubeydullah rose 
to prominence especially during the Russo-Ottoman war (1887–88) as he received a request from 
Abdülhamid II to join the ‘jihad’ against the Russian Army. According to his personal account, 
the Sheikh was able to gather thousands of armed men.
768
 The Sheikh’s participation in the War 
became one of the major factors in his growing nationalist sentiment and his disillusionment with 
the Ottoman state. In 1879, the Sheikh led an unsuccessful uprising against the Ottoman state. 
However, seeing the superiority of the state forces and an inevitable defeat at hand, he found a 
way out of this situation and convinced the Sultan that the uprising was not a rebellion against 
the Sultan himself, but rather an outbreak of the people’s frustration and against the local 
officials’ corruption. In the following year, perhaps in the hope that the previous year’s rebellion 
was the end of the Sheikh’s anti-state political activities, the Sultan bestowed his decoration 
upon him.
769
   




 Nehri, Mesnevi Şeyx Ubeydullah Nehri; Tuhfetul Ehbab: 108.  Also, Ateş states that: 
Sheikh Ubeidullah, in his correspondence with the Sultan Abdulhamid, claimed he headed a force 
of 30,000. The Ottoman Commander of the Caucasian and Eastern front, Ahmed Mukhtar Pasha, 
maintained that Sheikh Ubeydullah organized seven redif battalions, with battalions coming from 
other districts as well. In addition to regular troops, he wrote, ‘Sheikh [Ubeydullah] Efendi [from] 
Hakkari raised 50–60 thousand irregular soldiers, both infantry and cavalry, from his districts of 
Van province.’” 
Ateş, "Empires at the Margins: Toward the History of the Ottoman-Iranian Borderland Peoples, 1843-
1881," 311.  
769
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 Months later, using his Kurdish league,
770
 which was a broad union of Ottoman and 
Persian Kurds, the Sheikh took control of major parts of Kurdistan that were under Qajar rule. 
After a few months, especially when the war took some ugly turns as it increasingly came to be 
understood as a Shi‘i- Sunni war, the Sheikh was defeated and squeezed between the Qajar and 
Ottoman Armies amidst rumors of a possible arrival of the Russian troops to support the 
Persians.
771
 Later on, the Sheikh was removed from his own region and sent to exile in Istanbul. 
After his escape and return to Hakkari, this time he was sent to Hijaz, where he remained until 
his death in 1883.  
 It is important to note that unlike in the previous Kurdish uprising, the Sheikh’s activities 
were not limited to taking up arms and gathering forces to go against the non-Kurdish states. He 
started his movement with diplomatic efforts in an attempt at convincing the Great Powers that 
the Kurds were a separate nation. In addition to contacting Russian and British Consuls, he 
“established contact with the Sharif of Mecca772 and Khedive of Egypt.”773 He also tried to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Sheikh Obeyd Ullah is working hard to extend his influence.  He is ingratiating himself with the 
Christians and large numbers of the latter have migrated from Gevver into the Sheikh’s immediate 
neighborhood in order to enjoy his protection from other Kurds.  There can be no doubt that he 
still meditates throwing off the Turkish rule. On the other hand Bahri Bey, Samih Pasha’s aide-de-
camp, is to start this week to bear to the Sheikh the decoration that the Sultan has bestowed upon 
him. FO 195 / 1315(No. 20, Clayton to Trotter; Van, 25
th
 May 1880). 
770
 Apparently the establishment of the Kurdish league very much troubled the Armenian nationalists in Istanbul and 
outside the Ottoman territories. Despite the local Christian’s participation in the Sheikh’s revolt, the Armenian 
nationalist elite were trying to paint it as threat to the Armenians. Therefore, the British Parliament held an official 
session to make an inquiry about this league and demanded the members of the British cabinet to explanation the 
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respect and follow someone [as a caliph] who can be deposed by a fatwa issued by his own appointee (Sheikh al-
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persuade Abbas Mirza Molk Ara, a half-Kurdish Qajar prince, to join his efforts.
774
  
 The goal here is not to rewrite the chronology of the historical events, which has been 
dealt with as best as possible by others,
775
 but to investigate how a nationalist discourse fuses 
with Kurdish religious discourse and into their narration of the nation. This takes place in various 
contexts and forms: by Kurdish intelligentsia in Istanbul with their emphasis on ethnic Kurdish 
contributions to Islamic civilization (as shown above), Kurdish migrants and religious leaders 
from Iran, and by Sheikh Ubeydullah himself, in his political letters and poems. The fusion of 
religion and nationalism is also visible in these groups and figures’ criticism of their others, 




 The rise of Sheikh Ubeydullah signified a new era in the Kurdish politics and presents a 
modality of its development in which the fusion of nationalism and religiosity were clearly 
visible. This interesting fusion in the Kurdish political movements, which in some cases lasted 
until 1960s, endowed them with a unique characteristic. It could be explained by the fact that the 
Kurds simultaneously represented the religious and ethnic peripheral “Other.”  The Kurds were 
generally portrayed as backward and ignorant in the late-Ottoman period. So too did their 
religiosity, in the eyes of the Ottoman elite, represent a backward Islam.
777
 This was the case, as 
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mentioned in the foregoing chapters, not just because Kurdish Islam in particular, and non-
Turkish Islam more generally, was deemed outdated, and the Ottoman elite believed that 
“without receiving light from the Istanbul’s enlightenment”778 no nation could possibly leap to 
their stage of modern comprehension of Islam. Moreover, when it comes to the Qajar/Iranians’ 
and Kurds’ perceptions of each other, the Shi‘i- Sunni or Kurd-‘Ajam [non-Kurdish Iranians] 
divide represented a much wider intercommunal chasm than the division between the peripheral 
Shafi‘i/ Naqshbandi/ Kurds vis-à-vis the official Ottomans/Turkish Hanafi Islam across the 
border. This classification should not be seen odd. Shafi‘i school showed persisted stubbornness 
in its refusal to follow the officially propagated Hanafi school of law in the Empire. “This branch 
of Islam had not followed the Hanefis, (Hanafis), the main Ottoman mezhep (school of law) in 
its supine attitude towards the state.”779 
  
“The Kurds’ Religion is Different”780 
There is a great body of scholarship on Sheikh Ubeydullah’s rising in 1880. 
Unfortunately, except for a few letters by the Sheikh himself, his Mesnewi was not available
781
 to 
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  In October 1880 in a letter to Dr. Cochran, an American missionary in the Hakkari region, the Ubeydullah wrote 
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those who have studied his uprising before. The lack of attention to the Mesnewi is partly due to 
the fact that it was not available in print. It existed only in the form of a manuscript available to 
the close relatives and follower of the Sheikh. Also, it is written in Persian. Most likely Persian 
constituted an important barrier for the new generation of the Sheikh’s relatives who were living 
on the Turkish side of Kurdistan to have access to the Sheikh’s poetry. Furthermore, except for 
the work of Sabri Ateş, most of the scholarship concentrates on non-Persian documents in 
studying the Sheikh’s revolt. This is why for long the Mesnewi remained a manuscript unknown 
to people other than close relatives and followers of the Sheikh in the East. It took this poetry 
book over a century to appear in Persian print.  
 The Sheikh’s Mesnewi offers a firsthand account about his political and nationalist 
thoughts, which help us to get a better grasp of how his religious and nationalist views were 
intersecting. Jwaideh’s pioneering work more than any other has revealed a great deal about the 
Sheikh’s personality and his thoughts. Had Jwaideh had a chance to consult this collection of 
poetry, he could have offered even more about the Sheikh’s thoughts, his approach to Islam, 
politics, Kurdish nationalism and national identity, and the religious content of that identity. 
Jwaideh was among the first scholars, if not the first to note that “The Sheikh’s contention that 
the Kurds’ religion was different from that of the others is extremely significant. It indicates the 
extent to which nationalism depends on exclusiveness and difference.”782 Jwaideh contends that 
the Sheikh’s claim was untenable, particularly when it came to the Kurds’ religious differences 
with the Turks. However, “in order to emphasize the complete distinctiveness of the Kurds, the 
Sheikh magnified denominational differences and made this extravagant claim.”783  
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 Even if one assumes that these claims were made by a prominent Kurdish Naqshbandi 
Sheikh merely to garner British and Western political support, it does not diminish their validity. 
It still demonstrates that making a distinction between the Kurds’ religion and their Turkish 
brethren’s did not bother him and that this was not seen, as an Orientalist might suppose, as an 
act that was harmful to the unity of the “umma” or as a Sunni Muslim’s breach of his assumed 
pledge to “the caliphate.” The existence of the Ottoman caliphate seems to have had no effect on 
the Sheikh’s thinking when he wrote those letters or when he sought non-Muslim support to 
divide ‘the caliph’s domain.’ Nonetheless, this self-differentiation on the Sheikh’s part as a 
member of a national community was necessary for “imagining national singularity and 
homogeneity.”784 This ‘imagined homogeneity’ simultaneously takes the form of “construct[ing] 
the distinctions between themselves and other nations, most notably when the other nationality is 
believed to exhibit traits similar to those of one’s own national community, similar to what Freud 
called the ‘narcissism of small differences’.”785 
 The Sheikh’s poems about the Russo-Ottoman War and preparation for it, which must 
have been composed after the war,
786
 illustrate his admiration for Abdülhamid II solely as a 
person. He never refers to the Sultan as a caliph,
787
 but the Sheikh does not hesitate to call him 
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 He indicates the he delayed finishing the book because of the War. Nehri, Mesnewi Şex Ubeydullah Nehri; 
Tuhfetul Ehbab: 104. 
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 According to the Russian Officer, P. İ. Averyanov, the Sheikh did not believe in the legitimacy of the Ottoman 
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(Xani)(Istanbul: SIpan Yayincilik, 1995), 214-16. It should be noted that at one of his personal letters to the Sultan, 





 or as the promulgator of the religion and of justice.
789
 Apparently, at least when he 
wrote his Mesnewi, the Sheikh felt a significant amount of respect toward the Sultan, especially 
after hearing that the Sultan could not control his outburst of emotions when he read the Sheikh’s 
letter—calling on Kurds to join the jihad against Russia, in 1877.790 The Sheikh had been told 
that the letter was so moving that made Sultan unable to read the letter himself in its entirety. 
Therefore Abdülhamid asked an Imam sitting next to him to read the rest of the letter to him.
791
 It 
is clear that Ubeydullah perceives the Sultan’s reaction as a sign of his great religious devotion 
and piety. The Sheikh thinks that Abdülhamid concurs with him that the calamities that had 
befallen the Ottoman state were the result of the abandonment of Islamic traditions and laws and 
the spread of a great moral laxity (bar Kabā’er moṡerr).792 In the “absence of a true faith in 
Islam,” how could the Ottomans expect anything other than shameful defeats?793 However, the 
Sheikh was of the opinion that the Ottoman state was too corrupt for Abdülhamid to reform it. It 
was beyond his ability to make the required and necessary structural changes (tabdil in hay’at). 
Ubeydullah claims that the spread of this non-Islamic culture had reached a point where 
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 (garche sultan mayay-e fath ve zafar---did dar ejra-ye shar’-e namvar): ibid., 110. 
793
 ( zan sabab iman namandeh dar qolub--- az che nasar ayad ze ‘allam al-ghiyub): ibid. 
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Abdülhamid could no longer exert his power or rule effectively.
794
  
 Such assertions not only illustrate the Sheikh’s great disappointment with the entire 
Ottoman state apparatus, but also shed light on the incompatible appropriation of Islam by the 
center and by the periphery, which in turn signifies ethnic and communal differences as well.  As 
discussed in preceding chapters, even though the Ottoman elite usually saw peripheral Islam in a 
negative light, they tolerated some aspects of it, particularly those that could be put into the 
service of more effective governance. An Ottoman official’s remarks about Sheikh Ubeydullah 
and Kurdish Islam in 1873 showcase this dual approach to Islam in the periphery on the part of 
the elites when he states: 
[The Sheikh] works to bring the Kurds, who are inclined toward idolatry, onto the 
straight path of Islam. The township [naḥiye] of Shamdinan where the Sheikh lives is 
on the path of tribal migration routes and on the border [i.e., on the periphery of the 
Ottoman domains]. The order and security of this locality would have required three or 
four battalions. However, because of the Sheikh’s presence and help … only a local 
supervisor [mudir] and eight police forces [żabṭiye] are enough to govern and collect 
all … [the] taxes on time.795 (Emphasis added) 
Such views and perceptions about the Kurds become even worse when expressed by Persian 
elites. For instance, an Iranian bureaucrat, Askandar Qurains, describes the Sheikh as “the 
religious leader of the nomadic tribes that are ignorant of any tradition and religion.
796
 Qajar 
officials viewed the Kurds as a group of people who lived “on the borders of the sublime Qajar 
and Ottoman states.” To those officials, the Kurds were “imprudent, ignoramus-like, vile, and 
ungodly people…nomadic Sunnis, residing in high and unreachable mountains, most of whom 
                                                          
794
 (kardeh bidinan salbe ikhtiyar---bar sare mellat ze daste shariyar):ibid. 
795
 Necib Ali’s report rendered in  Ateş, "Empires at the Margins: Toward the History of the Ottoman-Iranian 
Borderland Peoples, 1843-1881," 333. 
796
 Ibid.  
209 
 
blindly follow[ed] the misguided Sheikh Ubeydullah.”797 
 Existing documents from the period above all show that the Kurdish community and its 
religious leaders too were mostly oblivious to the Ottoman Sultan’s proclaimed religious 
status.
798
 A document from the era, a petition written in Persian by Kurdish refugees in the city 
of Van to the Russian Consul in 1880, demonstrates that the Sunni Ottoman Caliph and the Shi‘i 
Qajar king were equally hated by the Sunni Kurds.
799
 Save for the Shi‘i-populated city of 
Kermanshah, the petition shows not only the signatories representing almost every major 
Kurdish town in Persia, it also bears witness to the religious notables’ abhorrence to both states. 
The document was signed by the Friday prayers’ Imams, high-ranking clerics, judges, muftis and 
merchants (tüccâr; sing. tacir) from different Kurdish cities and towns in East Kurdistan/Iran.
800
 
The petitioners cite their war with the state as their reason for fleeing Iran. However, they claim 
to have halted their war with the Qajar state due to their fear of Ottoman interference. They also 
claim to represent about 500,000 refugees who had apparently entered the Ottoman borders,
801
 a 
number that probably constituted one fifth of the entire Kurdish population at the time.
802
 
 Observing this phenomenon of the reciprocal effect of religious views and ethnicity, 
Basil Nikitin, who spent a considerable time among the Kurds as a Russian dignitary, states that 
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 In his letter, Sheikh Ubeydullah claims that the total population of the Kurds was around 500,000 families at the 
time (averaging around 5 per family); see Olson and Celîl. 
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 the Kurds show as much resistance to the Romîs803 (Sunni  Ottoman/ Turks) as they do 
to the Ajams (non-Kurdish Iranian Shi’ies). Because what makes the Kurds remain 
attached to Islam is not new modernist interpretation. The Kurds are attached to a type 
of Islam that is the legacy of the tribes and mountaineers that has always separated 
them for a stubborn will to independence and rebelliousness against the foreign forces 
from the plains that strove to civilize and to urbanize them in order to make them 




Although Nikitin takes notice of the depth of these differences, he tries to explain such religious 
differences by connecting them to the ‘immutability’ of the Kurdish rural worldview. Of course, 
Nikitin later contradicts himself by making another generalization when asserting that the Kurds 
“are lacking religious prejudice.”805 He also points to the important role of Sufi orders (ṭariqât) 
in obstructing foreign political influence in Kurdistan.
806
 Nikitin rightly shows that the anti-
foreign attitudes of these orders created a type of buffer zone against Kurdish absorption by 
ruling ethnic groups. However, the very emergence of those orders in itself evidences the 
instability of religious elements among the Kurds, which in Bruinessen’s phrasing corresponds 
with “a period of great upheaval and important political changes in Kurdistan.”807 In the 18th 
century, the Khalidi branch of the Naqshbandi, for instance, began to grow and would later 
become the dominant order in Kurdistan.
808
 It was a reformist movement in the sense that it 
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introduced a new interpretation of Islam.
809
 The Khalidi, unlike some other Sufi orders, was not a 
quietist Sufi group and concerned itself greatly with politics.
810
  
 It was part of the revivalist movement in ‘the pre-modern Muslim world.’ Khalidi revival 
was part of the general “orthodox revival” branded by Islamic modernist thinker Fazlur Rahman, 
as a revival “against the corruption of religion and the moral laxity and degeneration prevalent in 
Muslim society in the outlying provinces of the Ottoman Empire and in India.”811 What is at 
stake here is not to shed a positive or negative light on these movements but to draw attention to 
the complexity and volatility of the Islamic religious traditions and the way they came to be 
understood. Labeling them as the religious views of the tribes and mountaineers does not explain 
how they came about and developed, but reflects the center’s influence on the studies of the 
periphery. This possibility of religious reforms should in itself be an indication of a more 
complex situation than mere loyalty to the tribe and to the mountain dwellers’ religious 
traditions. However, stereotypes about ‘tribalism’ and the impact of mountains on the Kurdish 
Islamic beliefs aside, one can identify a type of Kurdish ethnic bent when it comes to their 
religiosity and their skepticism about their others’ religious sincerity.812 Kurdish religious leaders 
have generally shown traces of ethnocentrism in comparing their own religiosity with the forms 
prevalent among the Sunni Turks and Shi‘i Iranians. It was indicated earlier that Sheikh 
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Ubeydullah without any hesitation claimed a distinct Kurdish religiosity in his letters to the 
foreign Consuls. 
 
A Kurdistan-Centered Islamic Revivalism 
 Having discussed Islam as a condition of difference between the center and the periphery, 
now we shall take up the influence of ethnic perceptions on Sheikh Ubeydullah’s revivalist 
project. Aside from his Mesnewi, there is not much literature available to provide us with the 
specifics or particularities of his revivalism. The Sheikh’s Mesnewi is supposed be a religious 
revivalist project. He claims that he wrote his own Mesnewi to present a key to the understanding 
of or to revive that of Rumî.
813
 The Sheikh’s Mesnewi, however, mostly concentrates on the 
Naqshbandi branch of Islamic Sufism. The book is a poetic detailing of the history of the Order 
and a guidebook for the followers of this Tariqat. His new poetic account in a sense was a 
reconstruction of the Naqshbandi Order’s history to differentiate “its original and 
uncontaminated teachings” from the existing and prevalent misrepresentations of it by the 
contemporary generation.
814
 According to the Sheikh, the distance of people’s knowledge about 
the Order from its original teachings had reached a point where one could hardly find any 
resemblance between the two.
815
  
 Sheikh Ubeydullah’s views in many ways resembled those of other Muslim revivalists. 
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He was disturbed by the general direction of the contemporary state of affairs. He had very 
pessimistic views of the Ottoman state. It is clear that the Sheikh believed that the Ottoman 
state’s deficiencies were rooted in its indifference toward Islamic laws and its teachings. He 
considers Ottoman laws to be in direct opposition to Islam, or counter-Shari‘a (khelaf-e 
shar‘).816 To him, Islamic laws are nothing more than the Qur’anic verses and the Prophetic 
tradition and therefore anything incompatible with them is bid‘a (forbidden innovation).817 This 
illustrates a somewhat ‘Abduh and Rida-type Salafi-ism conflated with Sufi teachings in the 
Sheikh’s approach to the religious revival. He even invokes the idea of commonality of the 
Islamic umma’s laws when he contends that “the laws of this umma — which are the best of all 
laws — are grounded in the Qur’an and the Prophetic tradition.”818  
 It seems, however, that his brand of revivalism differed from that of figures like ‘Abduh 
and Riḋa in the sense that Ubeydullah was solely focused on reviving religion among the ethnic 
Kurds. Sheikh Ubeydullah was mostly concerned with the state of affairs in Kurdistan, and this 
is an area that separates him from other Muslim revivalists. As discussed in the preceding 
chapter, the Arab revivalists too had their own nationalistic agenda. ‘Abduh as well believed that 
“the Ottomans had usurped caliphate and the Turks were unable to grasp the spirit of the 
Muhammadan message since they were late converts.”819 Yet unlike Sheikh Ubeydullah, they at 
the same time concerned themselves with the Muslim world in general. However, the Sheikh 
does not pay much attention to the Muslim world beyond Kurdistan. 
 Sheikh Ubeydullah particularly holds positive views about Muslim Kurds religious 
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 Hamid Enyat quoted in Sātan, Halifeliğin Kaldırılması/ the Abolition of the Caliphate, 39. 
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devotion but simultaneously he is highly critical of the Sufi Orders, including his own Naqshi 
Order. He sees the degeneration in Kurdistan as the degeneration of the Sufi Orders. This is why 
he thinks that he is obliged to revive the previous generations’ Sufi tradition820 for two reasons: 
a) the degeneration of the Sufi Orders. b) The existence of an exceptional degree of religious 
enthusiasm in Kurdistan, which requires guidance and spiritual leadership.
821
 Without real 
guidance, asserts Ubeydullah, all this religious enthusiasm and excitement could lead down a 
wrong path.
822
 He claims that the obligatory nature of the religious (or tariqat’s) following 
necessitates writing a second Mesnewi to abide by the first and revive it.
823
  
 From the Sheikh’s perspective, the Sufi tradition in Kurdistan was losing it meaning and 
internal dynamism. Instead of achieving higher stages of spirituality through required training 
and obtaining the necessary knowledge, it was becoming a matter of inheritance. To pass the 
stages of Sufism, a Sufi no longer needed long years of stud y and deep personal spiritual 
endeavors.
824
 Therefore, despite their religious passion, the Kurds were roaming in the plains of 
religion (ṡaḥra-ye din).825 According to Ubeydullah, to the contrary of what has been the 
tradition of the Salaf (pious forebears), which comprises being critical of oneself and tolerant of 
others’ shortcomings, the contemporary Sufis perceived themselves as paragons of piety and 
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charged others with mischief.
826
  
 Another area that sets the Sheikh apart from other Muslim revivalist groups and figures is 
his approach to the Islamic past and its golden age. To the Sheikh who believed in the constancy 
of tajdid (renewal),
827
 Islamic history, along with the exceptional era of the Prophet and 
Rashidun, presented many golden ages as one that was located in Kurdistan’s recent past. The 
Sheikh called for the return to a pristine Islam, defined in the Qur’an and the Prophetic tradition, 
which was practiced and revived in ‘the great Sufi tradition’ even by the previous generation in 
Kurdistan. The memories of it were still fresh, just a few decades earlier when “Ḥażrat” or 
Mawlana Khalid, the founder of the Khalidi branch of the Naqshbandi Order was still around. 
Again, to the contrary of the more universalistic visions of those revivalists like Afghani or 
‘Abduh, the Muslim “degeneration”828 in Kurdistan was what mostly disturbed the Sheikh, 
which started not with the Umayyad’s rule.829 It started with the death of his father and of 
Mawlana Khalid Naqshbandi in the first half of the 19
th
 century. He believed Kurdistan was 
going through a process of degeneration in two senses: First, Kurdistan’s loss of vigor that began  
over a half a century earlier — at which time, according to the Sheikh, Kurdistan was a center of 
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learning which attracted all those who were in pursuit of knowledge from around the world.
830
 
Kurdistan was a garden of knowledge; people “from every region and every ethnic origin (qawm, 
Arabic, and qowm: Persian])” came to Kurdistan to harvest its fruits of knowledge.831 The 
Sheikh laments that in contrast to this, now “those seas of knowledge and illumination” have 
faded away and what is left is nothing but a façade.
832
 He claims that the spirit of the previous 
generation’s legacy has been lost833 and accuses many of the existing Sheikhs and khalifas of 
ignorance and indulging in “nonsensical claims of having access to the unseen world.”834 From 
the Sheikh’s perspective, they were lacking in any real mystical experience or spiritual 
acquisitions. This is how, according to the Sheikh, Kurdistan had lost its vibrancy and “its seas 
of light are dried up.”835  
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 The second aspect of this process of degeneration, to which Jwaideh devoted close 
attention, is the absence of a sovereign Kurdish state and the overall deterioration of the socio-
political situation. The Sheikh does not say much about whether or not the first situation was 
caused by the second. However, scholarship on 19
th
-century Ottoman Kurds unveils the 




 The Sheikh not only views the state as an institution that could establish order and 
security but also as a civilizing or modernizing agent. To him, one of the most important roles 
that a state could play is to educate the populace. This aspect of the state’s role is almost always 
alluded to in the Sheikh’s statements, letters, and poems. It is one of the most important factors 
to sway the Sheikh in his drive for an independent Kurdish state.
837
 This approach to the state 
becomes evident particularly in the following excerpt from the Sheikh’s letter to the American 
missionary Dr. Cochran when he writes: 
Among other evil things, you have probably heard of the [Kurdish] tribe of … Shkak, 
who are famous for their evil and ruin-causing deeds… and [who] will remain in their 
savage state… The Ottoman Government also, like the Persian, either has not the 
means of civilizing
838
 these people or else neglects them. Kurdistan has got a bad 
reputation and has been disgraced, distinction is not made between peaceable and evil-
disposed persons.
839
  (Emphases added) 
 In this letter’s preceding paragraph, the Sheikh contends that the Ottoman and the Persian 
governments intentionally avoid educating those Kurds since “their savage state” helps the two 
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governments to justify their policies in Kurdistan. Therefore, he accuses the Ottoman and Qajar 
state of doing two things at once against the Kurds. On the one hand, they refrain from educating 
the Kurds and even allow some tribes to commit all kinds of crimes; on the other, they use this to 
paint all the Kurds as savage. This is why, argues the Sheikh, all Kurds are infamously known as 
savages. Thus, 
 [b]e it known to you for certain that this has all been caused by the laches of the 
Turkish and Persian authorities, for Kurdistan is in the midst between these two 
countries, and both Governments, for their own reason, do not distinguish between 
good and evil characters. It is thus that bad characters remain unreformed, respectable 
people get an ill repute and become ruined.
 840
 
It seems the Sheikh saw the creation of a state as instrumental to the success of his 
revivalist project as well. He not only thought of the state as the provider of the law and order but 
also as the grantor of an educated nation. It is evident that to the Sheikh, education was a panacea 
for the Kurdish plight. In addition, to him, the lack of public education in Kurdistan was the 
principal reason for Kurdish exclusion. In his letter to Iqbal ad-Dowla,
841
 the Sheikh writes, “we 
admit that there are bad Kurds along with the good ones but there is no one who even thinks of 
educating … [the bad and therefore it is impossible] for the Kurds to right their wrongs and to 
have a more decent and humane society… without education.”842 To him, public education held 
the key to a more decent and humane life and a way for the Kurds to escape from their present 
miseries. 
 The instrumental role of education is frequently reiterated to a degree that even the 
Sheikh’s surrogates seem to subscribe to the importance of public education. In his meeting with 
the British General Consul Abbott, the Sheikh’s brother-in-law also echoed his concern and 
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“declared that Ubayd Allah, if successful, undertook to suppress brigandage, restore order within 
the borders of Turkey and Persia, place Christians and Muslims on equal footing of equality, 
promote education,
843
 and allow churches and schools to be built.”844  
 It is clear the Sheikh believed that the materialization of those projects would have 
required a state power. Undoubtedly, he also believed those objectives must be appealing to the 
Europeans and by the same token they were all modern.
845
 His brother in-law, while asking for 
the moral support of the Europeans in creating a Kurdish state, presents these stated strategic 
goals. He goes as far as to say that if Ubeydullah reneged from those promises he had made, “he 
was prepared to be judged by the tribunal of Europe, and to abide by the consequences.”846  
Simultaneously, the Sheikh was making the case, through his surrogate, that neither the Persians 
nor the Ottomans were willing to take such important steps for the welfare of the Kurds and the 
Christians.  
 As can be inferred from the above documents, the Sheikh sees a direct correlation 
between the lack of public education and the existence of such a phenomenon as brigandry, 
which the Sheikh, if successful in creating a state, promised to eradicate. In his Mesnewi, in 
which he does not have foreign interlocutors, he does not acknowledge the existence of Kurdish 
brigandry. However, he asserts that no matter how great one’s capabilities are or how noble 
one’s ancestry (aṡl-e najib) might be, one needs a proper education to fulfill one’s potential.  
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Despite that fact the raw gold is the same substance that is made into jewelry, it needs refinement 
to take on luster and value.
847
  To him, the Kurds are a unique ethnic group (qovm) in terms of 
their mastery in art and in their sophistication (fażl u honar).848 “No one can be as talented as the 
Kurds if they are properly educated.”849 If they were united under one leadership, they would 
have had a unique state (bî-maśal va bî-naẓir).850  Not many details are available about how the 
Sheikh conceptualized a modern state or what was the scope of his grasp of it. However, he 
clearly believed in the necessity of a state for the Kurds to become educated, to defend 




The Kurds under the Gaze of Others  
 All signs indicate that in the last decades of the 19
th
 century, Kurdistan was experiencing 
a great deal of unrest and its people had been generally alienated by the central states. The 
Tanzimat era, noted by Makdisi, introduced an interesting paradox to Ottoman society with far 
reaching impact. It widened the chasm between the center and periphery. As Makdisi points out: 
Beginning with the Tanzimat, Ottoman reformers identified with these subjects as 
potential fellow citizens with whom they should be united in a newly defined common 
modern Ottoman patriotism. They also saw them as fellow victims of European intrigue 
and imperialism. Yet at the same time, they regarded these subjects as backward and as 
not-yet-Ottoman, as hindrances to as well as objects of imperial reform.
852
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 Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," 770. 
221 
 
This Ottoman elite’s new approach to the society not only granted the people a collective status 
of being brigands, haydutler, but also brought enormous violence and a complete disruption of 
law and order in Kurdistan.
853
 
 From the 1860s onward the Ottoman and Qajar states, with the help and pressure of 
European powers, tried to demarcate the borders between the two Muslim Empires.
854
 Part of 
this project of border demarcation was involved in population politics and the study of the people 
ostensibly to make the division between the borderline communities smoother.
855
 The territorial 
demarcation was to take place for the sake of population control. As Foucault would put it, this 
region was to go under the control of the “State of population” from that of the “territorial 
State.”856 These attempts at reshaping the borderland populace were increasingly turning the 
Kurds into subjects of these types of studies and political projects. Consequently, it would make 
them even more prone to stereotypes and subjection to the central states’ disciplinary policies. 
This situation’s overall effect on Kurdish economic, cultural and social life was enormous. In 
cases like that of Hamza Agha
857
 who had a major role in the Sheikh’s uprising, the result was 
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decades of hostility and skirmishes with the Qajar State. These studies, which aimed at dividing 
the Kurds — regardless of their communal ties858 just for the sake of managing the population — 
rendered them as the embodiment of tribalism
859
 and as collective demons.  
 To come back to Kurdish perceptions and Sheikh Ubeydullah’s uprising, the latter was, 
in a way, a response to this limbo state of being excluded as a part of the deviant periphery and 
being included in the geographical and disciplinary boundaries of states. This situation unveils 
the distance between the periphery and center and their mutual perception of their respective 
“Other.” Contextualizing Kurdish perceptions of their “Others” will shed a greater light on the 
reasons behind the Sheikh’s uprising. Generally, in the studies on this uprising, this vitally 
important factor has been overlooked. It seems that the reason for ignoring this issue stems from 
the assumption that the Kurds at the time lacked any sense of belonging beyond their tribal 
affiliation.
860
 Therefore such studies are replete with contradictory arguments in explaining 
Sheikh Ubeydullah’s rising. 
 A study striving to explain why the Sheikh first revolted against the Qajar state
861
 claims 
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that “the Ottoman and British Officials convinced the Kurdish leaders to choose Iran instead of 
the Ottoman territories for their uprising.”862 Based on this claim, the Kurds had determined to 
rise up against the Ottomans — but the Ottomans, along with British officials,863 persuaded them 
to revolt against the Qajar state instead, as if the Kurds were making a minor change in their plan 
or in the field of operation for their revolt. Such confusions partly stem from the fact that some 
of the studies see the uprising from the statist point of view. From the statist perspective, the 
prima causa for any Kurdish political action is always rooted in their manipulability by foreign 
forces.  
 In the next few pages, the author of the same study points to a more profound reason or 
justification for the Sheikh’s commencement of the revolt in the Qajar territories and he notes 
that “the resistance to injustice and corruption of the Qajar officials can be cited as the primary 
reason behind the Sheikh’s uprising.”864 Again revealing his ideological conviction, just a few 
pages after this last remark the author once more contradicts himself by stating that “Kurdish 
nationalism had no role whatsoever in the Sheikh Ubeydullah’s uprising… [However] Kurdish 
feudalism benefited from the [Qajar] state’s weaknesses and strove to divide Iranian Kurdistan as 
they were enticed by the Ottoman and British Officials.”865 
 David McDowall and Hakan Özoğlu have also failed to see the Sheikh’s religious self-
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differentiation. Therefore, they try to explain the Kurdish revolt by describing it as a mere 
reaction to Armenian aspirations. McDowall views the Russo-Turkish War as a religious war. He 
claims that “Sheikh Ubayd Allah had already shown himself willing to help the Sultan866 against 
the Christian threat.
867
 He had been appointed commander of Kurdish tribal forces in the Russo-
Turkish war of 1877–78.”868 Interestingly enough, in the endnote to the same paragraph 
McDowall concedes that “In 1878 Ubayd Allah's influence saved many Christians869 from 
massacre in Bayazid and he enjoyed the confidence of the American missionaries in 
Urumiya.”870 McDowall, without citing any specific evidence, calls the Sheikh’s enterprise “a 
scheme cooked up in Istanbul which offered Sheikh Ubayd Allah undisclosed official 
sponsorship to form a movement that could act as a counterbalance to the Armenian threat.”871 
 McDowall’s account is in contradiction with the Ottoman state’s records. The official 
records unveil a great deal of concern on the part of the Ottoman state about the possible 
consequences of the Sheikh’s revolt on the Ottoman side of the borders. A document from the 
Ottoman Ministry of Defense reports that the Sheikh, with 70,000 armed men under his 
command, had secured control over the entire region of West Azerbaijan and had declared 
Kurdish independence. The report predicted that the Persian state would be unable to defeat the 
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Kurds. “Considering this event’s enormous impact on our side of the border,”872 stated the 
report, “local Ottoman officials must immediately take necessary measures and send and collect 
the required reinforcement, which must be only composed of Turks and Laz.”873 Ottoman records 
also indicate that in order to spur some of the less enthusiastic Ottoman Kurds to the revolt, the 
Sheikh had spread rumors that the Ottoman state was approving of his revolt against the Qajar 
State. The Ottomans found those rumors dangerous and believed they had to repudiate the 
Sheikh’s claim in every possible way.874  
 Furthermore, Celîli Celîl’s work, which is mostly based on Russian archival documents, 
reveals that the Sheikh turned against the Ottoman state in 1878, when the Empire was still at 
war with Russia.
875
 This shows that the Sheikh was quickly disillusioned after his first 
interaction with the Turkish army. Such disillusionment is clearly evident in the Sheikh’s own 
poetry.
876
 According to the Russian documents, the Sheikh’s efforts against the Ottomans started 
before the Berlin Treaty (in July 1878).
877
 In 1878, in a meeting with the Russian Consul in Van, 
one of the Sheikh’s deputies declared that “instead of protecting the life and property of people, 
the Empire itself has become a fundamental threat to them. Thus, the Sheikh believes that he is 
morally obliged to protect the people since they consider him as their real protector.”878 The 
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Sheikh did his best to garner Russian support against the Ottomans. According Celîl, the Sheikh 
used to say “it is better to stand next to the lion [Russia] instead of waiting behind the fox’s [the 
British] tail.”879   
 Following a line similar to that of McDowall, Özoğlu claims that “[it] seems that the 
main reason for the revolt was the promise
880
 made to Armenians”881 as, according to him, 
Kurdish nationalism had yet to be “created”—Özoğlu claims “that Kurdish nationalism was 
created at the end of World War I.”882 Özoğlu neither makes any claim nor presents any evidence 
about the Sheikh’s mistreatment of or his antagonism toward Christians during and after the 
War. However, both Özoğlu and McDowall discount or belittle the Sheikh’s own statements. 
They also fail to take note of the fact that even before his revolt against the Qajar state in 1880, 
the Sheikh had revolted against the Ottomans in 1879. The major problem with these types of 
studies is their inability to hear the dominated voice. There is a tendency to dismiss the non-state 
actor’s voice as nonsensical. One might argue that this is a general tendency in modern 
historiography that regards non-state actors’ actions as anomaly or a disturbance to the general 
flow of history. “A people or a nation lacked history, [Hegel] argued, not because it knew no 
writing but because lacking as it did in statehood it had nothing to write about.”883 Perhaps this is 
why McDowall describes the Sheikh’s statements as “such utterances” that in no way 
                                                          
879
 Ibid.  
880
 By “the promise”, Özoglu means the Article 61 in Berlin Treaty, which reads as follows: 
The Sublime Porte engages to realize without further delay, the ameliorations and the reforms 
demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their 
security against the Kurds and the Circassians. The Sublime Porte will periodically render 
accounts of the measures taken with this intent to the Powers who will supervise them. 
881
 Hakan Özoglu, "Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?" in Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms 
in Turkey, ed. Ayse Kadioglu and Emin Fuat Keyman (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011), 203. 
 
882
 Ibid, 203. 
883
 Ranajit Guha, History at the Limit of World-History(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 9. 
227 
 
corresponded to the nature of his revolt. Since the revolt did not produce a state, to him, “the 
revolt bore little evidence that it was anything other than the kind of tribal disturbance, but on a 
larger scale, that already bedeviled the region.”884  
 It should be kept in mind that perception or “imagination” is a fundamental factor in 
ethnic and nationalist self-differentiations. Such perceptions could motivate people’s self-
differentiations and decouple themselves from their coreligionist on ethnic and linguistic lines, 
which in turn could shape their religious interpretations. This is where the possibility of religion 
and nationalism’s fusion becomes visible. The scant literature from the late 19th century shows a 
great deal of sensitivity on the part of Kurdish ‘ulama, notables and learned persons to the 
common stereotypes and to depicting the Kurds as “savages.” As discussed at the outset, the 
Kurds were concerned that being perceived as such could affect their fate in the political games 
between the states and the colonial powers. 
 In 1880, Kurdish leaders from Vilayet-i Kurdistan published a political statement which 
spoke to their fear of the political consequences of these prevalent negative views of Kurds, 
among other groups. The Kurdish leaders declared that “we have been stereotyped (teşhir) and 
denigrated in full view of our friends and foes, in every imaginable way.”885 They then recounted 
an event in which a religious figure urged the aid workers who were trying to help the victims of 
the famine in Kurdistan, not to help the Kurds. It is claimed that this is because the religious 
leader declared that the Kurds “are savages and rebellious people — let them die from 
starvation.”886 The writers of the statement retort, “is it ethical to strip an entire community 
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(kavim) of their humanity and of their sacred civil rights (ḥuqûq -ı muqaddese-i medeniye)?”887  
 There are other documents in which the Kurds express their fear of the possible threat 
that these kinds of depictions may pose to their political survival. Heeding the documents 
produced by the states at the time, their fear does not seem without basis. Not only do those 
documents indicate a somewhat general Kurdish dissatisfaction and political awareness, they 
also show that the Qajar and Ottoman states were actively trying to depict them as such to 
legitimize their repressive policies. It is apparent that Kurds were well aware of the state’s 
policies against them. For instance, the following Persian Foreign Ministry letter to British 
officials very much validates Kurdish fears of the states’ civilizing discourse that could pose a 
threat to their very existence and serve to obliterate them: 
As their Excellencies the Representatives of the foreign Powers at the Court of Persia 
have become aware, savage and uncivilized Kurds, such as Abd-el-Kader and Sadeek, 
the sons of Sheikh Obeidullah, … accompanied by bad characters as wicked as 
themselves, have become guilty of acts of aggression such as are natural to them on 
the [Turco-] Persian frontier … according to secret information received by the Persian  
Ministers — some people having no knowledge of the habits of savage clans and tribes 
and being ignorant of their natural disposition to rapacity and plunder—have thought 
that this concentration of the Kurds is a source of injury to the state of this [Kurdish] 
nation— it would seem that there are no grounds for suspicions such are entertained by 
the above-mentioned people, like the ones to which they have often given vent, and for 
which they have been thoroughly punished. But now, by taking speedy measures, by 
the dispatch of troops, and by energetic steps for obliterating any signs of them, these 
people will be very soon completely destroyed and the roots of this mischief will be 
entirely eradicated.
888
 (Emphasis added) 
Now, since these people are savage and they have no political objective and their only 
motivation is pillaging and ravaging the region, it is expected from the “government of which 
your Excellency is the Representative will undoubtedly, out of its friendship … in no way object 
to taking any necessary measures [for aid] or to giving its moral support in order to procure the 
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return of peace and tranquility on
889
 the frontier.”890 
 In the late 19
th
 century, the Kurds constantly expressed that they were disturbed by the 
Other’s language or “gaze.”891 Sartre could not be speaking more clearly to this effect when he 
points out that “[t]he Other’s look touches me across the world and is not only a transformation 
of myself but a total metamorphosis of the world. I am looked-at in a world which is looked-
at.”892 The Kurds were becoming increasingly conscious of how they were addressed and of how 
letting themselves be addressed as such could carry a heavy political cost. This is not to suggest 
that there were common philosophical reflections among Kurds at the time on the consequences 
of being looked at or addressed as such. However, amidst their treatment by the dominant groups 
and nations, they could sense and feel the profound ignominy that was entailed in being 
addressed as such. This is evidenced in one of Sheikh Ubeydullah’s letters to the governor of 
Urmia when he says that “there is no nation whose honor has been trampled on as much as the 
Kurds.”893  
 The way a collective self
894
 is looked at or addressed, which is essentially related to 
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mutual perception, is determinative in that collectivity’s political stance and action. Being a 
symbol of ignobility for the Other and its injurious effect may be first felt by elites within a 
disgraced, oppressed community, as it threatens their own dignifying social status. “Thus the 
urge on the part of elites to find their own path is more than a matter of concern for their 
compatriots. It is also a matter of their own dignity.”895 One’s dignity is determined by the nature 
of the Other’s address. In other words, “One comes to “exist” by virtue of this fundamental 
dependency on the address of the Other.”896 If language has such an existential effect on the 
condition of one’s existence or “If language can sustain the body, it can also threaten its 
existence.”897 Thus, these ‘constitutive language acts’ affected Kurdish consciousness and made 
Kurds aware of their own Kurdishness as it had been identified in a negative light by their 
Others. Their distinct political collectivity came to be recognized through their Others’ negative 
reference.
898
 That they were “exposed [to themselves and to the Other] at the moment of such a 
shattering is precisely the volatility of one ‘place’ within the community of speakers; one can be 
‘put in one’s place, by such speech, but such a place may be no place.”899 
 The Eastern/ Persian Kurds’ petition, which was written to request that Russia and the 
other Great Powers intervene and investigate how they have been subjected to all kinds of 
injustices by both the Qajar and the Ottoman states, shows once more this feeling of 
psychological and physical exclusion and uprootedness.
900
 As Butler’s Hegelian take unveils, the 
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impact of the injurious language may engender awareness of one’s volatile state of existence, of 
one’s unequal socio-political standing and representing difference. The inflected could 
differentiate oneself from the one who inflects and injures her/him.   
 In 1880, the Kurdish refugees in Van requested that the Russians dispatch a fact-finding 
mission to see, in their words, who was “primitive (bedevi)901 and savage by nature (vaḥshi-ul-
mazāj) — the Kurds or those who have taken over Kurdistan by force?”902 Now, the Kurds were 
apparently trying to reproduce and project the same stereotypes onto their Others. Therefore, the 
petition claims that if a “just power such as Russia” had initiated a due investigation, it would 
have figured out that the real “savages by nature” are “the occupying states” of Kurdistan, not 
the Kurds.
903
 In a context in which the weak is usually stereotyped and perceived as liable, the 
Kurds are not only trying to create a similar image of their Others but are also declaring 
themselves as those whose lands were occupied and the occupiers as those who should be 
considered “uncivilized.” Again, this is a familiar argument, that the embodiment of a certain 
psychology and a political thinking in which any group or entity depicted as “uncivilized” is 
automatically stripped of any rights whatsoever.   
 Aside from the anecdotal aspect of the document, it highlights that from the Kurdish 
religious leader’s perspective, both states represented the same degree of otherness, 
notwithstanding the states’ religious alignments. The last part of this petition is particularly 
revealing because it not only shows that Kurds had little sympathy for or loyalty to either of the 
states, it also demonstrates their consciousness of and their disturbance by the common 
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stereotypes about them.  
 It is of no little significance to point out that these leaders saw their hostility to the state 
entirely in light of ethnic differences. They did not see the states merely as oppressive states, but 
as imposing oppressive policies on the Kurds due to their putative ethnic differences. The states 
are referred to as unjust powers that were unleashing their violence against the Kurds as a 
singular entity, as “a savage group,” — in this way, the states were justifying their harsh policies 
as falling well within the ambit of the civilizing discourse.  
 Furthermore, their awareness regarding the common stereotypes associated with 
Kurdishness seems to have been effective in the formation of Kurdish ethno-nationalist 
consciousness. A consciousness of “ being called a name” by which “one is also, paradoxically, 
given a certain possibility for social existence, initiated into a temporal life of language that 
exceeds the prior purposes that animate that call.”904 This also suggests that at the time, and in 
some socio-political contexts, ethnic self-differentiation easily overshadowed the common 
religious bonds among different ethnic groups. Or one’s Islamic bond could not be extended 
easily beyond one’s ethnic group or nationality. The function and saliency of self-differentiation 
is context-specific. This was the case with Kurdish participation in Russo-Ottoman War. 
Although they hated the Russian army more than the Turkish army, they did not hide their 
abhorrence for the Muslim Ottoman Turks.
905
 The Kurds knew, as discussed below, that they 
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were suffering and being humiliated for their ethnic differences. They might have acknowledged 
that each of the states, at least the Ottoman state, was Muslim as well. They knew that the ruler’s 
religious faith, however, would not deter the state from adopting exclusionary polices. Having a 
common religion did not help their inclusion. Perhaps when the religious bonds prove 
ineffective, they are either downplayed or disavowed completely, which was the case in both 
(1879-80) Sheikh Ubeydullah’s and (1925) Sheikh Said’s revolts, as revealed in their letters. The 
Sheikh’s threat to excommunicate some high raking Naqshi ‘ulama for their objection to fighting 
against Persian Muslims clearly speaks to this effect.
906
  
 As indicated earlier, the aforementioned petition was authored by those who had studied 
in Kurdish religious schools, the madrasa [Arabic/Persian/Turkish, medrese, pl. medâris]. So it 
should not come as a surprise that Kurdish religious leaders showed their indifference to the 
existing Ottoman Sunni caliphate since their Islamic views bore the marks of their general ethnic 
Kurds’ attitudes toward the Ottoman state and vice versa. This validates Martin van Bruinessen’s 
claim that the Kurdish religious schools initially gave birth to the idea of Kurdish nationalism.
907
  
In his words “not surprisingly it was in the madrasa environment, where students from various 
parts of Kurdistan met and where besides Arabic and Persian the Kurdish language was 
cultivated, that the idea of a Kurdish “national” identity first emerged.”908 This unveils the 
junction of Kurdish and Sunni-Shafi‘i identity along with the Naqshbandi influence. It is the 
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Kurdishness combined with the Shafi‘i-ness that separates them from the dominant Turkish 
Hanafis as well as the ruling Shi‘is in Persia.  
 The last part of this petition also indicates that the Kurds were concerned that the Qajars 
and Ottomans have been successful in depicting the Kurds as savages. They are not oblivious to 
the fact that the prevalence of the negative perception about the Kurds may have enabled the 
states to continue “their indiscriminate killings in Kurdistan.”909 What is interesting is how the 
prevalence of these views is presumed in the available literature, notwithstanding its paucity. 
Sheikh Ubeydullah also reasserts the same views and blames the Ottoman and Persian states for 
the omnipresence of this negativity about the Kurds. As indicated earlier, he wrote that “[t]he 
Kurdish nation…is known among all nations as mischievous and corrupt. This is how Kurdistan 
has been depicted. If one person (from among them) does an evil deed, a thousand peaceable and 
orderly people gain ill repute.”  Just like the signatories of the aforementioned petition, the 
Sheikh also views this issue as more than a mere cultural or ethnocentric matter. He too opines 
that it is a political issue. Therefore he contends that “for certain… this has all been caused by 
the negligence of the Turkish and Persian authorities, for Kurdistan is in the midst between the 
two countries, and both Governments, for their own reasons, do not distinguish between good 
and evil character.”910  
 It is hard to know what the Sheikh’s views were about the states, particularly the Ottoman 
state, before the War of 1887–88. It seems, however, that the Russo-Ottoman War was 
instrumental in affording him a new perspective on the Ottomans as he personally witnesses their 
treatment of the Kurds. If the Sheikh previously held positive views about the Ottoman state, this 
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had to change completely after his personal interaction with the Ottomans during the War. This 
much can be inferred from his account of his experiences in the War. The available historical 
account offers little about the Sheikh’s perception of the Ottoman Turks.911 Ali Afshar, who 
wrote his own account of the war against
912
 Ubeydullah in 1880, asserts that the Sheikh’s plan 
for the rebellion could be traced back to five years earlier.
 913
 He believes that the Sheikh had a 
plan for occupying Persia even before the Russo-Ottoman War. Afshar claims that the Sheikh 
was planning to conquer Persia in its entirety and to convert the Persians to Sunnism, exactly the 
way Shah Ismail had converted them to Shi‘ism in the 16th century.914 Afshar also claims that the 
Sheikh had notified the Kurds that he had seen his father Seyyed Taha in his dreams, telling the 
Sheikh to destroy the Qajar dynasty and Shi‘ism, to “spread Islamic law (Shari‘a) and establish a 
just rule in Persia.”915 Then, Afshar describes the event as follows: 
After hearing this announcement, the ill-natured Kurds (bad-bonyād) gathered around 
the second son of Ubeydullah Ibn-i Ziyad.
916
 Five years earlier, with the hope of 
                                                          
911
 In 1880, Dr. Cochran reports that the Sheikh 
has seemed disposed for some years past to get into closer relations with us and the civilized 
world. He regards the Turks and Persians as deceptive people, not living up to their religion, and 
altogether too depraved to hope that they will ever again hold the position they once commanded 
among the other nations. Regarding them in the light that he does, and situated as he is between 
them, he wishes to have the moral, if not material, support of a better people and government. To 
this end, he has several times sent to us, asking that we put him in a way of getting such help from 
the British government. Last year [1879] before entering on a campaign against the Turks, to 
whom he had up to that time paid tribute, he sent confidential agents to us repeating this request ( 
Speer, The Hakim Sahib, the Foreign Doctor: A Biography of Joseph Plumb Cochran, M. D., of 
Persia, 75.) 
912
 Afshar personally participated in the war, against the Sheikh. See his account: Afshar, Tarikh-E Khruj Akrad Va 
Qatl Va Gharat-E Ubeydullah-E Badbonyad Va Eghteshash Va Fitnay-E Ziyad Dar Mamlakat-E Azarbayjan, 1297/ 
the Kurdish Rebellion: The Ill-Natured Ubeydullah’s Massacres and Pillage in 1880..  
913
 Ibid.  
914
 Ibid., 22 & 219. 
915
 Ibid., 24 & 220. 
916
 The author here likens the Sheikh to Ubeydullah Ibn-i Ziyad who was one of the perpetrators in the killing of 
Hussein, the Third Shi‘i Imam and the grandson of the Prophet of Islam. 
236 
 
becoming a ruler this ignoramus Sheikh declared himself the king of the tribes (Sulṭan 
al-‘ashâ’er) and that he had ever since then been making preparations and collecting 
weapons for an arsenal.
917
 
 In his Mesnewi Sheikh Ubeydullah gives a full account of his participation in the Russo-
Ottoman War. Here, the anecdotal aspect of the Sheikh’s writing is not a matter of much 
concern. The most significant issue is to see how the Sheikh’s account reproduces the mutual 
Kurdish-Ottoman perception during the War, which was evidently the first direct Kurdish-
Ottoman elite’s interaction on a large scale. What is important here is to see to what extent 
Kurdish ethnicity, Kurdish Islam, and other distinguishing characteristics become an issue during 
this interaction. It is also important to find out to what extent this experience played a role in the 
Sheikh’s ensuing political actions and statements.  
 It should be noted that is not possible to speculate on the Sheikh’s views on Ottoman 
state and society before the War based on these poems.
918
 Those parts of his poetry in which 
political issues are talked about were written in the post-War era. Therefore, his views are 
entirely expressed in retrospect and reflect the impact of his experiences during the War.  
 The Sheikh dedicates over four hundred couplets of his poems to the story of Kurdish 
participation in the Russo-Ottoman War, under his own leadership. In this poetry book, the 
Sheikh attends to political issues with some degrees of hesitation since, he informs us, that book 
is strictly about religious matters. It is supposedly an instruction for the revival of Islam in 
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Kurdistan, with a clear Naqshbandi bent.
 919
 Whenever there is a discussion about worldly 
matters (aḥvâl-e donya), claims the Sheikh, it is hardly void of ill intent. However, “I discuss 
such issues to tell the story of the Kurds and the Romîs [Ottoman Turks].”920  “I could be 
accused,” he states, for backbiting, which is one of the gravest sins.921 However, “the maẓlum 
(the oppressed or the subject of injustice) has the right to talk about the oppressor (ẓalem), 
especially if what s/he says is identical to what actually happened (ṭebq-e majara).”922 The 
Sheikh further explains his intention for relating his experience during the War, in the last two 
couplets of his poem (on this story) as he writes, “it is for the sake of the beloved (vidad) Kurds 
that I allowed my pen to suffer, write, and [for their story] to be inscribed on the pages of time 
(ruzgar) to become a memory (yadgar) for the world (ºalam).”923  
 The Sheikh offers a detailed account of his preparation regarding the number of fighters 
whom he could gather, the nature of his interaction with the Ottoman army and the reasons for 
the Ottoman Army’s defeat. This provides us a window on the Sheikh’s thinking about the 
Ottoman state, the Kurds and his revivalist and ethno-nationalistic tendencies. His strict personal 
religious devotion comes to light as he recounts his preparation for the War. He claims that he 
had seen the Prophet of Islam in his dream, giving him a flag. When he goes to Gewer,
924
 a town 
close to his residence, he is informed that such a flag existed and a family that had preserved it 
                                                          
919








 Ibid., 127. 
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from the time of the ‘Abbasids willingly gave it to the Sheikh.925 Apparently, he bears the same 
flag when joins the Ottoman Army to fight the Russians.
926
 
 Ubeydullah seems convinced that all the calamities that had befallen the Ottoman Empire 
were the direct result of what he viewed as the cultural and moral degeneration of the state and 
its subjects. Thus, he retores that “how can there be a victory (nusrat) when there are no faithful 
(mu’min).”927 To him, the Ottomans (Romîs) had lost their moral compass and this was why they 
had sustained such a humiliating defeat at the hands of Russians.
928
 He sees a direct correlation 
between the degree of people’s religious devotion and their worldly failings and triumphs. It 







 That being said, however, the Sheikh did not believe that the whole community 
had become degenerate in the same way or had strayed to the same extent from the straight path. 
He clearly believed there were different attitudes toward Islam and morality between different 
ethnic groups. He was of the opinion that the Ottomans (Romîs), notwithstanding their greater 
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of the awaiting victory. Ibid., 113–14. 
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 Nehri, Tuhfetul Ehbab; Mesnewi Şex Ubeydullah  Nehri, 109. 
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 There can’t be a victory without faith--- how something can be if the conditions for its existence are not?  Ibid. 
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 See for example S. Qutb’s introduction to Abu al-Hassan al-Nadawi, Madha Khasare al-‘Alim bi InHitati al-
Mulismiin/  Muslim Degeneration and the  World's  Loss (Cairo: al-Iman, 1945), especially, pp. 10-11. 
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numbers, had surrendered their lands.
930
 They did so because they were too corrupt to stand their 
ground against the Russians’ incursion.931 To the Sheikh, the Ottoman defeat more than anything 
else was indicative of their moral failure. “The Muslims are controlled by thugs,”932 he said.  The 
Sheikh was especially harsh on the army and the bureaucrats. He had no problem calling them 
irreligious (bî-din).   
 During the fights, from the Sheikh’s perspective, the Ottoman side was composed of two 
opposing groups: The Romîs (Ottoman Turks), a morally lax group; and the poised Kurds, who 
had strong religious convictions.
933
  The Kurds were portrayed as devoted religious people, from 
among whom he had assembled tens of thousands
934
 of fighters as he called on them to join the 
jihad against the Russians’ invasion. According to the Sheikh, the Kurds were the only force who 
actually engaged in fights. After the Kurds’ arrival and as result of their outstanding fight the 
Russian army sustained many humiliating defeats, one after another. The details and the nature 
of the fights are explained diligently and the fighters’ motivation is linked to their ethnicity and 
religious devotion. Hence, the Sheikh describes the Kurds’ role in the war as follows: 
When in Abgha
935
 our fighters faced the Russians 
The Russians sustained a mortifying defeat 
The Kurds, just like roaring lions in the fight; 
The Russians, like deer seeking a way out of sight 
The Kurds’ thunderous roars turned them into a [formless] cloud 
Down the plains streamed Russian blood, 
Russian heads, like hail began to fall 
For our lions, even mountains were too small 
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 Ibid., 113. 
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 Ibid., 111. The affairs of this great umma are now in the hands of thugs and oppressors ( ikhtiyar-e kar-e khair al-
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 A place near the city of Van, in Northern Kurdistan/ Turkey 
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The bright glint of Kurdish swords 
Flashing like lighting, indescribable in words     
The enemy forces falling as they sought safe haven 
Kurdish roars echoed up to highest heaven 
The [Kurdish] Gazis’936 roars and shouts 
With the Russians’ fears and self-doubts 
And the Russians’ bodiless souls filled the air   
For their soulless bodies turned red everywhere 
As the Russians’ cries reached the sky 
Angels praising the Gazis from on high
937
 
 The Sheikh claims that the “Romîs “(the Ottoman Turks) would have been unwilling to 
fight — even if a soldier of theirs had dared to join the Kurds938 to fight against the Russians, he 
would have been severely punished by his superior upon sight. Hence: 
One of [the Ottoman] soldiers, brave and upright 
Having joined us during the Kurdo-Russian fight, 
Was beaten with a stick, gravely punished 
Lost his food ration, his honor tarnished 
His sin unforgivable and so grave 
Having joined the Kurds, so was he brave
939
 
 The Ottoman role is mostly seen as a destructive one. The impression they left on the 
Kurds was that they were full of hate for the Kurds. The Sheikh sees the “Romîs” as those who 
did nothing but squander the Kurds’ support and energy.  He states that the Ottoman army and its 
commanders awarded the Kurds’ bravery and sacrifice with hatred, mockery, jealousy and by 
cutting their food rations.  So, 
Despite that spectacular fight by the Gazis (the Kurds), 
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 Ghazi is someone who fights in the cause of religion. However, here the Sheikh uses the term exclusively for the 
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The reinforcements [the Kurds] alone defeated the enemy  
[Turkish] commanders awarded them with hatred and envy  
They tried to get rid of the Kurds and cut their food rations 




The Romîs hatred for the Kurds had no limit 
The degree of their jealousy who can relate
942
 
To the Sheikh, the Romîs represented all that was wrong with the Muslim world. He sees 
them as the classic example of Muslim degeneration, “vile (sofleh), lacking a heartfelt religion, 
and wolves disguised as shepherds.”943 The Turkish army’s mockery and ridicule of the Kurds, 
who are described by the Sheikh as being of the qavm-e pak din (the people of the true religion), 
makes them leave the battle field. Despite that fact the Ottoman army had promised to provide 
the Kurds with food and other logistical supplies, amidst the fighting they cut even food rations 
for the Kurds.
 944
 To the Sheikh, all these were signs of Ottoman hostility toward the Kurds, who 
had shown a great deal of bravery and a superior morality. The Sheikh reports that the Kurds left 
the Ottomans for 40
945
 days and the Ottomans lacked the guts to make any brave move at all to 
attack the Russians even once.
946
 When the Kurds responded to the Sheikh’s call, as he himself 
claims, they recorded one victory after another until they captured the city of Yerevan: 




 Ibid., 119. 
943
 Az gorgan, ra‘i pustin. 
944
 Celîl also points to the correspondence between army commanders, Faik Pasha and Ahmat Muhtar Pasha, with 
regard to Sheikh Ubeydullah’s fighters and their lack of food and other logistics. Although, the Sheikh believed that 
the Ottoman Turks intentionally ignored the Kurdish fighters’ needs, Celîl’s account shows that the Ottoman army 
was in terrible shape and most likely they were unable to attend to the irregular (Kurdish) forces’ basic needs. See; 
Celîl, 1880 Şeyh Ubeydullah Nehri: Kürt ayaklanması/ 1880 Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri's Kurdish Uprising: 42-43. 
945
 The valley of Zangzor has become a riddle — for forty days the army was stuck [there] (Vadi ḥayrat shodeh 
Zangzor — arba‘ini  lashkar mand az ‘obur );  with the Kurdish presence, this huge group of army dared not make 
any bold move (jor’atî namad az an qawm-e kaśir --- ke konad bî-Kord da‘va-ye dalir) Nehri, Mesnewi Şex 
Ubeydullah  Nehri; Tuhfetul Ehbab: 123. 
946
 According to the Sheikh, the Ottoman commanders once again asked him to call on the Kurds to join the fight. So 
for the second the Kurds responded to his call. Once more they inflicted a great defeat on the Russian. Their victory 
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The Kurds once again proved their gallantry 
Just as lions cannot satiate [their hunger] without victory 
as these lions faced the enemy again toe to toe  
the Russians started fleeing, confused where to go 
…  
The Russians sustained another humiliating defeat  
the Kurds destroyed their last shred of dignity, indeed 
… 
no days could pass without a Kurdish victory 
no days would pass without another display of bravery
947
 
According to the Sheikh, the Kurds, however, once again faced the hostility and mockery 
of the Romîs. They were not credited for what they did. Moreover, the Romîs did not hesitate to 
rub salt into the Kurds’ wounds.948 The Kurds, according to the Sheikh, had lost nine hundred 
fighters, while the Ottomans had lost none. Despite this, it was the Kurds who were being 
mocked and insulted for sustaining the loss.
949
 
 The Sheikh certainly is much more bitter in narrating Kurdish-Ottoman interactions 
during the War. To the Sheikh, the Ottoman Turks were just nominal Muslims. Deep down, in 
their heart, they lacked much religious feelings. He contends that the Ottomans or Romîs, as he 
calls them, were münafıq, lacking any real faith, while pretending to be Muslims. He recounts a 
ḥadith, attributed to the Prophet of Islam, of whose content the Sheikh believes the Ottomans’ 
religiosity to be the embodiment.
950
  According to this ḥadith, the Prophet declared that there 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
resulted in capturing the city of Yerevan. Only after the Kurds captured Yerevan and cleared it from the Russian 
army, the Ottoman army entered the city. The army was jubilant and declared that they were the ones who had 
captured Yerevan. They, at all, did not credit the Kurds for the victory. During the operation, the Kurds lost 9 
hundred fighters among whom were 6 religious scholars and Naqshbandi caliphs and  the Romîs  sustained no loss 
whatsoever. Yet, they continued  mocking the Kurds. The “Cockled [Ismail] Pasha sarcastically shouted at me: O! 
Sheikh no one fights like you Kurds! You have lost 9 hundred men and I have come all the way from Erzurum and 
lost only three solders.” Ibid., 121–24.  
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were three criteria by which one can tell if a person is a münafıq: a) if he tells untruth as he 
speaks b) if he breaks whatever promise he makes c) if he deceives whenever he is trusted.
951
  
Then the Sheikh goes on to explain how he feels about the Ottomans: 
No matter how much I say about their injustices, it would not be more than a tiny bit of 
what actually took place. The Romîs dishonored every single promise they made to us 
at the beginning of the War. They squandered all that we had done for them. They 
promised to take care of the Kurdish fighters’ food rations and they broke their 
promise…The Romîs’ actions rendered all the Kurdish sacrifice to be in vain.952      
While the Ottomans’ religiosity is painted by the Sheikh as almost non-existent, pretentious, and 
not heartfelt, the Kurdish religiosity just like their “bravery is unmatched.” Only the Arabs’ 
bravery and piety was equivalent to that of Kurds, according to the Sheikh.
953
  
They are born with natural sagacity
954
 
They are lions, symbols of bravery 
Epitomes of heroism in warfare  
They are Hatams,
955
 icons of generosity  
“d” in Kurd stands for din (religiosity)  
“k” stands for kamal and perfection  
“r” for rushd, spiritual maturation 
Only in Kurds can you find
956
 
All these virtues combined
957
 
This very stratification of people’s religiosity based on their ethnicity unveils the fusion 
of religion and ethno-nationalism, which in turn reflects the difference between the periphery and 
the center in their take of Islam. The Sheikh’s portrayal of the two communities — the “Romîs” 
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 Nehri, Mesnewi Şex Ubeydullah  Nehri; Tuhfetul Ehbab. 
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and the Kurds — as two distinct groups of people could not be any clearer. The “us” versus 
“them” dichotomy is defined in both religious and ethno-nationalistic terms. As shown in the 
foregoing chapter, the Ottomans too were generally suspicious of the nature of peripheral Islam. 
So was the periphery’s perception of the center’s brand of Islam. The Kurdish reaction to the 
center’s religiosity as suspicious, contaminated, and inauthentic is repeatedly expressed even by 
people like Sa'id Nursi, as shown in the following chapter. Simultaneously, the subtexts of these 
claims to purity, superiority or authenticity of the interpretations were connected to each group’s 
claim to some sort of ethnic or cultural superiority. Hence, the religious understanding and 
devotion of the ‘in-group’ is celebrated and that of the ‘out-group’ is condemned or its 
authenticity is strongly questioned.  As shown above, the Sheikh claims that the Kurds’ “superior 
qualities should not surprise anyone” and he connects this to their “noble origin,” supposedly 
from the same stock as “the noble Arabs.”958 These “unique qualities” were evidently related to 
their community origins. Was as much true of their “true” and “sincere” practice of Islam?   
 The purpose of rendering these outright claims to the Kurds ethnic supremacy by the 
Sheikh is to demonstrate the malleability of religious interpretation that allows for a smooth 
elision of nationalist and ethnic discourses. This is again contrary to what is not infrequently held 
views,
959
 is indicative of the susceptibility of religion to be interpreted locally. The general 
resistance to the possibility of nationalist discourses spilling over into religious understanding 
stems from the belief in the idea of religion’s inability to trespass into the modern world when 
nationalism comes into being. Remarks like “It is not only possible but also probable that 
                                                          
958
 Bediüzzaman Nursi likewise claimed that Kurds shared a common ancestry with “the noble Arab race”. Nursi, 
İçtima-I Dersler/ Social Lessons, 579. 
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"Religion and Nationalism in the First World," 213. 
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Ubeydullah, a Naqshbandi sheikh, did not know the explosive meaning of the word ‘nation’”960 
at best constitute an exaggerated belief in the unbridgeable gulf between nationalism and religion 
(or Islam in our case). 
 It is evident that even theoreticians of nationalism are not immune to the affect of this 
Manichean belief in the constancy of the space between nationalism and religion. As noted 
before, for instance, Greenfeld contends that “nationalism thus has been also the framework of 
the modern social consciousness. It was religion, by contrast, that formed the framework of 
social consciousness in the premodern world; nationalism has replaced religion as the main 
cultural mechanism of social integration.”961 Setting aside the fact that such a metaphysical take 
on consciousness as a pure and unmediated unitary thing is untenable, seeing the “premodern” 
world as a universe of the religion agent
962
 verses the “modern” universe in which the religious 
agent is absent, is blatantly Manichean, not to mention teleological. Considering the fact that 
Greenfeld simultaneously acknowledges that “religion was a crucial factor in the development of 
nationalism … [or] it played midwife at the birth of nationalism and protected it in its 
infancy...”963 the above views become particularly problematic. However, she goes a step further 
and cites a number of important cases in which, according to her, religion shaped and framed 
national consciousness. For instance, she maintains that “Pietism, was responsible for the 
conceptual and emotional framework of German national consciousness.”964 So if this 
uninterrupted dichotomy between religion and nationalism is seen as an ‘inert fact of nature’, 
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how can religion be both the sole framework of pre-modern social consciousness and have also 
framed German national consciousness—supposedly “essentially secular”? 
 It seems there are two reasons for these types of contradictions: a) a rigid distinction 
between modernity and pre-modernity
965
 and b) a narrow and a Europe-centered definition of 
religion. It is apparent that Greenfeld similarly has a very narrow and Protestant-centered 
definition of religion, which in modern times has lost its power to the state—another claimant of 
the “absolute truth.”966  It must be emphasized, however, that such a reading of Christianity too 
solidifies this religion in one phase of its historical development. Not only are all of its possible 
historical changes arrested, it is furthermore presumed that this dualistic religious view of life, 
one being under “[t]he Kingdom of the Lord [that] was not of this world, and … [the other 
under] kingdoms of this” 967 world, is part and parcel of all “the great religions.”968 
 Here the genius of Chatterjee’s approach becomes evident when he contends that the 
colonial world’s nationalism is derivative in nature and not a copy of its Other. 969 This 
derivativeness signifies the non-universal content of nationalism. This lends nationalism a 
capability to emerge in various local forms that make it open to the adaptation of regional mores, 
cultures, and religious interpretations. As noted before, Chatterjee explains this when he critiques 
Benedict Anderson for his claim with regard to the existence of a type of universal “modularity” 
for nationalism. Chatterjee rejects this notion of universality since “nationalism declares the 
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 This phrase is repeatedly used by Greenfield. For a great study of such classifications of religions see, Masuzawa, 
The Invention of World Religions, or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism. 
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domain of the spiritual [as] its sovereign territory and refuses to allow the colonial power to 
intervene in that domain.” 970 This very domain to which the “Other” is denied access contains 
the nation’s language, culture, and religion that is being reinterpreted and reformed,971 not 
discarded, by nationalists. 
 The greater “need to preserve the distinctness of one’s spiritual culture”972 while deeming 
it susceptible to reform and reinterpretation may in many ways resemble other types of religious 
interpretations that exhibit both signs of continuity and context-specificity. The changes and 
continuities entailed by nationalist discourse, based on the limit and scope of such reforms, may 
be called a new interpretation of religion or some type of secular reform.  
 To conclude this section with an example that substantiates this claim regarding the 
interpretability of religion, one could refer to Iqbal, the renowned Muslim philosopher’s take on 
the transformations in the Turkish political system during the 1920s, which he considers a 
significant event in “the history and working of Ijtihād in modern Islam.”973 He even goes as step 
further and states that  
[t]he point of supreme interest with the Nationalist Party is above all the State and not 
Religion. With these thinkers religion as such has no independent function. The state is 
the essential factor in national life which determines the character and function of all 
other factors. They, therefore, reject old ideas about the function of State and Religion, 
and accentuate the separation of Church and State. Now the structure of Islam as a 
religio-political system, no doubt, does permit such a view, though personally I think it 
is a mistake to suppose that the idea of state is more dominant and rules all other ideas 
embodied in the system of Islam.
974
(Emphasis added) 
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Certainly, Iqbal does not represent all his coreligionists. Of course, no one does. However, this is 
exactly what makes any universal claim to religious interpretation unfounded, secular claims 
included. The inclusion
975
 of the reinterpretations of regional mores and religions, which 
constitutes the defining elements for the alternative modernities, creates a possible context for 
the fusion of religion and nationalism.  Or as Asad puts it, “[t]he legitimate entry of religion into 
the debates results in the creation of modern ‘hybrids’: the principle of structural 
differentiation—according to which religion [is] located in autonomous social space no longer 
holds.”976    
 
 “The Kurdish Nation is a people apart”977 
Having discussed the influence of ethnic differences on Sheikh Ubeydullah’s perception 
of the “Other” and similarly on his revivalism, we shall now take up the declarative aspect of the 
Sheikh’s political statements. To borrow Judith Butler’s phraseology, in what kind of politics of 
the performative was the Sheikh involved?
978
 What did the Sheikh declare with his statements? 
What did he do with the words he used? Can any sense be made of his words? Did the 
declarative aspect of his revolt exhibit any novelty compared to previous Kurdish uprisings? 
What if his statements sound anomalous to commonly held views about the socio-cultural 
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context of his revolt? Can his statements be utilized to revisit the revolt or can they be ignored?  
 As mentioned above, some historians have raised questions as to whether the Sheikh was 
a nationalist. Özoglu, for instance,  denies the possibility that the Sheikh’s revolt was informed 
by nationalist  motives when he states that “the question of the intended meaning of the phrase 
‘Kurdish nation’979 immediately arises. Unfortunately, we do not know what word, the Sheikh 
used that was rendered as ‘nation’ by the translators or possibly by Cochran himself.”980 Özoğlu 
implies that Sheikh Ubeydullah might not have used the word nation
981
 and that the translator 
may have interpreted another Persian
982
 word that might not be this word’s equivalent. Although 
this could be an important observation, the context of the use of this word renders the choice of 
its Persian equivalent insignificant. Whether the Sheikh used qowm (Persian for ethnic group) or 
mellat (nation) is not perhaps even salient, given the lengths to which he finally committed 
himself when he declared that “the Kurds are a people apart” from others, not merely in terms of 
their language and costume, but even in terms of their religion. 
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 Furthermore, the primary documents produced by Kurds, in Persian and Ottoman 
languages, testify to the use of the word ‘nation’ in its modern sense. For instance, in Ottoman 
papers from the 1880s Kurdish intellectuals did not hesitate to call the Kurds a ‘nation.’ 
Actually, some did so in a hyperbolic fashion, claiming that even nomadic Kurds had a unique 
thirst for knowledge and that in the pursuit of knowledge “no other nation has arrived at such an 
honorable stage.”983 Similar statements exist in Persian documents produced by Kurds.984 
 By carefully analyzing what Sheikh Ubeydullah had to say about Kurds, Turks, and 
Persians, and in particular by looking at which characteristics he portrayed more positively and 
negatively to ascertain which aspects he wished to incorporate, change, or discard into 
revivalism, we can trace a distinct outline of how he saw Kurds vis-à-vis various Others. This 
analysis can lead to surprising discoveries about what he saw, how he interpreted it, and what 
cultural and religio-political motivations may have been driving him to express those particular 
views at those particular times and in those particular contexts. We can thus obtain a picture of 
the possible reasons why he thought the way he did.  
 The best way to determine what the Sheikh might have meant is to look at how he used 
the phrase ‘Kurdish people’ in a variety of different contexts. The Sheikh wrote many letters, 
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some of which have been reproduced in English, French, and Persian. Only a few of them are 
known well enough to be rendered in British documents. On October 5, 1880, in one of his 
letters to Dr. Cochran, an American missionary, the Sheikh wrote that 
The Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families, is a people apart. Their 
religion is different (to that of others), and their traditions and customs are distinct. It is 
known among nations as mischievous and corrupt. This is how Kurdistan has been 
depicted…Kurdistan has got a bad reputation, and has been disgraced...The chiefs and 
Rulers of Kurdistan, whether Turkish or Persian Subjects, and the inhabitants of 
Kurdistan, one and all are united and agreed that matters cannot be carried on in this way 
with the two Governments, and that necessarily something must be done, so that 
European Governments, having understood that matter, shall inquire into our state…985 
Also, in his letter to Iqbal ad-Dowle, governor of Urmia, the Sheikh declared that 
 
The Governor is, no doubt, aware that … no serious inquiry having now been made into 
the condition and affairs of Kurdistan, its people have always been painted in the very 
worst colors … The reason why complaints are made against the Kurds is that neither the 
Turkish nor the Persian Governments have either the power or the will to govern them 
properly. Through all this the Kurds get a bad reputation, and they in their turn have no 
respect for their Rulers. In view of this state of affairs, both the Persian and Turkish 
Kurds to unite and for a single nation, and keep order among themselves, and they 
undertake to bind themselves in writing that no disorder shall take place in their country 
… It will be impossible to quell the present movement by force — if the government 
resorts to it, they will be the losers, and great loss will result on every side. It is therefore 
advisable that the governments should adopt a pacific measure, otherwise there is no 
answering for the consequence.
986
 
Since Sheikh Ubeydullah was neither a historian nor a sociologist nor an ethnographer, 
then the question may arise as to what his goal was in separating the Kurds from other nations. 
What was he attempting to accomplish by these utterances? What we are doing here is trying to 
tease apart (1) what his intentions were, and (2) what picture of his politics his words illustrate. 
Thus to make sense of a speech act is to decode “the meaning of an action [which] seems 
equivalent, in the case of linguistic action, to understanding the nature of the illocutionary act 
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performed by the speaker.”987 The Sheikh addressed his letters to an official audience, and the 
contents and the context of his letters are plainly political. Hence, the letters are political 
statements or arguments to achieve certain political goals. This political aspect of his letters, the 
nature of his argument, and the way he describes or ‘narrates’ the Kurds become a matter of 
utmost importance to understanding his intentions. Moreover, we want to find an answer to the 
questions of why he made such political statements at that particular time and why he addressed 
those specific political figures. These questions arise since, as mentioned earlier, some scholars 
have raised doubts about the authenticity of the Sheikh’s views and consider his language to be a 
counterexample or an anomaly in Kurdish tribalism/religiosity. Those who consider his views 
inauthentic believe that the Sheikh could not have held nationalistic views since he was a 
religious person and lived in tribal socio-cultural context that left no room for the emergence of 
nationalism. My contention here is that instead of dismissing the Sheikh’s letters as anomalous to 
a certain way of conceptualizing non-state entities, one should be open to the possibility that 
these documents may prove the statist approach to history to be misleading. 
 ‘Tribalism,’ we are told,988 is a paradigmatic model to which the idea of nationalism is 
supposedly anomalous. The Sheikh’s statements or utterances are therefore deemed unfit to or 
imposed on that paradigm of tribalism. This “set of usage” is not expected to be employed by a 
specific “community of language-users for purposes [that are] political, interested in and 
extending sometimes as far as the articulation of a world-view or ideology.”989 The attempt here 
is to make sense of those statements themselves with the assumption that they cannot be ignored. 
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The utterances’ illocutionary force should be enough to be treated as a piece of political 
literature. Instead of imposing our views on the persons who uttered them, one should let the 
documents to speak for their author or at least take the document seriously, given that some 
interpretation is likely to still be necessary.  
 As indicated above, these letters were written for political purpose(s). Now the key 
question is as follows: can we make sense of the Sheikh’s ‘intentional act’ through a close 
reading of these letters? To what degree can these writings shed light on their own historical 
context? In his letters, the Sheikh tries to describe the Kurds. He attempts to convince his 
audience that the Kurds are a separate people or “a people apart.” They are neither Persians nor 
Ottomans. He does so in exaggerated language. The Sheikh goes as far as to say the Kurds 
believed in a distinct religion. Why did Ubeydullah want to convince Britons and others that the 
Kurdish religion was different from that of their coreligionists? What was the underlying logic? 
Was this the only way to convince the Great Powers that the Kurds had no religious loyalty to 
the Ottomans? 
 The key issue here is that although prior to the Sheikh’s uprising the Kurdish region was 
known for its anti-centralist uprisings, and most likely they had not emphasized their distinct 
identity then.
990
 It is Sheikh Ubeydullah who emphasizes the distinct ethnicity, religion and 
language of the Kurds and turns these into a basis for the legitimacy of his political claims. There 
had been a pattern of Kurdish uprisings even before the late 19
th
 century. Prior to the Sheikh’s 
revolt, however, the rebels had not cited Kurdishness as the reason for their uprisings. Ethnic 
differences and possible discriminatory policies must have played some role in the previous 
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revolts, but they had not exhibited signs of Kurdish self-reflection nor had they made any 
demand based on the distinct ethnicity of the participants. What distinguishes the Sheikh’s revolt 
from the previous ones in Kurdistan lies in the Sheikh’s tying the legitimacy of his political 
claims to his own description of the Kurdish community. This is exactly what is at the heart of 
modern nationalist claims in which the nation is presumed self-evident. This is best articulated 
by Billig when he notes that “nationalism, as a way of depicting community,991 is a historically 
specific form of consciousness. On the first page of Nations and Nationalism, Gellner asserts that 
‘nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit 
should be congruent.’”992  
 The Sheikh based his demands on the claim of distinct characters of the Kurdish nation. 
The Sheikh not only isolates Kurdish customs, traditions, and language from all others but also, 
as has been mentioned repeatedly, claims the existence of a distinct Kurdish religion. Even if in 
his original letter by the religion difference the Sheikh only meant the denominational 
differences among Sunni Muslims,which most likely was the case, the utterances’ political 
significance is not diminished. 
 What needs to be emphasized is that the Sheikh saw a direct connection between his 
description of the Kurds and securing their rights. Believing that certain facts will produce 
certain rights, the Sheikh, as a political agent, described or presented his ‘facts.’ This is what 
Derrida, in his discussion on the American Declaration of Independence, calls “the prescription, 
the fact, and the right.”993 This type of phrasing is unique to the era of nationalism. It is this era’s 
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convention to present a certain human collectivity’s characteristics as ‘facts’ to use these ‘self-
evident facts’ as the bases for demanding some ‘inalienable’ political and cultural rights. As we 
have seen, in this case the Sheikh describes the Kurds and declares them to be a single political 
entity, separable from other Muslim communities. Such declaration of the ‘facts’ and the 
constitution of them, takes place all at once. As Derrida puts it, “[t]his obscurity, this 
undecidability between, let us say, a performative structure and a constative structure, is required 
to produce the sought-after effect.”994 Unlike that of the Americans, the Sheikh’s declaration did 
not succeed in producing a state. However, it did summon into being a novel idea of the Kurds as 
a singular entity.  
 With the benefit of Austin’s insight, one could say that with the declaration of the 
distinctness of the Kurds, the Sheikh did create the nation that he wished to create, 
notwithstanding his lack of success in creating the state.
995
 Austin, as Skinner notes, “stressed 
that, in speaking about the force of an utterance, he was mainly pointing to what an agent may 
have been doing in the act of saying what was said.”996 So it is after these utterances that 
Kurdishness (Kurdayeti), not Kurdish tribes taken separately, became an issue of central 
concern. No matter which side of the border this invocation of Kurdishness took place on, the 
very invocation of Kurdishness becomes equated with a claim to sovereignty. The Sheikh, as 
later Kurdish history evidenced, made it natural to talk about the rights of the Kurds on the other 
side of the border. He used their collective suffering as a justification for this declarative act. He 
attempted to erase “the signature” of other states, to borrow Derrida’s line, and aimed at 
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“‘dissolving the links’ of their ‘paternity or maternity’.”997 
 Without coming to terms with the possibly of the fusion of religion and nationalism, one 
cannot explain how an actor whose main role and function was to lead his community in its 
religious affairs
998
 would use this language and become involved in a “politics of the 
performative.” The expected theological stance,999 to be drawn from a sheikh — any sheikh —is 
guarding the bonds of the umma as sacrosanct links. What is seen, however, is that these bonds 
are either dissolved or become secondary in the religious actor’s political thoughts as he ventures 
on this nationalistic enterprise. This is the case since the actor is ready to go against his 
coreligionists to further his ethnic nationalist cause. He rethinks these bonds with his current 
ethnic Other in their entirety. He is, at least, undisturbed by creating a new boundary between 
himself and his coreligionists on ethnic lines. These changes in the religious actor’s views take 
place along with the changes in his perception of ‘us’ and ‘them.’  These new political stances 
evidently are not the result of the actor’s conversion or complete abandonment of his religion. 
On the contrary, these political stances are usually justified religiously. This illustrates the 
penetration of what is known as national consciousness, for with it “each person mirrors 
(ma‘kas) his own nation,”1000 says Said Nursi, the renowned Kurdish religious leader. Thus, in 
studying the connection between religion (or Islam in particular) and nationalism, one has to 
look into how the nation-state becomes a kind of Weberian ideal type for governance.  
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 Whether it is an ‘ideal type’ or a ‘paradigm,’ as Billig calls it, nationalism is a modern 
convention, i.e., the universally accepted tradition of governance. Also, it is a framework which 
is conventionally assumed to bring a resolution to communal conflicts, notwithstanding its 
bloody history.
1001
 As Anderson puts it, “the ‘nation’ proved an invention on which it was 
impossible to secure a patent.
1002
 It became susceptible to being pirated by disparate and at times 
unexpected hands.”1003 Thus, if Billig’s insight of nationalism as a paradigm is accepted, then 
when one is within it, one thinks and acts nationalistically. Nationalism then provides a 
conventional procedure for the nationalist speech act to occur. To Billig, nationalism is a 
paradigm since it provides the framework for our thought, which in itself becomes invisible to 
us. We could all be nationalist without even being conscious of our nationalism, which is why it 
is “taken for granted” or “banal.”1004 The ‘invisible force’ of nationalism remains invisible to us. 
It must be this invisibility and omnipresence that makes it both local and universal.
1005
 Therefore, 
instead of thinking of nationalism only in terms of its connection with technological progress and 




 To come back to the Sheikh’s speech act, it can be only understood within the nationalist 
paradigm. It is within this paradigm that a distinct national group, based on self-referential 
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claims about itself, can demand certain political rights. It is within this paradigm that claims to 
nationhood are seen as rights and it becomes conventional to make such claims. In previous eras, 
such a convention did not exist.
 1007
 Despite the existence of nations in pre-nationalist eras, the 
claim to national sovereignty and self-rule based on distinct ethnic and collective characteristics 
was absent. Again, it is in this nationalistic paradigm that such claims have become 
conventional.   
 We can determine whether an utterance is nationalistic, if nationalism is understood as a 
dominant modern convention. Hence, Austin’s observation pointing out that “[t]here must exist 
an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to 
include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances”1008 can be 
expanded and applied to nationalist utterances as well. This approach can help us determine 
whether or not the Sheikh’s speech act took place within this paradigm or whether he was 
invoking this convention. Again, if Austin’s conditions on speech acts are applicable to 
nationalist claims, their conventional efficacy becomes a reality when they are uttered “by 
certain persons in certain circumstances.”1009 If ‘persons’ here is replaced with ‘community,’ this 
community must ‘imagine’ and claim its distinctness. This perception of in-groups’ distinctness 
is a unique form of ‘imagination,’ which only within the current paradigm could produce 
legitimate claims. It constitutes the right circumstance that renders the pursuit of nationhood or 
declaration of it sensible. In all likelihood, if similar claims were even made in pre-nationalist 
eras, they did not have either any efficacy or any meaning. Also, if individuals or groups who do 
not speak on behalf of an ‘imagined community’ do not follow the right procedure, their 
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declaration of a nation would not amount to more than what Austin calls reporting “a phatic act” 
like stating that “the cat is on the mat.”1010 Its efficacy would not go beyond a historian’s writing 
on any given people’s history. 
 The Sheikh backed up his declaration with a revolt. He foregrounded the legitimacy of 
his revolt in his own description of “the nation” as a legitimizing procedure that is only known to 
people in the age of nationalism. He first described the nation, which was equivalent to the 
declaration of its existence, and then he used these “sought-after-facts” as the bases for declaring 
the Kurds’ right to statehood. Thus, he wrote:  
We also are a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our own hands, so that in the 
punishment of our own offenders we may be strong and independent, and have privileges 
like other nations; and respecting our offenders, we are ready to take upon ourselves that 
no harm or damage shall occur to any nation. This is our object, and the reasons of my 
son’s going to Souj Boulak, so as to obtain inquiry into the state of Kurdistan.1011 
  The above statement not only illustrates the Sheikh’s awareness of nationalism, but also 
suggests that he must have assumed that his utterances had a certain legitimacy and acceptability. 
Therefore, with his claim, the Sheikh must have believed that he was making a certain moral and 
political argument that would have turned the creation of a Kurdish state into a kind of moral 
imperative. The “conventional procedure” was the idea of the nation-state and the assumption 
that any ethnic group with a certain characteristic could claim a nation of its own. The 
assumption is that within the accepted convention of nationalism, such claims must have force. 
The Sheikh mostly used this language of morality when he addressed the Westerners. For 
instance, in his letter to Dr. Cochran the Sheikh wrote that 
neither the Ottoman nor the Persian Government has purity of intention. They have not 
gone into any of our right...It is because of these kinds of things that Kurdistan is 
obliged to be, and is, under the necessity of being united, and can (no longer) put up 
                                                          
1010
 Ibid., 95. 
 
1011
 Sheikh Ubeydullah to Dr. Cochran. Correspondence. Turkey. Incl. 3. No. 5/61(1881). 
260 
 
with any such base and ruinous acts. We therefore earnestly beg of you that you will 
fully inform, and explain the matter to, the British Consul at Tabreez, so that, please 
God, the case of Kurdistan being understood, it may be inquired into.
 1012
   
In making the case for a Kurdish state, the Sheikh tried to convince the Great Powers, especially 
Britain, to support him in his undertaking. He may have genuinely believed that if “the case of 
Kurdistan [was] understood [by them], it may be inquired into.” That is, he thought that if the 
British government understood Kurdistan’s situation and if its legitimacy for nationhood were 
made clear, then this would be a necessary condition for Kurdistan to become a sovereign 
nation-state. Whether or not he misinterpreted the colonial powers’ intentions is secondary to the 
fact that he held that the time was ripe to make a case for Kurdish statehood. This signifies his 
consciousness of the era he lived in. The Sheikh could not have hoped for any result without 
assuming that his utterances could make some sense. For making such utterances “the meaning 
of the utterance itself, together with the context of its occurrence, are such that the speaker feels 
no doubt about the capacity of his or her audience to secure ‘uptake’ of the intended illocutionary 
act.”1013 The Sheikh’s utterances reveal the context of his utterance, which at the same time 
evidences the author’s own familiarity with the context. Therefore, the Sheikh’s arguments were 
modern and nationalistic. 
 It is instrumental to pay attention to some of his “certain references”1014 to see how these 
references signify the nationalist context of the Sheikh’s letters. These “certain references” could 
not exist before their modern conceptual framework came into existence, and they could not 
have been available to people before the modern era — before their entry into the nationalist 
paradigm. The Sheikh’s argument could only take place within this paradigm. Although in 
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previous eras there may have been instances in which Kurds invoked Kurdish ethnicity, they did 
not or could not ask for “the national and the political” to become congruent. For instance, the 
17
th
 century Kurdish poet Ahmad Xani hoped for the replacement of non-Kurds’ domination 
with that by the Kurds over the others. Hence Xani wrote that “If only there were unity among 
us, and we would obey one another, then all the Ottomans and Arabs and Ajam (Persians) would 
become our servants. We would reach perfection in religion and politics, and we would become 
productive in knowledge and wisdom.”1015 Xani wished the existence of a rule by a Kurdish 
prince or Mir, without arguing for the Kurdish nation’s right for self-rule.1016 But Sheikh 
Ubeydullah argued the Kurds were a distinct nation and therefore they should rule themselves. 
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He did not insist on the rule of others by Kurds. However, he insisted that the Kurds, too, ought 
to have their own separate state. It is true that Xani complained about the lack of unity among the 
Kurds. However, he believed their unity would have made them become the rulers of the Kurds 
and of other groups. Unlike the Sheikh, Xani did not invoke the idea of Kurdish self-rule in its 
modern sense. The Sheikh criticized the Ottoman and Qajar states’ civilizing discourse and 
practices, which depicted the Kurds as lower beings and savages. He simultaneously defended 
the Kurds as a nation like any other nation and asserted that they should gain a status that put 
them on equal footing with other nations. By contrast, Xani’s argument seems to have been more 
ethnocentric than nationalistic and therefore he saw the Kurds as those who deserved to rule 
others as opposed to being ruled by a non-Kurdish king.  
 What is worth noting about the Sheikh’s argument is the centrality of the idea of self-rule 
entailed in it, which distinguishes his political views from those expressed in Kurdish politics 
prior to him. In principle, he sets Kurds on par with all other nations and contends that “we are 
ready to take upon ourselves that no harm or damage shall occur to any nation.”1017 He even tries 
to convince other parties that a Kurdish state, as a repository of law and order, would be 
beneficial to them as well. In one of his letters to Iqbal ad-Dowle, the Sheikh writes that “the 
Kurds are no longer able to or wish to remain divided between Turkey and Iran and to be 
subjected to all these humiliations that they have endured till this day. Henceforth, they are 
firmly resolved to form a single nation.”1018 After declaring the necessity of creating a Kurdish 
state, the Sheikh ends his letter by writing that “all that I have announced to you has been 
inspired by my love for Persia.”1019 The Sheikh implied that his attempts to create a Kurdish state 
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should not be translated as hostility towards Persia since he claimed that an independent Kurdish 
state would bring peace and tranquility to the region.
1020
 
 To the Sheikh, this self-referential and self-defined nationhood of the Kurds constituted 
the moral ground for them to claim their own state and to reject Ottoman and Qajar rule. As 
stated earlier, this argument for the necessity of the Kurdish state was in essence modern. It 
could not have taken place outside the modern nationalist approach to statehood. The Sheikh’s 
letters carry a certain illocutionary force and contains certain vocabulary that belongs exclusively 
to “a certain construction,” i.e., to the nationalist paradigm.   
 In short, the Sheikh’s use of specific language with certain references took place in a 
“particular occasion” or era. Emphasizing the occasion with its connection to the use of certain 
language is vital in reading and understanding the Sheikh’s political statements and writings.  
Expanding on Austin’s work, Skinner remarks that Austin “placed his main emphasis on the fact 
that we need in addition to grasp the particular force with which any given utterance (with a 
given meaning) may have been issued on a particular occasion.”1021 The key terms here are “the 
particular force” of the utterance along with “the particular occasion” that provides the meaning 
and sheds light on the context of the utterance. In our case, instead of essentializing his religious 
adherence and the socio-cultural context of his operation, which would result in a dismissal of 
the Sheikh’s utterance, we need to see how his utterances shed light on his politics.  
 The Sheikh’s scattered writings thusly should be read on several different levels. First, 
The Sheikh describes or narrates a nation and with his very narration tries to justify the Kurdish 
claim to statehood. Second, by setting the Kurds as a nation on par with others, the Sheikh 
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delegitimizes or attempts to delegitimize both Ottoman and Qajar rule in Kurdistan. Third, his 
‘claiming a nation’ signifies a particular occasion of the ascendency of nationalism that the 
Sheikh himself influenced and was influenced by during its rise, and therefore he deemed it 
natural and necessary to distinguish the Kurds as a nation to gain the right to a separate state. 
Finally, not only was his Islamic faith no barrier to his nationalism, it accommodated and served 







Kurdish Nationalism and Khilafa 
in Nursi’s Pre-exile Writing  
 
 
In essence, the purpose of the religion is none other than serving the 
nation. 






Bediüzzaman Said Kurdi or Nursi (1878–1960) was a Kurdish mullah who produced a 
substantial body of writing. Nursi was trained at a Kurdish Medrese and had close connections 
with the Kurdish community.
1023
 His pre-exile life is another illustration of how one’s ethno-
nationalism can impact one’s religious interpretation. Nursi was an ardent advocate of 
constitutionalism, a bitter enemy of the Hamidian state, and an active figure in Kurdish politics 
before his exile in 1925. In many ways, his works demonstrate the fears, anxieties, and 
ambivalence of Kurdish religious leaders of his time. Bediüzzaman’s pre-exile writings (1907-
1925) exhibit three central trends that substantially contributed to his thought: a) the growth of 
Kurdish nationalism; b) Ottoman Constitutionalism and anti-Hamidian politics; and c) the 
increasing fusion of religion and nationalism in Muslim thought.  
                                                          
1022
 Süleyman Çevik, "Şex Seîd Ew Wezîfe Ku Daye Sere Xwe Bi Ferdi U Cemaeti Aniye Cih' / Sheikh Said Did 
What He Was Required to Do," Nübihar no. 45 (6/1996).  Abdulmelik Fırat (1934 - 2009) was a Kurdish scholar, 
politician and the grandson of  Sheikh’s Said, the leader of 1925 Kurdish rebellion in Turkey.  
1023
 In 1908, Nursi sent telegrams to the Ottoman Kurdish tribes to inform them about the compatibility of 
constitutionalism with Shari‘a (I. D. p, 158).  Also, from 1909 to 1911, Nursi spent two years in Kurdistan and 
encouraged the Kurds there to support a constitutionalist system. At the end of his trip, Nursi was apparently 
satisfied with his achievement, proudly uttering: “O! The patriots, you should know that now the Kurds also are 
either constitutionalists or becoming increasingly receptive to the constitutionalist ideas (fikran).” Nursi, İçtima-I 
Dersler/ Social Lessons, 81. 
266 
 
  Contrary to commonly held views, Islam did not serve as a barrier to Kurdish or Turkish 
ethnic self-consciousness.
1024
 The writings of iconic figures such as Said Nursi are a perfect 
illustration of the impact of nationalism. Yet it is generally claimed that Nursi was categorically 
against all forms of nationalism. For instance, Mardin states that  
Said Nursi is said to have figured among the founders of this association [the Society 
for the Advancement of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti)]. But a number of points 
have to be taken into account here, which, in fact, absolve Said from the accusation of 
being a separatist. Said does not figure among the directorate elected at the first 
general meeting of the society. He is not mentioned as a founder by the scholar who has 
collected the most extensive information about the association (Tunaya, II, 1986, 
186f.). He claims that he was always opposed to nationalism, which he considered an 




Nursi’s own writings, as will be shown below, attest that he had no qualms about dividing 
nationalism into two different categories: positive and negative. He considered nationalism to be 
positive as long as it did not deny others’ rights or existence. 1026   
 In the Kurdish case, Islam became a marker of ethno-national identity. Nursi’s pre-exile 
writing reveals this reality. Nursi attributes many of his own religious and ethnic qualities to his 
Kurdishness. This trend, in which one’s religious authenticity was connected to one’s ethnicity, 
may have started in the late 19
th





 In particular, the 1880 revolt led by the Kurdish Naqshbandi Sheikh Ubeydullah of 
                                                          
1024
 Cf. Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918; 
Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. 
1025
 Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, 90. 
1026
 It is important to note that way here Nursi conceptualize (collective) rights in and of itself is an indication of 
how he was influenced by modern nationalist thoughts. 
1027
 Erik Zürcher believes that there are existed a continued connection between Turkish naitonalism and Islam 




Nehri was a manifestation of this approach to Islam among the Kurds.
1028
 Ottoman 
administrative documents reveal that this particular revolt—which symbolized a fusion of 
religion and Kurdish nationalism—had a far reaching impact on Kurdish politics in general.1029  
At some levels it made Kurdish politics more ambiguous, since it convinced some actors that 
without outside help, Kurdish independence would not be possible. Nonetheless, it also offered a 
new meaning to Kurdishness and became a source of inspiration and continuous discontent with 
the state.  
Sheikh Ubeydullah’s revolt continued to influence Kurdish religious figures. The 
youngest son of Ubeydullah, Sheikh Abdulqadir, who later became the speaker of the Ottoman 
senate, emerged as an indispensable figure in Kurdish politics after his father’s defeat.1030 The 
same Sheikh Abdulqadir
1031
 started his anti-caliphate propaganda after being exiled in 1882. He 
disseminated anti-Hamidian views by sending out letters to the Kurdish region from Mecca.
1032
 
In 1894 in Medina, Abdulqadir held a meeting with a number of other well-known Kurdish 
dissidents, including Mela Selim Efendi, well-known for his revolt in 1914 in Bitlis.
1033
 This 
group of Kurds renewed their pledge to struggle against the Ottoman Empire as a means of 
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championing their desire for an independent Kurdistan.
1034
 Notably, considering the 
precariousness of the Kurdish situation in a post-WWI environment, Abdulqadir formulated 
Kurdish political demands in the form of a request for autonomy rather than independence, 
usually in public. In secret, however, he and his nephew Seyyed Taha were known for their 
unyielding efforts to garner British support for the creation of an independent Kurdish state.
1035
 
British records reveal that “in Constantinople ‘Abdul Qadir of Shamsdinan was ready to 
assume…the hypothetical post of ruler of a united Kurdistan.”1036 So, in his secret meetings with 
Western delegates, Abdulqadir, along with Nursi and others, seems to have been more 
comfortable expressing the real Kurdish desire.
1037
 Abdulqadir also seemed to have been hopeful 
that if the Kurds were able to make their case, the League of Nations might recognize their right 
to an independent state.
1038
    
State records show that the 1880 revolt had a significant effect on the mutual perceptions 
of the Ottoman state and the Kurds. Therefore, for almost a decade after the revolt, a major rift 
between the state and the Kurds continued to exist. To the extent that the Ottoman state was 
forced to come up with a new policy to bridge this gulf,
1039
 the state had to make use of 
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 Arabic was the most commonly taught language in Kurdish Medreses and the state 
tried to use Arabic to propagate its policies in Kurdistan. The state’s creation of Aşiret Mektebi 
(tribal schools),
1041
 with its “civilizing” objectives, and Hamidiya Calvary1042 were components 
of new assimilatory policies in Kurdistan. It was in the same context that Abdülhamid II himself 
had remarked that “[w]e can now tolerate within our borders those who share our religion and 
[therefore] are one of us. We need to strengthen the Turkish element in Anatolia and give priority 
to making the Kurds part of us.”1043 It is important to note that “strengthen[ing] the Turkish 
element in Anatolia,” in the guise of religion, was to take place at the expense of assimilating the 
Kurd or making them “part of us [the Turks].” However, the state’s attempt to “win over the 
Kurds’ hearts” could not bring an end to anti-Hamidian state activities.  
 Anti-state Sunni Kurdish politics were expressed in various forms, and prominent 
Kurdish religious figures and families were under constant surveillance by the Hamidian regime. 
The activities of Sheikh Barzani
1044
 and Sheikh Berzenji
1045
 provide one example. In state 
records, those Sheikhs’ activities are usually referred to as ifsad (dissemination of vice) and 
şekavet (brigandry).  
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In 1908, Sheikh Abdul Salam Barzani demanded the religio-political autonomy of 
Kurdistan. This autonomy would have made Kurdish an official language, required that taxes 
levied in Kurdistan be spent locally, and that Kurdish affairs be administered by the Kurds 
themselves in accordance with the Shafi‘i school1046 of jurisprudence.1047 The Barzan Sheikh’s 
discontent with Ottoman policy did not end until he was executed by the CUP (Committee of 
Union and Progress) government in 1914.
1048
 There were various other Kurdish activities, which, 
despite their religious leadership, remained strictly concerned with the Kurdish political fate. The 
1910-1914 uprising in Bitlis, under the leadership of the abovementioned Mela Selim, similarly 
exemplified the continuity of such Kurdish ethno-religious politics.
1049
  Suat Parlar is right to 
describe tekke or tekiye (the Sufi lodge) as major “centers for the promulgation of Kurdish 
nationalism.”1050   
 With the turn of the century, the influence of nationalism on Islamic religious thought 
became clearer in the Muslim world in general. Even Muslim thinkers such as Sa‘id Halim 
Pasha, the Ottoman Grand Vizier, who held that Islamic religious beliefs were universal by their 
nature, had become keenly aware of the impact of national and local culture on religious 
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interpretation. Therefore, in essence, the views of such figures also signified the influence of 
modern nationalist discourse on Islamic interpretations. The Grand Vizier spoke to this reality 
when he remarked that “just as the universal character of scientific truths engenders varieties of 
scientific national cultures which in their totality represent human knowledge, much in the same 
way the universal character of Islamic verities creates varieties of national, moral and social 
ideals.”1051 This assertion attests to the extent to which Muslim societies were grappling with the 
impact of nationalist ideas by the 20
th
 century.   
Muslim activists, scholars, and politicians from various ethnic backgrounds were shaping 
various interpretations of Islam into the straitjackets of their own nationalistic agendas. Their 
assertions usually speak to the prevalent fusion of nationalist ideas with their conceptualization 
of religion. As such, the assumed impurity of the other’s religious comprehension was tied to the 
ethnic character or history of the other. For instance, as noted in the previous chapters, ‘Abduh 
was not reticent to state that Islam [originally] was a religion of the Arabs.1052   
Rashid Rida, another prominent Islamic revivalist, “held that the Arabs had better mental 
faculties and possessed superior scientific minds than the Turks.”1053 Rida claimed that unlike 
Arab conquest, which brought prosperity, the Turks brought catastrophe by conquering lands. He 
stressed that “the greatest glory in the Muslim conquests goes to the Arabs, and that religion 
grew, and became great through them; their foundation is the strongest, their light is the 
brightest, and they are indeed the best umma brought forth to the world.”1054 However, non-Arab 
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thinkers such as Gökalp believed the reverse was true. He even argued that “after their 
conversion to Islam, notwithstanding their strong religious faith and deep sincerity, the Turks 
[always] remained free from bigotry and fanaticism”1055    
  What is interesting about the aforementioned Sa‘id Halim Pasha remark is the 
insinuation that the local character of religious interpretation, replete with elements specific to 
the very context of a given interpretation, simultaneously could be one form among many of 
Islamic universal varieties. Here, Said Pasha does not stress the universal character of the 
religion alone. He also acknowledges the universality of more than a single religious 
interpretation and by the same token the multiplicity of truths. Setting aside the paradoxical 
nature of his statement, Said Pasha appears to inadvertently admit that, like other forms of 
human knowledge, religious interpretation, or ijtihad, is also equally local and impure.
1056
 In 
reality, Abdülhamid II’s reinvigoration of the caliphate should also be seen within the same 
context, in which the idea of a central state affects interpretation of Islam. Again, Islam becomes 
subservient to the interests of the state. Therefore, it increasingly comes to be seen as a 
phenomenon that has to be contained within the boundaries of state power and national interest. 
The culmination of this approach is very much visible in the Republican era.  
 Nursi was a product of the late-Ottoman period. Yet, he was, in a sense, an unusual and 
unique personality, but in combining a firm commitment to Islam
1057
 with a deep concern for the 
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Kurdish people, he reflected an attitude that was not uncommon among Kurdish mullahs and 
religious leaders.
1058
 Nursi frequently boasted about Kurdish religious sincerity, and related his 
own personal honesty and bravery to his Kurdish upbringing. Once, frustrated at his trial at his 
court martial, Nursi addressed the court by saying “without being prideful, we are Kurds; we 
could be deceived but we do not deceive and we do not lie for an [ephemeral] life.”1059 In 
another occasion, he writes:  “as someone who has grown up in the mountains of Kurdistan, 
before visiting the capital of the Khilafa, Istanbul, I imagined it to be filled with beauty. Now, as 
I see it, Istanbul is nothing other than a savage man with a fearful and vicious heart, disguised in 
a civilized cloak.”1060 Despite his occasional harsh criticism of Kurdish culture, he usually 
remained boastful about the Kurds. To challenge and mock widespread negative views about 
Kurds, he frequently referred to himself as a “primitive, bedevi, Kurd” and was not averse to 
remarking that “the pro-constitutionalist nature (taba-i meşurtiyetperveraneleri) of the Kurd laid 
the foundation of their [religious] studies in the form of debating [subject matters].”1061 When 
Nursi became disillusioned with the post-Hamidian Turkish state in 1909, he declared that he 
“[preferred] the high mountains of Kurdistan, the abode of absolute freedom”1062 over 
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civilization in Istanbul. 
 Nursi had been involved in politics prior to his travels to Istanbul in 1907. By then he was 
already acquainted with the brutality of the Hamidian rule and with the ideal of 
constitutionalism.
1063
 However, his first encounter with the Palace was in the context of Kurdish 
politics. In 1907, he criticized the state’s education policy and offered a reform project that 
would have recognized Kurdish as one of the languages of instruction in the Kurdish Ottoman 
provinces. The Palace reacted to Nursi’s proposal by sending him to a mental hospital. 
Abdülhamid’s harsh reaction to Nursi’s project is said to be due the Sultan’s belief that it would 
have paved the way for the eventual dismemberment of Kurdistan.
1064
  
Considering the enormous significance of language and its connection with the ideas of 
nationalism in the Ottoman political context, the importance of Nursi’s attempt must not be 
overlooked. This is especially the case since Nursi revered those who devoted themselves to the 
improvement of Kurdish language. He opined that the lack of Kurdish literacy had resulted in the 
exploitation of the Kurds by those who “were once inferior”1065 to the Kurds in terms of their 
socio-political status.
1066
  To explain the value of the Kurdish language, Nursi went as far as 
equating one’s degree of self-worth to one’s devotion to one’s mother tongue. During his 1909-
1911 trips in Kurdistan, he reproached the Kurds for their inattentiveness to the development of 
Kurdish, declaring that 
what is called the mother tongue (lisan-ı maderzad denilen) is the mirror of the 
                                                          
1063
 Şükran Vahide, Islam in Modern Turkey : An Intellectual Biography of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi(Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2005), 20-3. Also, Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case 
of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, 75-80. 
1064
 Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, 19; Ahmet Turran, "Said 
Nursi Ve Nurculuk," http://dergi.samsunilahiyat.com/Makaleler/1525073178_199810020211.pdf  
1065
 Ekradın madündunda bulunanlar. 
1066
 Şark ve Kürdistan Gazitesi. ( No. 1; Dec. 2, 1908). Also,Nursi, İçtima-I Dersler/ Social Lessons, 507. 
275 
 
dissemination of national sentiment, the water for livelihood; and the tree grown out of 
the literary toil, the measurement of knowledge, and the criterion of [the collective 
level of] self-worth and perfection…. I make my lamentation known to you for letting 
[our] language, which is a sign of civilization become dry, deficient, and 
dysfunctional.
1067
 (Emphasis added) 
 
It was also in this context that Nursi expressed his admiration for Halil Hayalî, the most 
renowned northern Kurdish poet at the time.
1068
 Nursi referred to the poet as an exemplary 
patriot and remarked, “permit me to acquaint you with a model of patriotism,1069 Motkili Halil 
Hayalî Efendi, who in his linguistic efforts, as in all other patriotic fields, has obtained a 
pioneering role.”1070 
In some Turkish nationalist historiographical works,
1071
 Said Nursi’s efforts for the 
inclusion of the Kurdish language in the educational system and the Sultan’s reaction to Nursi’s 
ethnically based demand have been completely obscured. For instance, M. Hakan Yavuz 
fabricates an entirely different story when he recounts: “In an effort to bring the natural sciences 
together with Islamic sciences, Nursi visited Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1907 to seek his support 
for a university in Van. However, the sultan rejected his proposal to reconcile scientific 
reasoning with Islam.”1072 
Nursi’s reading of history is one of the more important instance that shows the influence 
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of ethno-nationalsim on his religious thought. His historiographical take reveals both his ethnic 
pride and what he believed to be the cause of “the decline of the Muslims.” It is clear that he 
viewed Ottoman caliphal history as the history of tyrannical rules (istibdad), while he tacitly 
honored past Kurdish disobedience to those rules.
1073
 Once, addressing Kurdish porters in 
Istanbul, Nursi declared that the Kurds must let these six hundred years of the Turkish obedience 
to tyrannical rule be the history of their bygone generations.
1074
 The Kurds should demonstrate 
their own nobility (asaletimiz) and only use their wisdom and knowledge.
1075
  
Another instance of such an impact of ethno-nationalism can be seen in Nursi’s difference 
with Arab revivalists over the blood lineage of the caliph and the caliphate itself. To Nursi, it is 
the nature of the state rather than its labels that determines its legitimacy. It is this approach to 
governance in Islam that constitutes one of the points of his disjunction with ethnically Arab 
revivalists such as ‘Abduh and Rida. Unlike ‘Abduh and his disciple, Nursi did not believe in the 
exclusive right of Arabs to Khilafa, notwithstanding that Arab revivalists influenced some 
important aspects
1076
 of Nursi’s religious thought.1077 As a pro-constitutionalist religious scholar, 
Nursi claimed that a true shar‘i state is a constitutionalist one and therefore it is incumbent upon 
all to obey such a state.
 1078
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Hamidian rule, was defined by Nursi as: “an arbitrary, a whimsical rule.”  Istibdad, argued Nursi, 
“turns human beings into the least dignified creatures; it is this that has poisoned the Muslim 
world and pushed them into internal feuds and misery.” 1079    
Nursi goes so far as to call the entirety of post-Rashidun Muslim history (661 CE 
onward) the history of tyrannical rules. He attributes the emergence of a number of theo-
philosophical schools to the existence of tyranny. Himself being an ’Asha‘ari, Nursi regarded 
Jabries and Mu‘tazilies in the Abbasid era as false schools of religious thought that were the 
direct outgrowth of the tyrannical rule of their time. For him, tyranny could be either political or 
scholastic, but both were lethal and could do the utmost harm to “true religiosity.” 1080  
As indicated above, in Nursi’s thought, ethnic lineage as a qualification for the caliph was 
a non-issue. In Nursi’s view, only one principal differentiates a caliph from a king: whether or 
not he follows the Prophetic path (a similar idea was defended by Ibn Taymiyyah, 1263–1328 
CE). If a king follows the tradition of Muhammad he “is a caliph, a just ruler; his rule is 
constitutional and founded on shar’i precepts.”1081 Despite his conflicting loyalties, unlike Arab 
revivalists, Nursi never concerned himself with the ethnicity or the blood lineage of the caliph. 
This indicates how one’s religious views could be affected by one’s socio-political conditions 
and cultural background. Certainly, Nursi was well aware of claims that regarded Quraishi or 
Arab lineage as a condition for the caliphate. He almost always praised Arabs “as an illustrious 
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nation,”1082 also claiming that “the Kurds are racially related to the Arabs.”1083 However, in 
Nursi’s thinking Arab-ness never constituted a condition for the caliphate.  
In a similar vein, Nursi argued that tyranny had various manifestations. Besides the 
political and scholastic type, there was communal tyranny.
1084
 However, he saw meşrutiyet, 
constitutionalism, as the panacea to all ills. Constitutionalism was thus not merely a political 
system, but a form of culture that could provide grounds for various ideas to be treated based on 
their inherent values and merits. If the Kurds wanted to compete with their Other, then they had 
to first bury the existing “communal tyranny” and adopt the culture of constitutionalism. The 
Kurds must “repent,” says Nursi. They needed redemption, and to collectively rush “toward 
doors of repentance,” which would be opened to them by adopting the culture of 
constitutionalism.
1085
 We are told that “every nation has a spiritual pool that constitutes and 
protects its national audacity, honor, and power.”1086 These components of national 
consciousness “work like a string for [threaded] beads…. When the idea of nationhood is 
shattered…the nation loses its reality.”1087 The Kurds needed to know, Nursi opined, that some of 
the Kurdish religious and community leaders were tyrannical. In fact, their tyranny was the 
supreme impediment to Kurdish nationhood.
1088
  
This classification of tyranny and strong emphasis on its degenerative impact on all 
aspects of life illustrates the deep influence of al-Kawakibi’s celebrated work, Tabāyiʻal-
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Istibdād.1089 (Al-Kawakibi’s work had widespread impact on religious scholars, as is evident in 
the work of prominent Shi‘i scholar, Na’ini in Iran during the constitutional era, 1906-1909.)1090 
As shown above, Nursi saw the impact of “communal tyranny” as being extremely destructive, 
and the principal impediment to Kurdish nationhood. He saw “holes” in Kurdish national 
consciousness. In his 1911 piece, Münazarat (debates), Nursi tried to respond to the question of 
why the Kurds, despite their “extraordinary bravery, zeal, and exceptional personalities,” were 
lagging behind their neighboring nations whose populations and power were said to be no match 
to that of the Kurds.
1091
 Once again, Nursi pointed to tyranny as the prima causa for the 
deficiencies of Kurdish politics.
1092
 
In Nursi’s Kawakibi-like approach to tyranny, every human relation is based either on 
tyranny or justice. However, he maintains that every beauty in any just human relation originates 
from religion, from the teachings of Prophets—who, in Nursi’s words, were masters of morality 
for all of humanity. Therefore, there is nothing beautiful and humane in medeniyet, modern 
civilization, that cannot be found in Islam.
1093
  In Nursi’s political thought, no tyrannical rule 
could qualify as the caliphate, since he considered tyranny to be in direct opposition to 
Muhammad’s path “that was founded on justice.”1094 Thus Nursi categorically denied 
Abdülhamid’s rule any religious legitimacy. He stated that “the connection of the horrible and 
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unjust tyranny with shari‘a was no more than an illusion [created by the tyrant] to protect 
himself from internal and external threats.”1095 
Even after WWI, Nursi referred to the demise of the Hamidian regime as the beginning of 
freedom (bidayet-i hurriyet). However, by this time, as someone who had witnessed the horrors 
of the modernist CUP’s rule and the devastation of WWI,1096 Nursi was no longer as optimistic 
about medeniyet. He thought its destructive aspect to be almost equivalent to its benefits.
1097
 
Nowadays, one can only think of the miseries and dilemmas of modern citizens as illustrated in 
Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life,1098 when one senses Nursi’s 
fears and concerns about how the modern state functions. Nursi asserted that the modern state 
could easily “destroy Islam or Islamic brotherhood in its entirety” in the name of “protecting 
Islam or the caliphate.” Indeed, if a person, in an attempt to protest the state, takes refuge inside 
“a building as sacred and of as incalculable worth as the Ayah Sophia, this medeniyet can issue a 
fatwa for its destruction.”1099  
Nursi’s views of modern civilization could shed light on the complex relationship 
between people like him and the rising nation-state. On the one hand he saw the modern state as 
the carrier of modern civilization that offered an extraordinary advancement in science, medicine 
and technology. On the other hand, the modern state symbolized an unprecedented capacity for 
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destruction and violence. At the same, for non-Turkish Muslims like Nursi, the Ottoman state 
represented the last remaining fortress against the full colonial takeover of the Muslim world.  
Like many Arabs, Kurds and other Muslims, Nursi experienced a great dilemma. He had no 
problem with what he termed as musbet miliyetcilik (positive nationalism)
1100
 – a type of 
nationalism that refrained from tenakür (denying other nations’ existence and rights).1101 This 
meant recognizing the legitimacy of the disintegration of the Ottoman state. Nevertheless, Nursi 
was terrified by the prospect of the disappearance of the Ottoman state, the last Muslim 
sanctuary against Europe. Such ambivalences and “double loyalties” reflected his concerns about 
the fate of his own ethnic group in the face of growing Turkish nationalism. Nursi experienced 
socio-political pressures thusly, bearing witness to ever-increasing colonial pressure upon the 
Muslim world, as well as the Kurdish fear of a possible Armenian return in the wake of the 
Turkish-Kurdish genocidal campaign against them.  
Nursi’s works thus reveal a complex stance on the Ottoman caliphate that is generally 
overlooked by scholarship on the subject. In the post-WWI era, there was increasing pressure on 
Ottoman/Turkish officials to do away with any institution with an international influence. Chief 
among such institutions were the caliphate and Sheikh-al-Islam.  As early as 1920, Nursi appears 
to have been concerned about the weakening or possible abolishment of those institutions. He 
believed that in their current form, those institutions had caved in to both domestic and foreign 
pressures and had abandoned many Islamic precepts and requirements. Nursi proposes reforming 
the office of Sheikh-al-Islam.
1102
 His attempts to reform such institutions indicate that, like many 
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of his fellow Kurds, Nursi was terrified by the likelihood of the emergence of an ardent Turkish 
nationalist state. As a last resort, some influential Kurdish figures strove for a revival of a type of 
Ottomanist narrative. According to Mesut Yeğen, at the time, the survival of the caliphate as a 
major symbol of Ottomanism could mean “maintaining the ‘status quo’ which ensured that 
Kurds enjoy an autonomous existence.”1103  
 Nursi’s proposal aimed at transforming the inistitution of Sheikh-al-Islam from one run 
by a person, the Sheikh al-Islam, into a type of religious legislative body with the potential for 
international respect and a larger following in the Muslim world. As such, this new institution 
would not succumb to foreign or domestic pressure when making critical decisions or issuing 
fatwas.
1104
 In 1921, Nursi defended the vitality of the caliphate, which he declared to be 
inseparable from the Sultanate. Therefore, he argued that “our Padişah, as a King, oversees 
(nazaret) thirty million people [within Turkey] and, as a caliph symbolizes the sacred bond 
among three hundred million [Muslims].”1105 Once again, this reveals that Nursi had no problem 
with the ever-expanding independent Muslim state—what he characterized as the “attainment of 
their own rightful sovereignty.”1106 Of course, Muslims’ attainment of national sovereignty was a 
just pursuit as long as there was some level of unity among them against European colonialism; 
this unity was symbolized by their reverence for the institution of caliphate.
1107
 
It must be noted that there was another significant aspect to Nursi’s proposal, which was 
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rooted in his firm belief in constitutionalism. Nursi considered the caliphal role to be mostly 
ceremonial in a constitutional state. This aspect of his thought becomes particularly evident in his 
piece, Munzarat, published in 1911. It was a constitutional caliphate, after all, which resembled a 
constitutional monarchy. Nursi declared that “from now on, Khilafa will necessarily be 
represented by the ‘ulema (meşheti Islamiye)…. Since the ruler [in a constitutionalist system] is 
the public opinion, not one person.”1108 Certainly, this was one of the issues that marked Nursi as 
an original thinker. This put him on a fussy and complicated borderline between “modernity” and 
“tradition” that afforded him the ability to fundamentally rethink Islamic governance. The credit 
of such rethinking, however, should in part be given to Hamidian tyranny as it strengthened and 
produced, at the very least, three antithetical models to its own version of caliphate: a) an 
opposing nationalist model such as the one advocated by the exclusive right of Arabs to the 
caliphate; b) a ‘secular’ model à la CUP and later Republicans in which the parliament was seen 
as  the real political authority; c) Nursi’s model in which the office of Sheikh al-Islam was 
perceived to function as a clerical assembly, most likely paralleled by a more conventional form 
of meclis, parliament. That clerical assembly was supposed to consist of forty to fifty clerics 




One point of contention with regards to the pre-exile life of Nursi is whether or not he 
supported the 1925 Kurdish Revolt led by Sheikh Said of Piran. Turkish nationalists, be they 
secular or Islamist, hold that Nursi would have not supported a nationalist/separatist revolt such 
as that of Sheikh Said. They adamantly reject such a possibility because, we are told, Nursi 
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“always condemned nationalism in his publications and speeches.”1110 Turkish Nurcu, mainly the 
follower of the renowned Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen, go even farther and claim that 
“throughout his life, [Nursi] stood against any kind of Kurdist (Kürtçülük) activities.”1111 They 
note that Nursi not only opposed Sheikh Said’s Revolt and rejected his invitation to join that 
revolt, but also convinced many Kurds not to fight against the Turkish army.
1112
 This account, 
along with the people and the places that are cited in it, has already been debunked, rendering it 
incoherent and sloppy.
1113
 Rigorously scrutinized by Turkish academics Cemalettin Canlı and 
Yusuf Kenan Beysülen, the story was found to have significant inconsistencies. The source of the 




Nursi was certainly a moderate nationalist and, as indicated above, concentrated heavily 
on Kurdishness, Kurdish national consciousness, and Kurdish cultural activities in his pre-exile 
works. Even Özoğlu who characterizes the 1925 Kurdish Revolt as a Kemalist State-
manufactured event
1115
 admits that Nursi’s     
Turkish followers try to downplay his Kurdish identity, [but] Said Nursi, particularly in 
his early career, paid careful attention to his Kurdishness…. Prior to his membership in 
the SAK [Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan], Said Nursi’s articles were printed 
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in Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi, published by the Kürt Teavün ve Teraki Cemiyeti 
(Society for Kurdish Mutual Aid and Progress), founded in 1908. According to Tarik 
Zafer Tunaya, a Turkish historian, Said Nursi was a member of the Kürt Neşri Maarif 
Cemiyeti (Society for the Spread of Kurdish Education) founded in 1919 by the 




Furthermore, as noted earlier, Nursi was a member of the Kurdish delegate that met with 
American and French representatives in Istanbul in 1919. The delegate’s mission was to discuss 
Kurdish aspirations for an independent Kurdistan with those foreign officials, notwithstanding 
the Ottoman state’s warnings against such activities.1117 Interestingly enough, it was Nursi who 
told the American representative that in order for Kurdistan to become a viable state, it would 
have to be connected to a seacoast. The American representative’s response was that Nursi’s 
suggestions would violate Wilson’s points according to which an independent Armenistan should 
have been created.
1118
 The point is that Nursi was not only for an independent Kurdistan but also 
believed in its geographical expansion such that it could have access to international waters.
1119
    
Nursi’s support for an independent Kurdish state did not mean that he was ready to 
pursue such a goal at any cost. Most likely, Nursi would have shied away from violence and an 
internal Muslim fight to achieve the creation of an independent state. For Nursi, fighting other 
Muslims for one’s nationhood could be equivalent to menfi milliyetçilik (negative nationalism) 
and constituted denial of the other (tenâkür).
1120
 This pacifist stance seems to coincide with the 
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general spiritual conditions in his inward journey.
1121
 According to Sheikh Said’s grandson, A. 
M. Firat, by 1925, Nursi “had already given up [the fight] and accepted his defeat.”1122 Firat’s 
assessment seems to reflect the disappointment of the Revolt’s leaders, including Mela 
Abdulmacid, Nursi’s own brother.1123 Unlike Nursi, they believed in an armed struggle against 
the Kemalist state.
1124
 However, there is evidence revealing that Nursi remained sympathetic and 
emotionally attached to the participants in the Revolts and their relatives many years later. Over 
ten years after his exile, when he encountered the sons of Cebranli Halit Bey, the organizational 
leader of the Revolt, for the first time, Nursi hugged them and lost control of his emotions, 
“[bursting] into tears and [appearing] extremely saddened.”1125 In a 1954 conversion with A. M. 
Firat, Nursi states that “I will take – I have taken the revenge of my esteemed – my most 
respected brother, Sheikh Said Efendi.”1126 The same Sheikh Said had claimed that Turkish Islam 
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and caliphate represented “400 years of misusing Islam to enslave the Kurd.”1127 Furthermore, 
Nursi had emotional ties with the Azadi (Society for Kurdish Independence) as well as the 
Revolt’s leaders. Not only did Nursi’s own brother have a leading role in Azadi, he was also in 
close contact with other leaders, most notably Colonel Cebranli Halit Bey, until September 
1924.
1128
 All this indicates that Nursi did not question the legitimacy of the revolt’s goal, but the 
method used in pursuing it.  
A close reading of Nursi’s pre-exile writings reveals that Nursi not only had doubts about 
Kurdish unity but was also unsure of a widespread Kurdish national consciousness.  
Notwithstanding his deep concern for the fate of the Kurds, Nursi seemed to believe that, unlike 
the Armenians, the Kurds’ national consciousness had yet to reach the level required for forming 
a nation. As indicated earlier, he claimed that “Kurdish national consciousness looks like [a 
bunch of] beads [threaded] with a shredded string.”1129 He saw widespread Kurdish illiteracy and 
internal discord as major impediments to the growth of national consciousness. He believed the 
real formation of national consciousness came about when an individual member of a nation 
became the embodiment of its collectivity.
1130
 
 In 1908, Nursi made his views clear in a Kurdish address to his people: “O! Kurdish 
people (ey! geli kurdan), there is power in solidarity, life in unity, blissfulness in brotherhood, 
and a healthy collective life in statehood.”1131 Three jewels needed their protection: Islam, 
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 The Kurds still suffered at the hands of their greatest “enemies: 
ignorance, poverty and discord.”1133  Kurds could learn from Armenian nationalism; Armenians 
could “lead us toward awakening and progress; [so] we extend our hands of friendship toward 
them with the utmost pleasure.”1134 It should be noted, however, Nursi was simultaneously very 
much ambivalent about the modern state in any of its forms. 
Nursi became increasingly horrified by the reckless nature of the modern state and its 
capability to unleash overwhelming degrees of violence.
1135
 It is possible to say that he thought 
that in the event of a war with the state, the Kurds might not fare any better than their Armenian 
neighbors. To add to this frightening picture, the Kurds still lived in complete despair and 
anxiety at the prospect of an Armenian return with European help, and a possible British 
retribution for their involvement in the 1915 Armenian genocide alongside the Turkish state. 
British documents shed light on this enormous fear; according to British records the “Kurds who 
[were] in an overwhelming majority in these districts, took alarm. And the strong nationalist 
sentiment, which already existed among them enhanced by the fear of Western powers, 
contemplated putting them under the despised Armenians.”1136  
Considering this complex political situation, it is most likely that Nursi preferred to wait 
and see instead of taking an active role in Sheikh Said’s revolt.1137 Most of what is known about 
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Nursi’s connection with and remarks about the 1925 Revolt is unreliable.1138 It is an undeniable 
fact that Nursi was closely associated with many of the Revolt’s leaders and had an organic bond 
with them. Indeed, he was a founding member of the Society for Kurdish Mutual Aid and 
Progress.
1139
 He founded this organization with Sheikh Abdulqadir and the members of the 
Bedirxan family and others who later, unlike the secular and religious Turkish groups, all 
supported Sheikh Said.
 1140
 Also, Nursi was well respected among both the Kurdish ‘ulama and 
common people. Nursi’s respect and fame among the Kurds was so great that, as early as 1909, 
he believed a telegram from him to Kurdish tribes would have sufficed to change their attitudes 
toward Constitutionalism.
1141
 His influence on Kurds, particularly in the Van region, was 
indispensable. Moreover, as shown above, in his universalistic religio-political views on issues 
such as the caliphate and Sheikh al-Islamate, Nursi did not ignore the seriousness and the reality 
of the nation-state.
1142
 Also, there is no evidence that the Kurdish ‘ulama challenged Nursi, 
except on his optimism about Constitutionalism and his endorsement of greater individual 
liberties. Apparently, Mela Selim had criticized him for holding such views, and Nursi appears to 
have acknowledged the validity of Mela Selim’s criticism in later life.1143  
In summation, Nursi’s pre-exile works represent a turbulent period for both Kurdish and 
Muslim history in general. Nursi hoped to change the attitudes of the overlords toward the Kurds 
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through the reforms he proposed. He also strove to change the Kurds through the introduction of 
a new educational system. His tragic life-story started with the hope of opening a university in 
Kurdistan and ended with the same hope. He hoped that new schools would change the fate of 
the Kurds, whom he called benim cinsimdan, of my own kind.
 1144
 He ended up in a mental 
hospital for pursuing such a goal. He had high hopes that the 1908 Constitutional Revolution 
would result in many good things, highest among which was Kurdish education. Thus, he 
declared that “in a short time schools will be built in places where there ha[d] never been any, 
and the old schools will be replaced by modern ones in [every region of Kurdistan].”1145 After his 
disillusionment with politics, Nursi went back to Van and resumed teaching his people until he 
was exiled in 1925. In the 1950s, after decades of life in exile, Nursi hoped that his calls for 
changes to Turkish politics could mean something. Thus, he once again repeated his request for 
opening a university in Kurdistan. Nonetheless, in the autumn of his life, and now for the last 
time, Nursi was disappointed with the enduring hostility to his request to educate his own people. 
He saw this as his personal mission, since the Tyrant, i.e., Abdülhamid II, had kept them under 
tabakat-i gaflet (multiple layers of ignorance).
1146
 Özdalga summarizes Nursi’s lifelong effort for 
establishing a Kurdish university as follows: 
In 1907 he went to Istanbul in order to convince Sultan Abdülhamid to support his 
project, but the Young Turks’ revolution of 1908 interrupted his efforts. He persisted in 
his campaign even after Mustafa Kemal had come to power, but his goal was 
impossible under the new secularist and nationalist regime. As late as 1951, after the 
Democratic Party had come to power, Nursi once more brought up the idea of 




It was also in this turbulent time that the entire Muslim world dealt with the reality of the 
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emerging nation-state and the introduction of constitutionalism in the face of colonialism.  
Particularly for a Kurdish leader such as Nursi, these ideas caused enormously contradictory 
political stances, ambivalence and dilemmas. Despite his anti-colonial and pro-Muslim unity 
politics, Nursi remained a believer in what he called positive nationalism. It must also be noted 
that despite his ambivalence in pre-exile writings, Nursi always remained very much attentive to 
the fate of Kurds as a distinct ethnicity.
1148
 It is true that Nursi’s concerns and anxieties were not 
limited to the fate of the Kurds. Nursi’s early writings, however, shed light on the overall context 
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This study has attempted to problematize a number of notions, chiefly the assumed 
unbridgeable gulf between religion and nationalism and the absence of nationalism in Muslim 
(and specifically in Kurdish and Turkish) communities before 1912.  Based on such assumptions, 
religious interpretations are stable, and nationalism is inherently secular. However, my attempt 
was to show that even the most celebrated religio-political concepts such as the caliphate could 
function as empty signifiers. A closer look at the caliphate concept alone is sufficient to 
demonstrate that Islam or (more precisely) Islamic interpretations cannot easily be explained in 
isolation from other human affairs and concerns. The caliphate, both as a concept and as an 
institution emerged and took shape in a contested political environment. Its form and shape thus 
reflected the nature of contemporary internal Muslim rivalries as much as their religious 
concerns. From the start, the caliphate carried both regional and communal labels. The value 
attached to blood lineage for occupying that office is notable. Blood lineage became a 
legitimizing tool that eased the accession of certain groups to power and barred others. It seems 
that blood lineages, ethnic or religious ties have always served as legitimizing tools for 
individuals and groups to claim power or the right to govern. This is the case even in today’s 
modern democracies. 
In the aftermath of the Prophet Mohammad’s death, Abu Bakr’s tribal lineage (Quraishi-
ness) was regarded as a qualification that other claimants to succession lacked. His very lineage 
was presented as a means to induce certain political rights, which automatically deprived non-





 Those groups that had another type of lineage, i.e.; direct blood ties with 
Prophet Muhammad were deemed charismatic—in the Weberian sense of the term. 1150 The most 
fundamental issue to be noted is the fact of how, through accommodating blood lineage, 
contemporaneous social relations were reproduced in the interpretations of religion and affected 
both juridical and institutional forms of power. This is despite the fact that the Qur’an (as the 
primary source of the law) regarded piety (taqwa) as the single criterion for nobility 
(karamah).
1151
 Yet the supremacy of the privileged group and its exclusive right to govern was to 
be reinforced and constituted a juridical precedent even for the Arab claimants of khilafa in the 
age of nationalism. Shi‘i, Sunni, and Khariji versions of Islam were molded by the debate over 
political legitimacy and related power relations. The debate over the caliphate and the institution 
itself was the product of these political and communal disputes and continued to carry marks of 
the power struggle until the end of the Ottoman caliphate. This points to the conspicuous impact 
of local cultures on a given religious interpretation. The issue of the ethnicity of the caliph 
becomes particularly significant as religious interpretations in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century 
visibly reflect the prevalence of the impact of the ideal of nationalism.   
Until the 16
th
 century no non-Arab caliphate had a chance to emerge. There was at least 
one case of a non-Quraishi caliphate, the Fatimids in Egypt, but they were ethnically Arabs. The 
16
th- 
century Ottoman conquest of Arab lands coincided with the transfer of power from one 
ethnic group to the other: Arabs to Ottoman Turks. This led some Muslims to question Ottoman 
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caliphal claims. Until then many Muslim groups had opposed Quraishi-ness as a condition for 
the caliphate. With the demise of the Arab caliphate the dominant group, i.e., the Ottomans or the 
state itself, began to question the exclusive right of the Quraishis to the caliphate. Thus, the 
transformation of power changed some aspects of the debate over caliphate. Now it was up to an 
Ottoman grand vizier to defend the legitimacy of non-Quraish or non-Arab rule. In the new era, 
Arab-ness, or more precisely, the restriction of caliphal rule to the Quraishis’ was going to be 
revitalized by the governed.  
Lütfi Pasha, an Ottoman grand vizier, maintained that the caliphal quality and legitimacy 
of his rule should not be tied to his blood lineage. Instead, he claimed, the legitimacy of a ruler 
had to be based on the ability to establish order wherein the community of the faithful would be 
able to carry on with their religious duties in peace. In other words, the very establishment of 
order in and of itself would engender the legitimacy of any rule. Lütfi Pasha insisted that such an 
act alone amounted to serving Islam. According to him, it was only through creating such an 
order that the community could meet the requirements of the religion and this constituted 
sufficient cause for the ruler to be recognized as the sultan, the caliph, the imam, or the imam of 
all imams.  This line of argument in defense of Ottoman caliphal legitimacy was revitalized by 
Hamidian rule as it faced both foreign pressure and internal ethnic and nationalist challenges. 
In the history of Muslim political thought, there is a conspicuous and continuous change 
in the interpretation of concepts such as the caliphate, which testifies to the socio-political 
influence of the context. Similarly, religious interpretations also continue to bear the impact of 
their context in the age of nationalism. Regional calims to the caliphate in the era of nationalsim 
testify to the influence of Islamic reinterpretations as religious actors adopted the nation state as 
the ideal type of governance. The fact that religious interpretation took place within the 
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nationalist paradigm should also problematize the general attitude in excluding the presence of 
religious factors in modern nationalist thought. Hence, approaching religion and nationalism as 
perpetually opposed binaries appears simplistic.   
Conversely, the outright denial of nationalism in religious discourses is also an equally 
simplistic approach to both Islam and nationalism. Thus, the thesis of the latency of nationalism 
in Ottoman domains is unpersuasive. It holds that unlike other imperial subjects, the 19
th
-century 
Ottoman Muslim polity remained unaffected by the growing nationalist discourse, mainly due to 
its Islamic identity. Like its neighboring empires, the Ottoman state, as many Ottoman scholars 
have argued, adopted the ongoing centralization policies in Europe. It also strove to modernize 
its army and bureaucratic system, and aimed at the destruction of all grounds for ethnic and 
religious challenges, which could not take place in a vacuum.  
In addition to the measures listed above, in the early 19
th
 century, in the hopes of offering 
a unified official interpretation of Islam, the Ottoman state moved to further incorporate the 
religious establishment into the state. Furthermore, in the last quarter of the century, the Ottoman 
state declared Turkish the official language and increasingly attempted to Turkify the language of 
its educational and bureaucratic system. Concurrently, it criminalized the cultural and linguistic 
activities of Albanian, Kurdish and other communities. Interestingly enough the Turkification 
efforts by the Hamidian state coincided with its increased focus on the religious outlook of the 
state. In its attempt to universalize (ta‘mim) the Turkish language, the Hamidian regime adopted 
even stricter policies than the Hapsburg Empire, for instance, in its attempt to universalize 
German. 
Immediately after the 1878 Ottoman defeat and the resultant reduction in its non-Muslim 
population, the Hamidian regime chose the slogan of serving Islam as the sole legitimizing 
296 
 
means for the state’s practice. What is known as Hamidian Pan-Islamism signified changes in the 
modality of adaptation of modernist reforms along with a stronger emphasis on the Islamic-ness 
of state-sanctioned identity. These changes should not be viewed as the state’s indifference 
toward Ottoman official nationalism; rather, they coincided with the intensification of official 
nationalism. The Muslim world was facing two phenomena: colonialism and the emergence of 
nationalism. Emphasizing the Islamic identity of the Ottoman state was partly a strategy to deal 
with both of these threats to the Ottoman/Turkish establishment. The reassertion of Islamic 
identity was to bring about obedience at home and some sort of universal Muslim unity against 
the colonial powers. Thus, both in its Ottoman context and beyond, as Khalid rightly argues, 
“pan-Islamism was a complex phenomenon whose various dimensions need to be understood 
separately. Once we do that, we find a variegated phenomenon more akin to nationalism...”1152  
Foreign threats and local nationalism created a dilemma that induced a sense of double 
loyalty for many Muslims. In many instances, Muslims showed some sort of sympathy toward 
the Ottomans against the colonial powers. This, however, could not eclipse diverse Muslim 
communities’ sense of ethnic and national belonging. Of course, even the term ‘double loyalty’ 
should be taken with a grain of salt. Different Muslim groups’ perception of the Ottoman state, as 
in the Kurdish case, did not stay the same over the course of half a century—from Abdülhamid’s 
accession to power to the abolishment of the caliphate. Moreover, there were moments of 
difference in the “public and hidden transcripts”1153 of leading Muslim figures and groups.   
 Without trying to write an extensive history of the caliphate, my aim is to demonstrate 
that Islamic concepts neither carried immutable meaning throughout history nor remained 
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unaffected by their socio-political contexts. Nor did attempts to render them stable—especially in 
the scholarship on Kurdish religio-political movements—have much of a base in reality. What 
needs to be pointed out is that Islam came to be understood in exclusionary and differential terms 
by both Ottoman elite and statesmen and people like Sheikh Ubeydullah. Therefore, if we do not 
attend to the ethno-nationalistic tendencies present in modern Islamic interpretations, the 
diversity in Muslim political thought cannot be explained. This diversity is exemplified by the 
religious binaries through which Sheikh Ubeydullah describes the Kurds in general as qowm-e 




By the end of the 19
th
 century different ethnic groups increasingly saw Islam through 
their own ethno-nationalistic prisms. Of course, rapid political changes and the overall volatility 
of the Muslim world affected the political loyalties of Muslim communities. There is no denying 
that the Islamic faith remained a fundamental factor affecting Muslim political action in general. 
However, there was variety of other factors affecting the political stances of Muslim groups. 
Sometimes Islamic faith, in the face of non-Muslim and colonial presence, as in Sheikh 
Ubeydullah’s case, engendered the complicated issue of double loyalties. Kurdish politics, even 
after Sheikh Ubeydullah’s revolt, reflected this complexity. There were several factors that made 
the Kurdish relationship with both the Great Powers and the Ottoman state still more 
complicated. Unlike that of other Muslims, the Kurdish relationship with the Ottomans was very 
complex, having as much to do with their common history as their common religious faith. In the 
post-Armenian genocide era, the Kurds lived in complete despair and anxiety. They were 
frightened by the prospect of an Armenian return and possible British retribution for their 
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involvement in the 1915 genocide. They had also sustained hundreds of thousands of losses at 
the hands of joint Armenian and Russian forces during WWI.
 1155
 British documents shed light 
on their enormous fear that left them between the rock of Turkish nationalism and the hard place 




To add to this complexity, some of the Kurdish leaders did not hesitate to express their 
fear of facing the Armenian fate at the hands of Turkish nationalists.
1157
 A statement by Sheikh 
Said, who was accused of attempts to revive Ottoman caliphate, reveals the ethno-nationalism in 
that era’s Muslim thought. Sheikh Said declared that the entire Ottoman caliphate was a symbol 
of “Turkish cunning and deception.”1158 This shows clearly that the Kurdish Islam, granted there 
was only one, was no exception to the general rule of carring the makrs of its socio-political 
context. 
The idea of universal Muslim obedience to the caliphate, frequently shown as a sign of 
the lack of nationalism among Muslims in earlier periods, is at best a myth. It is, to a great 
degree, an Orientalist as well as a Kemalist construct. Among the late Ottoman Sultans, 
Abdülhamid II enjoyed the greatest public religious persona. Those who succeeded him were 
hardly known to the common people of the Empire. This is because the Caliphate generally 
remained a ceremonial office in the post-Hamidian era, especially during the CUP reign. From 
the rise of Mustafa Kemal until its abolishment, the Caliphate increasingly grew weaker. The role 
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of the successors of Abdülhamid was mostly a nominal one. However, even Abdülhamid, the 
best known and the most popular among the later Caliphs, was not adored. If some of the 
Kurdish leaders or scholars from afar had any respect for Abdülhamid, one trip to Istanbul would 
have sufficed for their disillusionment with his Caliphate. A great example of such cases is the 
famous Kurdish poet, Sheikh Riza Talabani (1842-1909) from Suleimaniye. Talabani penned a 
poem after visiting Istanbul that best summarizes this discussion: 
 
Kâsh ke roozi be maydân-e homâyuni rah-dahadam  
Tâ Abdülhamid Khân ra beguyam; ey hamirul mu’min 
Be‘sat-e to dar khelâf-e be‘sat-e peyghambar ast 
Anta mâ ’ursilta illa zahmatan lil‘âlamin1159 
 
I wish, one day he allowed my entry into the imperial square 
To call Abdülhamid Khan, O! Jackass of the faithful, 
You’re sent for a purpose opposite to that of the Prophet, 
You’re not being sent except as a trouble for the world 
 
After hearing this poem, the Minister of Pious Foundations (awqaf) summoned Talabani and 
questioned him if he had written a poem with such content. Knowing the harsh consequences, 
Talabani changed a few words in his poem and read it to the Minister as: 
 
Kâsh ke roozi be maydân-e homâyuni raham dahand 
Tâ Abdülhamid Khân ra beguyam; ey amirul mu’min 
Be‘sat-e to dar vefâq-e be‘sat-e peyghambar ast 
Anta mâ ’ursilta illa rahmatan lil‘âlamin1160 
 
I wish, one day he allowed my entry into the imperial square 
To call Abdülhamid Khan, O! Commander of the faithful, 
You’re sent for a purpose harmonious with that of the Prophet, 
You’re not being sent except as a mercy to the world
1161
  
As shown earlier, even the Kemalists acknowledged that the ‘ulama of Kurdistan never 
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considered that of the Ottomans’ as ‘a true caliphate.’  
 The aim here is to reassert that Islam did not create a unified political collectivity as 
Islam has historically been understood differently in different socio-political contexts. Islam, 
even within specific religious denomination such as Sunnis and Shi‘is, has never produced a 
universally accepted Islamic interpretation. 
 In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, the Ottoman state propagated its Islam among the 
Sunnis to obfuscate the Islam of Others. At the same time, Arab and Kurdish elites each defended 
the superiority of their own Islamic understanding and practices. In the modern era, as shown 
above, usually different Muslim communities tied ‘the superiority’ of their Islam to their 
ethnicity. At the same time, such claims were used as the basis for the legitimacy of certain 
collective political demands. These types of exclusionary Islamic interpretations helped 
communities like the Kurds to either downplay their religious bond with the ethnic Other or 
made the religious and ethnic boundaries coterminous. Such interpretations of Islam are modern 
and at the same time nationalistic. In the premodern era, claims to ethnic and religious 
superiority neither could induce collective political demands or will to the self-rule nor could 
grant any legitimacy to such demands. This is precisely where exclusionary interpretations of 
Islam intersect with modern nationalism or become testaments to the fusion of the two. As 
repeatedly stated, neither nationalism nor religion(s) can be studied in isolation. Religions, 
whatever their origins may be, are conducive to interpretations. Any interpretation of any 
religion is human endeavor that is affected by its context. As shown earlier, despite elements of 
continuity, generally modern interpretations of Islam carry a paradigmatic emblem of 
nationalism. Rethinking and reinterpretations of Islam are not homogeneous as they bear the 
mark of their interaction with specific socio-historical contexts. Hence, Islamic religious thought 
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affected by its entanglements and its reciprocal relation with nationalism. Such a situation in and 
of itself provides the room for the continuity of Islamic religious thought and its fusion with 
nationalism.  
As was shown earlier, conceiving of nationalism as a modern convention, in its Austinan 
sense, helps us grasp the malleability of nationalism and the possibility of it fusion with religious 
thought. If we are able to expand the idea of convention—as illustrated in the case of Sheikh 
Ubeydullah—we are able to make a better sense of some religio-nationalist utterances in the 
modern Muslim history. This is the case since if nationalism is a convention according to which 
an ‘imagined community’ has the right to make ‘the national and the political coterminous,’ then 
any utterance to this effect is nationalistic. Theoretically, in such a convention a given communal 
self-referentiality constitutes the ground for the legitimacy of claims to self-rule. Hence, any 
utterance, religious or otherwise, that ties collective right to the communal self-referentiality is 
modern, nationalistic and locatable within the paradigm of nationalism. Therefore it is also 
justified to claim, as this study does, that there existed competing Muslim nationalisms long 
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